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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses two major outcomes of work in the Egyptian labour market, namely 
wages and job satisfaction. We examine the labour’s selection into the formal sector and 
the differences between wage determination in the formal and informal sectors of 
employment. Additionally, we assess the impact of labour productivity on wages, and we 
inspect the determinants of job satisfaction, focusing on the contribution of higher wages. 
We utilise data from the 2012 round of the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 
to examine these issues in Egypt’s private sector and address two methodological issues, 
sample selection and endogeneity biases.  
 
In addressing the differences between the formal and informal sectors, we find that sector 
selection is only significant for formal sector wages. Also, we find significant differences 
between the impact of the wage determinants in each sector in terms of returns to 
education, gender differentials, and occupational differentials, among others, whether for 
the complete sample of labour or the male labour sample separately. Once refocusing the 
analysis on the contribution of productivity to wages, which we proxy for using a health 
measure since individual labour productivity is unobservable, we find that selection into 
participation in the labour force is only significant for the male labour sample. Conversely, 
we find that health has a significant and positive impact on wage levels of the complete 
and the male labour samples, which is particularly evident after correcting for the 
endogeneity of health. Finally, we find that higher wages contribute significantly and 
positively to alleviating levels of all types of job satisfaction for the complete and male 
labour samples. Furthermore, the impact of higher wages on satisfaction levels is of a 
bigger magnitude for the male labour sample compared to the complete labour sample.  
 
In summary, this research contributes to the Egyptian and developing countries’ literature 
on labour market outcomes. We used relatively new data that is nationally representative 
and enables us to study a range of topics, and we addressed the methodological issues of 
sample selection and endogeneity to obtain unbiased and consistent results.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction and Outline of Thesis 
 
1.1 Introductory Note 
Egypt belongs to the Arab world1, and particularly the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA)2 region. Also, the United Nations (UN) identifies it as a developing country and 
reported its 2014 Human Development Index (HDI), which has been increasing over the 
years but at a declining rate, at 0.69, ranking Egypt in the 108th place among 190 countries 
(United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015). Similarly, the World Bank 
(WB) identifies Egypt as a ‘lower middle income’3 country (World Bank [WB], 2016a), 
and the latest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita figure ranks Egypt in the 125th 
place among the world economies (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2016). 
Furthermore, Egypt’s GDP and GDP per capita growth rates went down from 7.1% and 
5.3%, respectively, in 2007 to 4.2% and 2.0% in 2015 (World Bank [WB], 2016b). Worse 
still, GDP per capita in 2011 and 2013 experienced growth rates of -0.3% and -0.2%, 
respectively (WB, 2016b). In addition, 28% of the Egyptian population were reported as 
living under the poverty line in 2015 (WB, 2016a).  
 
Of more relevance to this thesis and similar to many developing countries, Egypt is often 
described as suffering from numerous labour market inefficiencies, such as low wages, 
productivity, and female participation rates, high unemployment and informality, as well 
as difficulty in job creation (Kandil, 2012; Radwan, 2002; El-Megharbel, 2007; Fawzy, 
2002). All of these challenges have negatively impacted the Egyptian population’s labour 
market outcomes and well being as well as posed numerous obstacles to the stability, 
development, and growth of the economy. Accordingly, the Egyptian labour market has 
                                                        
1 Includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015).  
2 Includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank 
and Gaza, and Yemen (World Bank [WB], 2016b).  
3 Includes: Armenia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Kiribati, Kosovo, Kyrgyz, Lao, Lesotho, Mauritania, Micronesia, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, 
Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, and Zambia (WB, 2016b).  
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attracted a considerable amount of attention, as evidenced by the abundance of literature 
addressing the various issues that characterise this market. Despite this abundance of 
literature and the numerous structural reforms applied in the two decades before the 2011 
revolution, Assaad and Krafft (2013b) argued that the state of the labour market in early 
2012 was much worse than in 2006 based on the recorded decline in employment and 
female labour force participation rates as well as the slight increase in unemployment and 
the rather significant increase in under-employment. This implies that the requirement for 
appropriate and effective labour market reforms has become even more substantial 
(Abdelgouad, 2014; Subrahmanyam & Castel, 2014). It is worth noting that the Egyptian 
government devised a medium-term plan in 2015 to address some of the main economic 
challenges, including some of the labour market inefficiencies, which were particularly 
highlighted by the 2011 revolution and its demands. 
 
Still, economic issues in Egypt extend far beyond the labour market inefficiencies, and 
these equally affect the labour market and the population’s well being. For instance, 
Egypt’s high inflation rates have raised many concerns over the years, where inflation rates 
exceeded 10% in 2007, reaching as high as 19.5% in 2012 (WB, 2016b). Although rates 
declined to 9-11.5% between 2013 and 2015 (WB, 2016b), inflation is still an issue that 
attracts a lot of attention, especially given the low wage levels. In addition, Egypt has 
faced problems in currency markets, with the country running low on its foreign currency 
reserves in 2016, and the US dollar trading at a 75% premium to the official rates on the 
black market (Sfakianakis, 2016). This was followed by a devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound (EGP) by 50%, after the EGP was allowed to float in late 2016 (Holodny, 2016). 
Inequality is another significant issue in Egypt, with Egypt’s Gini coefficient estimated in 
2014 at 30.8 and the quintile ratio4 at 4.4 (UNDP, 2015). Furthermore, Egypt’s 2014 
Gender Inequality Index (GII)5 of 0.573 (UNDP, 2015) was below the Arab and ‘medium 
development’6 countries’ averages and ranks Egypt in the 131st place among the world. 
                                                        
4 The quintile ratio represents the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% in the 
country to that of the poorest 20% (UNDP, 2015). 
5 The GII accounts for gender differentials regarding maternal mortality rate, adolescent 
birth rate, the share of seats in parliament, population with at least a secondary education, 
and labour force participation rates (UNDP, 2015).  
6 Includes: Botswana, Moldova, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Gabon, Indonesia, Paraguay, 
Palestine, Uzbekistan, Philippines, El Salvador, South Africa, Vietnam, Bolivia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Cabo Verde, Micronesia, Guyana, Nicaragua, Morocco, Namibia, 
Guatemala, Tajikistan, India, Honduras, Bhutan, Timor-Leste, Syria, Vanuatu, Congo, 
Kiribati, Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, Ghana, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Sao Tome and Principe (UNDP, 2015).  
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1.2 Main Objectives 
Decent wage levels are a crucial aspect of labour markets. Individuals work primarily to 
earn income that would allow them to support themselves and their dependents. In Egypt’s 
context, low wages have become especially problematic as evidenced by the consistent 
deterioration of the population’s standard of living, the demands of the 2011 revolution, 
and the increased discussions of minimum wages that particularly followed the revolution 
(Kandil & Helmy, 2012). Furthermore, Morsy et al. (2015) explained that the share of 
wages in GDP declined over the years, worsening further the state of the Egyptian labour. 
 
Labour productivity is also central in these discussions, and boosting labour productivity 
levels is fundamental in all economies. Higher labour productivity may increase workers’ 
wages as well as reduce employers’ costs and increase their profits. On a more aggregate 
level, higher productivity is essential for economic growth. In Egypt, the concentration of 
labour in low-productivity industries has intensified Egypt’s slow rate of growth of labour 
productivity (Morsy et al., 2015), leading to numerous economic problems, such as weak 
economic competitiveness (El-Araby, 2009).  
 
In addition, and similar to various developing economies, the Egyptian labour market is 
segmented into a formal sector, which includes jobs that promote job security and are 
usually associated with higher pay, and an informal sector, involving poorly regulated and 
poorly paid jobs. Gatti (2011) explained that individuals tend to turn to the low-pay/low-
productivity informal jobs to escape unemployment, and that informal employment has 
been the driving force behind job creation in Egypt in most recent years. In fact, Egypt’s 
informal employment was estimated at 51.2% of employed labour in 2009 (International 
Labour Organisation [ILO], 2015) and is considered the main refuge for unemployed 
individuals (El-Megharbel, 2007), although some individuals are eventually able to move 
from informal to formal employment.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis, focusing on the private sector, addresses two labour market 
outcomes related to labour productivity in Egypt, which are wages and job satisfaction. In 
chapter IV, we investigate the determinants of an individual’s selection into the formal 
sector and the differences between the wage determinants’ impact on the formal and 
informal wages. In chapter V, we are concerned with the extent to which labour 
productivity, which we proxy for using health, determines wages. Finally, in chapter VI, 
we examine the factors that influence job satisfaction, focusing on the role of wages.  
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1.3 Significance and Motivation 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we address the 
Egyptian labour market that is relatively larger than that of similar developing countries 
and has faced numerous obstacles over the years, which hindered the country’s process of 
economic development (Springsborg, 2017). In particular, job creation and unemployment 
have long been significant problems in Egypt (Fawzy, 2002; El-Agrody et al., 2010; 
Hassan & Sassanpour, 2008), and labour productivity has remained low even when 
economic growth has been high (Morsy et al., 2015). It has often been argued that there is 
a fundamental mismatch between education levels of the labour force and the needs of the 
labour market (Galal, 2002). In addition, the country has not been able to generate 
sufficient investment in labour-intensive sectors (Fawzy, 2002; El-Agrody et al., 2010). In 
this context, El-Megharbel (2007) had highlighted how policies applied in Egypt in the 
past, while successful at first, had failed to sustain their long-term contribution to the 
improvement of Egypt’s economic performance. It is also likely that the deficiency of 
effective systems of follow-through and updating the policies to coordinate with the 
changing economic environment of Egypt may have contributed to the failure of policies 
on the long run.  
 
Second, our analysis makes methodological contributions to the literature. Throughout the 
thesis, we have attempted to correct for two possible biases simultaneously, including 
sample selection and endogeneity. Sample selection may arise in wage determination 
estimations, as we do not observe the wages of individuals out of work. If unemployment 
is purely random, this would not be a problem, however, this is unlikely to be the case. In 
fact, unobservable factors, such as ability, which influence selection into the labour force 
may also affect the wages individuals receive. Consequently, our estimates would be 
biased if we were to ignore this sample selection. Endogeneity on the other hand, arises 
technically since the error terms of our main equation of interest may be independent of 
some of our explanatory variables, which could arise because of reverse causality or 
omitted variables. One example of this reverse causality that we address in this thesis is 
with regards to the effect of health on wages. Better health is likely to improve workers’ 
performance, and hence earn more. Still, individuals who earn more are likely to be 
capable of maintaining better states of health. Thus, both variables simultaneously affect 
one another, and ignoring this interrelationship may bias our estimates.   
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Given the range of models we estimate, including linear as well as non-linear models, 
correcting for endogeneity is not always straightforward. Furthermore, simultaneously 
addressing sample selection adds to the challenge of obtaining reliable estimates. We use a 
range of methods that utilise multi-equation simultaneous systems to address both issues, 
including Two-Stage Least Squares and Maximum Likelihood Estimations. One of the 
main challenges with multi-equation models is finding accurate identifiers for each 
equation, which should be significantly correlated with the variables they are identifying, 
but not related to the dependent variables of interest. In this thesis, we utilise 
unemployment rates stratified by educational attainment levels, which we will hereafter 
refer to as ‘educational unemployment’, to identify selection in the various chapters. 
Additionally, we instrument health in wage determination by incidences of dead siblings 
and work injuries as well as mothers’ employment status when respondent was 15 years 
old (see chapter V), and we instrument wages in the estimation of job satisfaction by the 
private sector’s average weekly wages stratified by gender and industry, as well as 
occupations, tenure, and tenure squared (see chapter VI).  
 
On a final note, we address the Egyptian labour market at a significant period of transition, 
which followed the 2011 revolution (International Monetary Fund, 2014; Ghanem, 2014; 
Springborg, 2017), utilising the most recent nationally representative data available. We 
aim to provide accurate casual estimates of the determinants of labour market outcomes in 
Egypt, and our findings should help inform labour market policies in Egypt.  
 
 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis comprises six chapters besides the introduction chapter herein. Chapter II 
provides a review of the main characteristics of the Egyptian labour market and some of its 
central issues. In this context, we review some significant statistical data covering the 
labour force, employment, unemployment, and wages, and we link these statistics to the 
literature’s findings and conclusions. Also, we briefly review some of Egypt’s recent 
economic reforms and highlight their relevance to the labour market.  
 
As this thesis addresses Egypt’s labour market through an empirical approach, secondary 
data is used, which is examined in chapter III. We begin by introducing the main dataset 
utilised in our analyses, the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), along with any 
other sources of data used. Thereafter, we illustrate the structure of the specific sample of 
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interest that is extracted from the 2012 round of the ELMPS and constitutes the private 
sector workers. In addition, we review the descriptive statistics of the principle variables 
utilised in our analyses.  
 
The next three chapters represent the central ones of this thesis. Chapter IV addresses the 
differences between formal and informal labour in Egypt. Specifically, we inspect factors 
that affect the probability of selection into formal employment. In addition, we examine 
the differences between the various determinants of wages in each sector of employment, 
and we address and correct for the selection bias likely to prevail due to the proportion of 
the sample whose wages are unobservable in the estimation of the sectoral wage equations. 
Since the female sample is a very small one, the results for the complete labour sample’s 
models and those of the male labour sample are not very different. Conversely, there are 
numerous significant differences between the formal and informal sectors’ wage 
determination. Our findings show that the impact of age, tenure, parent’s education, 
educational attainment levels, occupations, job stability, and size of firm all affect wages 
differently in each sector of employment. Still, we confirm the value of education in 
increasing the probability of formal sector employment as well as wages in both sectors of 
employment, although men’s returns to education are lower than those of the complete 
labour sample. On a final note, we surprisingly find that unemployment is insignificant for 
sector selection in Egypt. 
 
Chapter V focuses on the impact of labour productivity on wages in Egypt, and we use a 
measure of health to proxy for the unobserved individual labour productivity levels. This 
choice of proxy rests on the assumption that individuals who experience better health are 
likely to work harder and increase their productivity (Grossman, 1972; Grossman & 
Benham, 1974; Luft, 1975; Berkowitz et al., 1983; Bloom & Canning, 2000). In this 
chapter, we address reverse causality as well as sample selection. Particularly, we expect 
better health to increase productivity, and hence wages received, but also higher wages 
may allow individuals to maintain better health states. Consequently, health may be 
endogenous to wages, and thus we instrument health by factors that are likely to affect 
health, but not wages. Also, we correct for sample selection, which is likely to result from 
the unaccounted sample whose health states may be severely bad that they opt out of the 
labour force completely, and thus their wages are unobservable. After correcting for both 
biases, we find that participation into the labour force imposes a selection bias to the wage 
estimates of men, but not those of the complete labour sample. More importantly, we find 
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that health, and thus productivity, has a significant and positive impact on private sector 
wages of both samples. Relative to our other control factors, the reported coefficient of 
health is quite high for the complete labour sample, and it is even higher for the male 
labour sample. This implies potential productivity increases by improving the health of 
individuals in Egypt, which would in turn improve the individuals’ wages.  
 
The final analytical chapter, chapter VI, focuses on job satisfaction, which is another 
significant outcome of work. We address the impact of various labour characteristics on 
job satisfaction in Egypt, and particularly focus on the contribution of wages. Note that we 
address two measures of job satisfaction, the ‘overall job satisfaction’ and the ‘components 
of job satisfaction’. The former determines individuals’ satisfaction levels with their 
overall job, while the latter determines individuals’ satisfaction levels with specific job 
aspects, including job security, type of work, working hours, working schedule, working 
conditions, commuting to work, and matching between qualifications and job. Again, we 
address reverse causality as well as sample selection in this chapter. Reverse causality, 
which results in the endogeneity of wages in job satisfaction estimations, is likely to arise 
due to higher wages enhancing workers’ job satisfaction, whilst satisfied workers are 
expected to work harder and enhance their productivity, which should feed back into 
wages earned. Additionally, we expect our results to suffer from a sample selection bias 
due to the unaccounted proportion of the sample, which may opt out of the labour force 
completely due to being extremely dissatisfied with the labour market conditions. Our 
findings again confirm a sample selection bias only for the male labour sample’s models. 
Furthermore, they confirm that overlooking endogeneity imposes a downward bias to the 
estimations. Particularly, we find that all methods report the significance of wages for both 
job satisfaction measures addressed, whether for the complete labour sample or the male 
labour sample. Yet, the coefficients are much larger after correcting for the endogeneity of 
wages. Also, the male labour sample’s wage coefficients are bigger than the complete 
labour sample’s coefficients, which is plausible since men in the Egyptian context are 
usually the main providers and financial supporters of their households, thus they are likely 
to place more emphasis on their wages. Generally, our findings substantiate the value of 
wages to Egyptian labour, and the potentiality of improving labour market outcomes by 
dealing with issues of low wages.  
 
Finally, chapter VII concludes the thesis by summarising the objectives and main findings 
of our research.   
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Chapter II 
The Egyptian Labour Market: A Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the general framework of the Egyptian labour 
market by highlighting some of its main elements. In order to do this, we review some of 
Egypt’s statistical labour data, trace trends over time, and compare Egypt to a range of 
other countries. In addition, we draw links and connections between the statistics and some 
of Egypt’s labour market literature’s findings. While chapters IV, V, and VI of this thesis 
rely on individual-level labour market data from the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS), we concentrate on broad macro patterns in this chapter. Therefore, we use data 
from a range of macroeconomic sources, including the ‘Statistical Year Book’ and the 
‘Egypt in Figures’ publications of the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics (CAPMAS), the World Bank’s (WB) data bank, and the United Nations 
Development Program’s (UNDP) 2014 Human Development Report.  
 
This chapter will proceed with sections (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) that respectively review 
labour force, employment, and unemployment data, and highlight Egypt’s major labour 
market issues with respect to these factors. Thereafter, section (2.5) provides a review of 
wage data and wage determination in Egypt, which brings forward the historical role of the 
public sector and the ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ in shaping the Egyptian labour 
market. Finally, section (2.6) highlights some of the major economic reforms applied in 
Egypt and their relation to the labour market, while section (2.7) concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2.2 The Labour Force  
CAPMAS, representing the main Egyptian governmental institution responsible for the 
major data collection efforts, identifies the labour force as, “All individuals which their 
ages range from 15 years old (the minimum age of employment according to the Egyptian 
labour law) to 65 years old (the retirement age) whether they are actually taking part by 
their physical or mental efforts in an activity related to the production of commodities and 
services” (Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics [CAPMAS], 2016a).  
 
In 2015, Egypt’s labour force was ranked the 20th biggest in the world (CIA, 2016). 
CAPMAS estimated the labour force at 28.4308 million in 2015, constituting 32.22% of 
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the population (CAPMAS, 2016a). Also, Egypt’s labour force has increased annually by 2-
3% between 2008 and 2014 (see table 2.1). This growth has owed more to the growth in 
the male labour force rather than the female labour force (see figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1: Total/Male/Female Labour Force (Unit: ’00), 2004-2015 Estimates:  
 
Source: based on data extracted from Egypt’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2016a) 
 
Egypt’s labour force in 2014 was 20.58% of MENA’s labour force (WB, 2016b), 
highlighting the significant factor of production available to Egypt compared to other 
similar economies. Also, Egypt’s labour force growth rates between 2008 and 2014 have 
mostly followed the same trends as the MENA region’s averages, though were slightly 
lower (see table 2.1, columns 1 and 2). Conversely, Egypt’s figures exceeded the more 
variable averages of ‘lower middle income’ countries (see table 2.1, columns 1 and 3).  
 
Table 2.1: Labour Force Growth Rates (%) – Egypt vs. MENA and Lower Middle 
Income Countries, 2008-2014 Estimates: 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Year Egypt MENA Lower Middle Income 
2008 2.8 2.2 2.0 
2009 2.5 3.0 2.1 
2010 2.6 3.1 1.4 
2011 2.5 2.8 1.6 
2012 2.2 2.8 1.2 
2013 1.9 2.7 1.3 
2014 2.2 2.3 1.3 
Source: WB (2016b) 
 
2.2.1 Age Structure of the Labour Force 
The Egyptian population is quite large and is continuously growing. Given the 
youthfulness of the population in 2016 (see table 2.2), it is not surprising that Egypt’s high 
dependency ratio of 61.8% in 2016, owed largely to the youth dependency ratio of 52.6% 
0
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(CIA, 2016). The 2016 population statistics (see table 2.2, column 1) show that 31% of the 
population were in the 0-14 age group, and approximately 20% of the population were in 
the 15-24 age group, which are considered in their early stages in the labour market. 
Analysing a similar population composition at the beginning of the 2000s, Assaad (2007) 
argued that it had created a pressure on job creation, though this pressure had eased off as 
the youth bulge made its way into the labour market. Assaad and Krafft (2013b) see a 
return of this pattern in the 2012 ELMPS data. This emphasises the importance of 
addressing youth labour, since they represent a large proportion of the population, an 
important factor of production, and are likely to be dynamic and risk-taking.   
 
Table 2.2: Total/Male/Female Population7 and Sex Ratios8 - by Age, 2016 Estimates:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age Group % Of Population Total Male Female Sex Ratio 
0-14 31.3 28,455 14,724.4 13,731.2 107.2 
15-24 19.9 18,159 9,299 8,859.2 105 
25-35 17.4 15,864 8,057.6 7,806.4 103.2 
35-49 16.6 15,068 7,609.1 7,459.2 102 
50-64 10.5 9,564 4,793 4,770.9 100.5 
65+ 4.3 3,913 1,930.9 1,982.1 97.4 
Total 100.00 91,023 46,414 44,609 104 
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics [CAPMAS] (2016b) 
 
More specific to Egypt’s labour force estimates of 2013 (WB, 2016b), data shows that 
almost half of the population above 15 years old participated in the labour market. 
Conversely, only 34.5% of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 had participated 
in the labour market.  
 
2.2.2 Gender Differentials  
In terms of gender differentials, the WB estimated that women were only 23.1% of the 
total labour force in 2016, which has been roughly consistent since early 2000s (WB, 
2016b). Relative to similar economies, this figure is only marginally higher than MENA’s 
average of 21.1% but significantly lower than the ‘lower middle income’ countries’ 
average of 32% (WB, 2016b).  
 
Gender distributions of the labour force further illustrate the significant difference between 
the male and female labour force participation rates (see table 2.3). Specifically, the 
                                                        
7 Unit: ’000. 
8 Sex ratio calculated as males per 100 females. 
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participation rate of the 15+ years old male labour force was almost three times that of 
females. Similarly, almost half of the male population between ages 15-24 participated in 
the labour market as opposed to only 18% of the female population in the same age group 
(for a discussion of these patterns, see Assaad, 2007; Assaad & Krafft, 2013b). In this 
context, Assaad (2007) had highlighted that the low level of female participation in the 
labour market was a by-product of the decline in the women’s preferred public sector 
employment. More recently, Assaad and Krafft (2013b) had added that a massive decline 
in the labour force participation rates of youth females has contributed to the reported low 
overall levels of female labour force participation.  
 
Table 2.3: Male/Female Labour Force Participation Rates – by Age, 2013 Estimates: 
Category Participation Rate (%) 
Age 15-24: 
Male (% of Male Population Ages 15-24) 
Female (% of Female Population Ages 15-24) 
 
48.2 
18.0 
Age 15+: 
Male (% of Male Population Ages 15+) 
Female (% of Female Population Ages 15+) 
 
73.4 
22.9 
Source: WB (2016b) 
 
2.2.3 Educational Distribution of the Labour Force  
Finally, we find that the highest labour force participation rates are among the individuals 
who have finished their secondary education followed by tertiary education (see table 2.4), 
where we report that 38% of the male labour force had secondary education and 16% had 
tertiary education in 2013, while the equivalent figures for women were 36% and 29%. A 
much smaller percentage (less than 6%) of the labour force had finished only primary level 
education. This verifies the often-cited association of education with labour activities in 
Egypt (Assaad, 1997).  
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Table 2.4: Total/Male/Female Labour Force Participation Rates – by Education, 2013 
Estimates: 
Category Participation Rate (%) 
Primary Education: 
Total (% of Total Labour Force) 
Male (% of Male Labour) 
Female (% of Female Labour) 
 
4.9 
5.8 
2.1 
Secondary Education: 
Total (% of Total Labour Force) 
Male (% of Male Labour) 
Female (% of Female Labour) 
 
37.5 
38.1 
35.6 
Tertiary Education: 
Total (% of Total Labour Force) 
Male (% of Male Labour) 
Female (% of Female Labour) 
 
18.7 
15.7 
28.6 
Source: WB (2016b) 
 
 
2.3 Employment Levels  
CAPMAS estimated that the majority of the labour force, approximately 25 million 
workers, was employed in 2015 (CAPMAS, 2016a). Employment levels (see figure 2.2) 
have experienced similar trends to that of the total labour force (see figure 2.1). Total 
employment was on the rise between the years 2004 and 2015, with a slight dip in 2011 
(see figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2: Total/Male/Female Employed Labour (Unit: ’00), 2004-2015 Estimates:  
 
Source: based on data extracted from Egypt’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2016a) 
 
 2.3.1 Gender and Age Distributions 
Similar to the gender differentials of the labour force, male labour employment levels, 
which surpassed that of females over the years, have been consistently increasing, except 
in 2011 (see figure 2.2). Conversely, female employment rose sharply in 2007 and has 
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grown hardly at all since then (see figure 2.2). The general drop in figures in 2011 may 
owe to the political instabilities during that year.    
 
Employment to population ratios stratified by gender further illustrates the low 
employment levels of women compared to men, which may have resulted in the previously 
discussed low female participation rates in Egypt. The WB estimated that employed 
women (15+ years old) were only 17.4% of the female population in 2013 as opposed to 
the employed men’s share of 66.2% of the male population in the same age bracket (WB, 
2016b). Similarly, employed women (15-24 years old) were only 8.6% of the female 
population in 2013, while employed men in the same age bracket constituted 34.3% of the 
male population (WB, 2016b).  
 
On a final note, the age distribution shows that employment levels are higher among the 
older individuals. While the total employed labour between 15 and 24 years old constituted 
22.7% of the Egyptian population in 2013, this figure was estimated at 42.1% of the total 
population for individuals older than 15 years old (WB, 2016b).  
 
 2.3.2 Distribution of Employment: Sector-Level 
In 2013, employment levels were highest in the services sector, whether in total or by 
gender (see figure 2.3). This distribution of employment with respect to the services sector 
matched the sectors’ value added distribution (see figure 2.4), where the highest value-
added was also contributed by the services sector. 
 
Figure 2.3: Total/Male/Female Employed Labour9 - by Sector, 2013 Estimates:  
 
Source: based on data extracted from the World Bank’s databank (WB, 2016b) 
 
                                                        
9 Percentage of total/male/female employed labour. 
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Conversely, total employment in the agricultural sector exceeded that of the industrial 
sector (see figure 2.3), contradicting the structure of value-added contributions (see figure 
2.4) and implying that labour productivity is lower in the agricultural sector than in the 
industrial one.  
 
Figure 2.4: Sectors’ Contributions to Value Added10, 2015 Estimates:  
 
Source: based on data extracted from the World Bank’s databank (WB, 2016b) 
 
 2.3.3 Distribution of Employment: Industry-Level 
CAPMAS’s data allows us to have a more disaggregated view of employment in terms of 
industries and gender (see table 2.5). While the manufacturing, construction, and whole 
and retail sectors employ approximately 3 million workers each, mining and quarrying, 
real estate, insurance and financial, and information and telecommunication industries are 
all significantly smaller, employing less than 400,000 workers each. Note that the largest 
number of workers is employed in the agricultural/hunting/forestry/cutting trees category 
(see table 2.5, column 1), highlighting the importance of this sector in the Egyptian 
context.  
 
In terms of gender differences, women constitute a much smaller proportion of 
employment in most industries (see table 2.5, column 3). The only exceptions are with 
respect to the health and social work as well as the education industries, in which women 
are 61% and 48% of the total labour employed, respectively. This is not surprising since 
these are traditionally seen as female intensive industries across the world.  
 
 
 
                                                        
10 Percentage of GDP. 
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Table 2.5: Total Employed Labour and Gender Distribution - by Industry, 2015 
Estimates: 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry Total11 Male 
% of 
Total 
Female 
% of 
Total 
A: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Cutting Trees 64,026 71.12 28.88 
B: Mining & Quarrying 388 96.13 3.87 
C: Manufactures 27,810 91.46 8.54 
D: Electric, Gas, Steam, Air Condition Supplies 2,039 93.92 6.08 
E: Water Support, Drain, Recycling 1,867 91.38 8.62 
F: Construction & Building 30,049 99.33 0.67 
G: Whole & Retail Sale Vehicles, Motorcycle Repair 29,355 84.92 15.08 
H: Transportation & Storage 19,027 98.35 1.65 
I: Food, Residence Services 6,476 96.22 3.78 
J: Information, Telecommunications 2,063 81.39 18.61 
K: Insurance & Financial Intermediation 1,596 76.13 23.87 
L: Real Estate, Renting 379 91.82 8.18 
M: Specialised Technical, Scientific Activities 4,085 82.96 17.04 
N: Administrative Activities & Support Services 1,864 87.77 12.23 
O: Public Administration, Defence, Social Solidarity 17,908 77.00 23.00 
P: Education 22,164 51.72 48.28 
Q: Health & Social Work 7,466 39.34 60.66 
R: Amusement & Creation & Arts Activities 1,154 81.98 18.02 
S: Other Services Activities 5,905 94.48 5.52 
T: Services of Home Service for Private Households 2,137 58.07 41.93 
U: International & Regional Agencies & Organisations 31 93.55 6.45 
Source: CAPMAS (2016a) 
 
 
2.4 Unemployment  
Unemployment has been a serious problem in the Egyptian labour market for a long period 
of time. Despite all the attention that numerous scholars and policy-makers have afforded 
this issue and the efforts expanded to deal with it over the years, high unemployment rates 
still persist in the Egyptian economy.  
 
We can see in figure 2.5 that unemployment rates in Egypt have generally increased in the 
first half of the 2010s. Assaad and Krafft (2013b) had verified that this increase in 
unemployment levels is evident regardless of the definition of unemployment used. In 
terms of gender, male unemployment rates declined until 2010, after which they increased 
                                                        
11 Unit: ’00. 
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to approximately 10%. Conversely, female unemployment rates remained above 10% 
except for four years, between 2006 and 2010, when they dipped slightly below 10%.  
 
Figure 2.5: Total/Male/Female Unemployment Rates, 2004-2015 Estimates: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from Egypt’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2016a) 
 
On another note, the UN estimated Egypt’s youth unemployment in 2014 at 34.3% of total 
youth labour force (UNDP, 2015). Thus, more than 1 in 3 in the 15-24 age group were 
unemployed, reflecting a significant waste of human capital in the Egyptian economy. 
Worse still, this figure is much higher than that of Arab and ‘medium development’ 
countries (see table 2.6). Still, Assaad and Krafft (2013b) mentioned that the slowing down 
of the growth of the youth population over the years had contributed to decreasing the 
pressure on the labour market as well as on youth labour supply and youth unemployment 
rates.  
 
Table 2.6: Youth12 Unemployment Rates – Egypt vs. Arab and Medium Development 
Countries, 2014 Estimates: 
Country Youth Unemployment (%) 
Egypt 34.3 
Arab Countries 29.0 
‘Medium Development’ Countries 15.1 
Source: UNDP (2015) 
 
Relative to MENA and ‘lower middle income countries’ (see table 2.7), Egypt reported 
above-average unemployment rates in 2013. Moreover, Egypt’s steadily-increasing 
unemployment rates after 2011 furthered the gap between Egypt’s rates and other 
countries’.  
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Table 2.7: Unemployment Rates (%)– Egypt vs. MENA and Lower Middle Income 
Countries, 2010-2013 Estimates: 
Year Egypt MENA Lower Middle Income 
2010 9.0 10.9 5.8 
2011 12.0 10.1 ………. 
2012 12.7 ………. 4.9 
2013 13.2 10.5 5.4 
Source: WB (2016b) 
 
Worse still, a significant proportion of Egypt’s labour has experienced long-term 
unemployment 13 . In 2013, 88.5% of total unemployed labour experienced long-term 
unemployment, which is only a minor reduction from 2012’s figure of 88.7% (WB, 2016b) 
and similar to figures reported before 2011. This is further exacerbating the status of the 
labour market and implies the hardships that unemployed workers may face.  
 
 2.4.1 Regional Unemployment 
Inspecting unemployment in a more disaggregated form, we find that regional 
unemployment 14  rates, stratified by the Egyptian governorates, have experienced 
significant variation over the first half of the 2010s (see table 2.8). Expectedly, 
unemployment rates in most areas rose sharply in 2011 (see table 2.8, column 2), 
corresponding with the political upheaval of that year. Notable are the unemployment rates 
recorded between 2010 and 2015 in Port-Said and Suez, which are the highest amongst the 
governorates. This may be mirroring the effect of the political instabilities on the Suez 
Canal area. Also, two of the most populated regions, Cairo and Alexandria, recorded 
similar and relatively high unemployment rates over the period 2010-2015, with 
Alexandria’s rates consistently exceeding Cairo’s. Additionally, Aswan, which is an area 
highly dependent on tourism, has experienced an upsurge in its unemployment rates in 
2015 (see table 2.8, column 6), surpassing all its previous unemployment rates. Besides the 
above, the gap between the Egyptian governorates’ unemployment rates has narrowed 
between 2010 and 2015, which remained between 8.5-15.2% in 2015 (see table 2.8, 
column 6). Note that Assaad and Krafft (2013b) stated that regional unemployment could 
be explained by the urban/rural disparities, where unemployment decreased in urban areas 
and increased in rural ones.  
 
                                                        
13 Long-term unemployment constitutes labour with continuous periods of unemployment 
that last for a year or longer (WB, 2016b). 
14 We exclude from our review any governorates that are not present in the ELMPS 
sample, including Red Sea, El Wadi El Gidid, Matrouh, North Sinai, and South Sinai.  
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Table 2.8: Regional Unemployment Rates (%) - by Governorate, 2010-2015 
Estimates:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governorate 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cairo 12.7 17.0 17.3 17.7 16.0 14.6 
Alexandria 12.1 19.7 17.3 18.9 18.4 16.1 
Port-Said 25.9 26.7 26.5 23.3 25.9 24.2 
Suez 10.7 14.2 16.5 24.0 17.7 22.5 
Damietta 7.5 16.9 11.8 12.9 10.6 14.9 
Dakahlia 9.4 12.9 14.1 12.7 11.8 13.3 
Sharkia 9.0 10.2 14.0 13.7 13.8 15.2 
Kalyoubia 7.5 11.0 12.7 14.1 13.7 13.2 
Kafr El-Sheikh 7.0 14.9 13.6 12.4 11.7 12.2 
Gharbia 13.0 16.7 16.3 15.1 15.5 14.7 
Menoufia 4.1 8.4 7.7 9.1 11.1 10.0 
Behera 6.0 6.4 7.4 8.4 8.2 9.7 
Ismailia 10.5 11.7 14.6 13.9 13.1 13.7 
Giza 13.6 12.3 12.3 13.0 12.7 13.1 
Beni-Suef 4.3 3.9 5.6 7.7 10.9 9.1 
Fayoum 6.9 11.3 11.6 9.5 12.2 10.9 
Menia 4.2 6.9 8.9 11.2 12.5 9.2 
Asyout 9.5 10.6 11.4 13.6 12.8 12.5 
Suhag 7.7 10.3 11.3 13.7 13.1 11.1 
Qena 9.7 8.7 10.9 10.0 9.3 11.7 
Aswan 15.9 17.7 16.1 15.9 15.3 18.9 
Luxor 10.1 11.8 12.8 13.7 12.5 8.5 
Source: CAPMAS (2016a) 
 
 2.4.2 Educational Unemployment 
Educational unemployment rates, which are stratified according to the individuals’ highest 
level of educational attainment, are a significant issue in the Egyptian context. This is due 
to the often-raised argument that Egyptians with higher educational attainment experience 
higher unemployment levels (Assaad, 1997). This is confirmed by inspecting 
unemployment levels across the different educational degrees (see figure 2.6), where we 
find that the highest unemployment rates for men are experienced at the ‘university and 
above’ level, while the highest unemployment rates for women are experienced at the 
‘intermediate’ educational level. This implies that men with a university degree or higher 
or women with an intermediate degree find it more difficult to find employment than their 
counterparts with other degrees. Still, the rate of female unemployment among the 
‘university and above’ level is quite high (see figure 2.6). Assaad and Krafft (2013b) 
verified Egypt’s high educational unemployment rates in 2012 by stating that three 
quarters of unemployed men and 90% of unemployed women were educated. 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Total/Male/Female Unemployment Rates – by Education, 2015 Estimates: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from Egypt’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2016a) 
 
 
2.5 Wages 
Since wages represent the main and common theme across the analyses in this thesis, 
waged workers represent the main sample of interest, and these represent a significant 
proportion of the employed labour in Egypt. The WB estimated that 62.5% of Egypt’s 
employed labour in 2015 was waged and salaried workers (WB, 2016b). In terms of 
gender differentials, 65.3% of total men employed were waged and salaried workers as 
opposed to 51.6% of total women employed in 2015 (WB, 2016b).  
 
We begin this section by illustrating the average weekly wage figures for men and women 
in the public and private sectors (see section 2.5.1), which we link to findings of Egypt’s 
wage determination literature. Thereafter, we review Egypt’s ‘Employment Guarantee 
Scheme’ and its significant impact on the Egyptian labour market (see section 2.5.2).  
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2.5.1 Wages in the Public and Private Sectors 
Table 2.9 demonstrates the male and female average weekly wages in the public and 
private sectors, which only account for the basic monetary wage and excludes any 
additional benefits or payments.  
 
Table 2.9: Public and Private Sectors’ Average Weekly Wages - by Gender, 2009-
2015 Estimates: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Public Sector Wages (in EGP) Private Sector Wages (in EGP) 
 Male Female Male Female 
2009 449 500 309 241 
2010 530 630 314 242 
2011 649 715 420 289 
2012 834 927 407 336 
2013 951 1,065 456 364 
2014 1,008 1,161 529 419 
2015 1,042 1,220 510 615 
Source: CAPMAS (2016a) 
 
Average weekly wages have been increasing in both sectors since 2009. In the public 
sector, men’s wages increased from 449 EGP in 2009 to 1,042 EGP in 2015, while 
women’s wages rose from 500 EGP to 1,220 EGP over the same period (see table 2.9, 
columns 1 and 2). Men’s private sector wages rose much slower from 309 EGP to 510 
EGP for men, while women’s wages rose from 241 EGP to 615 EGP (see table 2.9, 
columns 3 and 4). Thus, a large and increasing gap remains between the sectors’ wages.  
 
This gap has widened further for men due to a higher growth rate in their public sector’s 
wages. While men’s public sector wages grew by 132.07% over that period, the equivalent 
growth in the private sector wages was only 65.05%. Conversely, women’s wages 
experienced a flatter growth trend in the public sector relative to the private one, where 
women’s public sector wages grew by only 144% compared to a 155.2% growth in the 
private sector. Note that women’s wages experienced higher rates of growth compared to 
men in both sectors, implying an improvement in Egyptian women’s private sector wages. 
 
El-Ghamrawy and Amer (2011) claimed that it is conceptually puzzling and contradicting 
to theory that Egypt’s public sector, which had historically played more of a social rather 
than an economic role, to offer higher wages than the private sector (see table 2.9), which 
is likely to seek high-productivity, highly-educated, and highly-skilled individuals. Still, 
the authors have stated that there are plenty of differences between the Egyptian worker’s 
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education, occupations, and economic activities in the public and private sectors, which 
may induce these wage differentials. Another plausible explanation for the higher public 
sector wages may relate to the usual superiority of public sector employment in the context 
of developing nations, where only the very dynamic private sector firms might offer higher 
wages than the private sector, which average figures cannot clarify. Furthermore, the 
private sector is dominated by informality, and hence more likely to offer lower wages.  
 
Egypt’s wage determination literature has also confirmed this public sector pay premium. 
For instance, Said (2007) argued that the public-private sector wage differentials were 
higher in 2006 than in 1998, and Assaad (1997) explained that public-private sector wage 
gaps were due to differences in workers’ educational levels in each sector. Conversely, El-
Ghamrawy and Amer (2011) have challenged this explanation and argued that the high 
public sector wages are set as so for political and social considerations. Salehi-Isfahani et 
al. (2009) provided a similar explanation based on labour market rigidities and their effect 
on increasing the value and rewards of education.  
 
Note that while there is a consensus towards the public sector pay premium, which the 
literature15 as well as the statistical data (see table 2.9) shows, wages still represent a 
significant problematic issue in the public sector. In particular, Abdelhamid and El Baradei 
(2010), who had addressed the reformulation of the government’s pay system, summarised 
that the main problems with this system include the low wage levels, the impact of these 
low levels on motivation and the government’s ability of attracting strong calibres with 
significant skillsets, the vagueness of the allowances system, and the huge financial 
burdens placed on the government. Accordingly, even Egypt’s public sector’s higher 
wages are considered quite low. 
 
On a final note with regards to gender wage differentials in each sector, Said (2015) found 
that gender wage-differentials in the public sector had been almost eliminated as of 2012, 
whereas the private sector’s wage gap of 40% is quite significant. Furthermore, the author 
claimed that women’s labour conditions in the private sector are worsening and their 
wages are higher in the public sector. While we still find that women’s wages in the public 
sector exceed those in the private sector (see table 2.9), we have to re-state that women’s 
private sector wages are experiencing a higher rate of growth.  
                                                        
15 Even El-Ghamrawy and Amer (2011), who argued that the public sector pay premium is 
characteristic-specific, still did not completely dismiss the idea of a public sector premium. 
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2.5.2 The ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ in Egypt 
In order to better comprehend wage determination in Egypt, which represents the central 
issue of this thesis, it is worthwhile to discuss the Egyptian government’s ‘Employment 
Guarantee Scheme’, which coincided with massive nationalisation efforts around the 
country in the 1960s and has had a drastic impact on Egypt’s labour market. Despite 
decades elapsing since the implementation and abolition of this scheme, its influence on 
Egypt’s labour market is still apparent. In what follows, we discuss the major elements of 
this scheme and its impact on Egypt’s labour market.  
 
  2.5.2.1 A Historical Perspective: 
In the 1960s, the Egyptian government instituted the ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ 
with the main purpose of guaranteeing employment for university graduates and later for 
vocational secondary school and technical institute graduates as well. This scheme was 
mainly administered by the Ministry of Manpower and Vocational Training, whose 
responsibility covered receiving the applications from the graduates as well as the 
governmental institutions’ and public enterprises’ requests for graduates. This represented 
a highly centralised system of hiring, which prohibited the involved institutions and 
agencies from hiring any labour on a permanent basis from outside this system.  
 
Still, this system had problems. Assaad (1997) highlighted that despite each appointee 
coming with a budgetary allocation, and hence the lack of incentive for the involved 
institutions to limit their requests for graduates, the graduate applications still exceeded the 
requests for graduates received. Furthermore, the public enterprises defied the system by 
hiring labour on a temporary basis until they were allowed to hire labour from outside this 
system in 1978. This added to the pressures on the governmental institutions of absorbing 
and hiring the excess supply of labour (Assaad, 1997).  
 
2.5.2.2 Impact on the Labour Market: 
The ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ had far-reaching effects on the labour market and 
the economy in Egypt. First, the demand for education at all levels had significantly 
increased, which was matched with increasing accessibility to education through the 
lowering or abolishment of fees altogether, resulting in an excess supply of highly 
educated labour, since this category of labour was the one guaranteed public sector 
employment. Assaad (1997) explained that when the scheme was applied, eligible 
graduates comprised a small proportion of the labour force, but between 1963 and 1983, 
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the number of eligible graduates grew by 12% a year as opposed to a 2% growth of the 
whole labour force. This implies the massive burden placed on the government by the 
higher demand for public sector employment and its obligation to accommodate the 
individuals covered by the ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’.  
 
Consequently, public sector employment had significantly increased. Assaad (1997) 
explained that white-collars and women dominated this increased employment. This was 
particularly due to the higher likelihood of these individuals remaining longer in the queue 
for public sector jobs. Thus, the private sector’s share of this kind of employment had 
declined (Assaad, 1997). Alongside the increasing public sector employment, 
unemployment rates also rose sharply, which could owe to the increasing number of 
graduates queuing for public sector jobs, as they were counted towards the unemployed 
proportion of the labour force. Worse still, the queuing graduates would not give up their 
places in the queue even if they landed a private sector job, and when the government 
established a system of dropping individuals who attain formal private employment, there 
was an incident of mass resignations (Assaad, 1997). This could have contributed further 
to alleviating the recorded unemployment levels (see section 2.4). Expectedly, graduates 
experienced the highest unemployment rates, and Assaad (1997) explained that this 
situation was exacerbated further as a result of the government’s reduction of graduates’ 
hiring. This trend is, in fact, still evident until present day, where unemployment rates are 
highest among those with higher educational attainment (see figure 2.6).  
  
With ever-increasing pressure on the government, real public sector wages were reduced to 
make public sector jobs less attractive. Still, the dominance of the public sector in the 
labour market implied that its wage-setting policies, which were historically determined 
according to non-market characteristics, especially education (Assaad, 1997), and the 
‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ influenced wages in the private sector. In particular, 
there were two main effects (Assaad, 1997). First, a wage floor for the private sector was 
set for those who were covered by the ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’, since these 
individuals had an expected public sector wage that usually exceeded private sector wages. 
Second, the excess supply of graduates pushed down the market-clearing private sector 
wage for these individuals. Accordingly, we expect that private sector wage levels, 
although to some extent determined according to market-factors, to still be influenced by 
the public sector ones. 
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2.6 Economic Reforms 
Numerous economic reforms were applied in Egypt over the years, which impacted the 
functioning and efficiency of its labour market. In the beginning of the 1990s, Egypt’s 
government implemented the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ERSAP) and followed this by a continuation set of reforms in 2004. Generally, the two 
sets of reforms addressed investment, trade, privatisation, and price liberalisation, which 
were expected to enhance the economic environment, the labour market, and the 
population’s well-being. Among some of the consequences of these policies were the 
decreased inflation rates, removal of subsidies, privatisation of many low-performing state-
run businesses and banks, as well as joining the World Trade Organisation and tariff 
reductions (Sesay & Hove, 1999; Alissa, 2007). Still, Fawzy (2002) explained that the 
reforms’ purpose of strengthening the role of the private sector to take over some of the 
government’s role in the economy had fallen short, and the private sector’s involvement in 
solving problems of low investments and low employment levels remained limited.   
 
Another significant effort by the government was the passing of the Unified Labour Law 
(No.12) of 2003. The objective of this law, which came into action after the government’s 
abandonment of its ‘Employment Guarantee scheme’, was to improve employer-employee 
relations, and as El-Megharbel (2007) mentioned, to encourage the private sector to fill the 
gap in job opportunities. The law addressed social security, minimum wages, working 
hours, overtime pay, the hiring and firing process, and the right to strike. The idea was to 
balance the rights and benefits of each party involved in order to improve the labour 
market’s functioning and outcomes. In fact, Wahba and Assaad (2015), who addressed the 
effect of this law on the prevalence of formal job contracts, concluded that the flexibility of 
hiring and firing introduced by this law had indeed promoted formal employment in Egypt.  
 
Most recently, the Egyptian government has devised and began the implementation of 
another reform plan to attract international investments to enhance Egypt’s economic 
growth. The three main pillars to this plan include growth policies, financial consolidation, 
and improvement of the well-being and human capital of the population (Salsecci et al., 
2015). Of most relevance to this thesis is the third pillar, for which the government is 
addressing issues of illiteracy, the lack of healthcare services and institutions, improving 
social security coverage, as well as developing slum areas and low- and middle-income 
housing units (Salsecci et al., 2015). Wages were also addressed, and monthly wages were 
set at a minimum of 1,200 EGP and capped at a maximum of 42,000 EGP.  
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, the Egyptian economy has faced numerous challenges that hindered its 
processes of development and economic growth, which has persisted for a long period of 
time and worsened with the significant period of instability post-2011. Despite the image 
of increased stability, the economic measures have not yet reflected the intended 
improvements.  
 
More specific to this research, numerous problematic issues characterise the Egyptian 
labour market, including high unemployment and low female participation rates, wages, 
and productivity. There is also a large degree of informality, whose discussion is retained 
to chapter IV, since it represents one of the main issues we address in this thesis. 
Researchers have recently come to emphasise the particular importance of dealing with 
Egypt’s low wages and labour productivity, identifying these as solutions to the more 
conventional problems that have existed for long periods of time. Moreover, Egyptian 
women in particular suffer from a much more disadvantaged status in the labour market, 
which was illustrated by the gender differentials with respect to labour force participation, 
employment, and unemployment. This requires policy-makers to devise policies that are 
particularly helpful in improving women’s labour market conditions and outcomes.  
 
On a final note, economic reforms implemented in Egypt over time have consistently kept 
the labour market in the centre of attention, yet the policies applied have not fulfilled their 
purpose. Thus, it is not sufficient to draft and implement policies and regulations, but the 
government is also required to put in place effective monitoring and follow-through 
systems and techniques to ensure that the policies are succeeding in their intended 
purposes and updated according to needs. In addition, a key aspect of these reforms should 
be to better reflect the structure of the economy and account for the particular economic, 
political, and societal contexts of Egypt. 
 
Accordingly, empirical research should allow us to better understand the Egyptian 
economy and the labour market forces in play that affect outcomes. This should also aid in 
drafting more specific and effective plans and policies to ensure the achievement of goals 
outlined in reform plans.  
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Chapter III 
Dataset, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, we use data from the 2012 round of the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS), which we will discuss in this chapter. The ELMPS, which is nationally 
representative, provides us with various variables that we utilise in our analyses. This 
chapter begins by presenting the ELMPS’s rounds, samples, and scope of variables along 
with any other data sources we utilise in section (3.2). This is followed by section (3.3), 
which illustrates the specific sample of interest, section (3.4), which provides a statistical 
review of the main variables of interest, and the chapter’s conclusion in section (3.5).   
 
 
3.2 Dataset: The Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 
The Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), our main source of data, is 
administered and maintained by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with 
the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS). This survey 
comprises three waves, namely 1998, 2006, and 2012, and provides labour data on 
numerous aspects, such as education, employment, unemployment, and earnings.  
 
This dataset provides the first and most recent individual-level data for a nationally 
representative sample of the Egyptian labour market (Assaad & Krafft, 2013a). Also, along 
with the survey’s expansion of observations over the different rounds (see table 3.1), the 
same individuals were followed and re-interviewed over time. The 1998 round began with 
a sample of 4,816 households, which was expanded in the 2006 round to include 3,685 
households from the original sample, 2,168 splits from the original households, and a 
refresher sample of 2,498 households. This sample further expanded in 2012 to include all 
observations in the 1998 and 2006 rounds, the split households that emerged, and a 
refresher sample of 2,000 households, making this round the largest to date.  
 
Table 3.1: ELMPS Samples’ Sizes - by Round: 
 Round 1998 Round 2006 Round 2012 
Households 4,816 8,351 12,060 
Individuals 23,997 37,140 49,186 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS (Economic Research Forum [ERF] & 
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics [CAPMAS], 2013)  
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In terms of data collection, the questionnaires used to collect data in each round are very 
similar (Assaad & Krafft, 2013a). Still, our main variables of interest in chapters V and VI, 
health and job satisfaction, respectively, appear only in the 2012 round. Therefore, our 
analyses in these two chapters are confined to this round of data. To facilitate comparisons 
across the chapters, we also confine ourselves to the 2012 round in chapter IV.  
 
In order to determine the representativeness of the ELMPS sample, Assaad and Krafft 
(2013a) have compared the ELMPS to other sources of data, including the 1996 and 2006 
population censuses as well as the 2010 and 2011 labour force surveys (LFS). The authors 
mainly focused on demographic and labour market characteristics and found various 
similarities between the samples across the different surveys. Theses similarities are 
especially beneficial for our analyses, since in addition to the ELMPS, we extract data 
from the ‘labour’ section of CAPMAS’s Statistical Year Book, whose sample is based on 
the censuses and LFS of various years. In particular, we extract sector- and industry-level 
information from the Statistical Year Book to use as instruments in our analyses. This 
includes data on unemployment stratified by educational attainment and the private 
sector’s average weekly wages stratified by gender and industry. All these classifications 
are also evident and similar to those in the ELMPS, allowing us to supplement the 
individual-level ELMPS data with sector aggregates for some of the analyses. Still, it 
should be noted that while both sources use the same international definition of 
unemployment, there are some divergences between the unemployment rates reported in 
the Statistical Year Book and those in the ELMPS, which are traced to differences between 
the data collection methods of each survey (Assaad & Krafft, 2013a).  
 
 
3.3 Sample 
As previously mentioned, we are particularly interested in the ELMPS2012 sample. The 
sample of interest is that of working age, which is 15 to 65 years old, based on the 
definition provided by CAPMAS of the legal and official working age (CAPMAS, 2016a). 
Accordingly, individuals under 15 and over 65 years old were dropped, as they are not 
counted towards the official Egyptian labour force. After applying this restriction, the 
sample drops to 30,399 individuals. Using the standard market definition to identify the 
labour force, we find that only 29,834 observations have successfully provided information 
about their labour force status (see table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Labour Force Status – Total/Male/Female Sample Distribution: 
Labour Force Status Males Females Total 
Employed 11,456 2,691 14,147 
Unemployed 423 859 1,282 
Out of the Labour Force 2,807 11,598 14,405 
Total 14,686 15,148 29,834 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
The similarities between the Statistical Year Book’s data and that of the ELMPS explained 
by Assaad and Krafft (2013a) are further confirmed by the labour force sample distribution 
of the ELMPS. Specifically, the much lower female participation rate (see figure 2.1) and 
the much higher female unemployment compared to males (see figure 2.5) are both 
reflected in our ELMPS sample (see table 3.2).  
 
Looking at the employed sample, we find that only 14,147 individuals successfully 
provided information regarding their employment status at the time of data collection. 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the employed observations. 
 
Table 3.3: Employment Status - Sample Distribution: 
Employment Status Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Waged Workers 10,185 71.99 71.99 
Employers 1,507 10.65 82.65 
Self-Employed not Employing Others 1,381 9.76 92.41 
Unpaid Family Workers 1,013 7.16 99.57 
Unpaid Workers for Others 61 0.43 100.00 
Total 14,147 100.00  
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
Since we are mainly concerned with wages in this thesis, we focus on the waged workers, 
which represents 72% of the whole employed sample (see table 3.3), and we drop the 
employers, self-employed not employing others, unpaid family workers, and unpaid 
workers for others from our sample, since they do not provide information concerning 
wages. This leaves a sample of 10,181 waged workers who have provided information 
regarding their wages.  
 
As noted in chapter II, there are significant differences in the wage-setting behaviour of the 
public and private sectors (see section 2.5). Therefore, we concentrate specifically on 
private sector workers, whose wages are set in the market. We will consider the sample’s 
public-private sectors differences in a little more detail below.  
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The ELMPS includes workers in six sectors, governmental, public, private, investment, 
international, and others. We modify this distribution into three subsamples (see figure 
3.1). One subsample combines the governmental and public sectors, which we refer to as 
‘public’, another subsample comprises the private sector workers, and the final subsample, 
which we refer to as ‘others’, is a miscellaneous category, which includes the investment, 
international, and other sectors. The majority of the ELMPS sample, comprising 57.21%, 
is employed in the private sector, with 40.36% employed in the public sector (see figure 
3.1). Thus, while our sample includes the majority of the workers, by excluding the public 
sector, we are leaving out two-fifths of the sample. Still, with the wage-setting rules and 
norms being so different in the two sectors, it was not possible to include them both in the 
same analysis.  
 
Figure 3.1: Organisational Sector - Sample Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
Additionally, following on from chapter II, where we indicated that female labour force 
participation was low in Egypt, we find that women form a very small proportion of our 
sample too. Again, in order to keep the analysis simple and because the female sample is 
so small that many of our models would not converge, we restricted ourselves to the 
complete sample (including both males and females) and the male sample separately. 
Thus, we model the male sample utilising the same model as the complete sample to 
promote consistency and provide comparable results. 
 
While men and women are equally represented in the ELMPS sample and sample 
distributions are similar to other sources of data (Assaad & Krafft, 2013a), men represent 
82.36% of the employed waged workers sample. Furthermore, men represent the majority 
of the private sector workers (5,444 men as opposed to 381 women), while the majority of 
40.36%
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2.43%
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Private
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the employed women are in the public sector (see figure 3.2), which is characterised by 
more stable and secure jobs. This is not surprising, given women’s preference for public 
sector employment (see section 2.5.2.2). Furthermore, the lower female labour force 
participation rates (see tables 2.3; 3.2) and the higher female unemployment rates (see 
figure 2.5; table 3.2) are likely to affect the employed female sample size as a result of the 
difficulty Egyptian women face in finding jobs.  
 
Figure 3.2: Sample Size – by Gender and Organisational Sector: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents some statistical data for our four main variables of interest, wages, 
sector of employment, health, and job satisfaction, in addition to some labour 
characteristics, which are commonly utilised in wage and job satisfaction studies. All our 
following statistics focus on our main sample of interest of the private sector workers.  
 
3.4.1 Wages 
Wages represent the primary variable of interest in this thesis. Therefore, we begin by 
inspecting the nature and structure of wages16 in the sample in study. To begin with, we 
                                                        
16 Although the ELMPS provides hourly wage figures, it is specified that these measures 
are derived values, which are computed by dividing total monthly wages for the previous 
three months on the usual number of hours spent on market work over the same period 
(ERF & CAPMAS, 2013). 
Complete Waged 
Workers Sample
(10,181 observations)
Public Sector
(4,109 observations)
Male Sample
(2,740 observations)
Female Sample
(1,369 observations)
Private Sector
(5,825  observations)
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(5,444 observations)
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(381 observations)
Other Sectors
(247 observations)
Male Sample (201 
observations)
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observtions)
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find that average hourly wages of the public sector (7.38 EGP) are higher than the private 
sector’s average (5.46 EGP) in our sample. This matches our previous review of average 
weekly wages, which showed that average weekly wages are higher in the public sector 
than the private sector (see table 2.9). Having said this, the maximum wages observed for 
the public sector are 230.77 EGP as opposed to 807.69 EGP for the private sector sample, 
showing that private sector workers may potentially reach higher wage levels.  
 
In wage studies, the logarithm of hourly wages is the preferred measure to use, in order to 
minimise the impact of wage outliers on the results. By inspecting the private sector 
sample’s distribution, we find that the logarithm of hourly wages is more normally 
distributed compared to hourly wages (see figure 3.3). Furthermore, we find that the 
majority of the sample reported the lower end of the hourly wage range.  
 
Figure 3.3: Hourly Wages vs. Logarithm of Hourly Wages – Private Sector Sample 
Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
3.4.2 Sector of Employment 
In the ELMPS, the individuals’ sector of employment is determined according to the 
answers they provide to two questions, whether they hold a formal job contract and 
whether they contribute to social security. If individuals answer yes to either question, then 
they are identified as formal sector employees. Thus, there are three possible definitions 
for formality, and according to all definitions, the majority of the private sector workers 
are informally employed (see table 3.4). This distribution follows El-Ghamrawy and 
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Amer’s (2011) claims about the private sector’s significantly large share in informal 
employment. This may be one reason why the public sector wages are higher than the 
public sector wages (see section 3.4.1), as public sector employees are largely formal and 
the private sector is mostly informal.  
 
Table 3.4: Sector of Employment (Different Definitions) – Private Sector Sample 
Distribution: 
 Formal 
Contract 
Social 
Security 
Formal Contract &/or Social 
Security 
Formal 878 1,061 1,241 
Informal 4,947 4,764 4,584 
Total 5,825 5,825 5,825 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
In terms of wages, the formal sector’s average hourly wages are higher than those of the 
informal sector according to all definitions of formality. When classified according to 
whether workers have a formal job contract, contribute to the social security system, or 
both, which is the definition we use to identify formal employment in this thesis, the 
average hourly wages in the private formal sector are 7.63 EGP as opposed to 4.88 EGP 
for the private informal sector sample.  
 
3.4.3 Health 
Another important factor in this thesis is health. Information on health is only provided in 
the 2012 round of the survey based on a number of questions. Individuals are asked about 
their general state of health, using a scale of 1-5 to rank it, with ‘1’ representing  
‘excellent/very good health’ and ‘5’ representing ‘very bad health’. We will refer to this 
measure as ‘self-perceived health’ in this thesis. Note that we modify the scale ranking by 
combining ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’ health states in a single category, since we find that the 
number of individuals in both categories is relatively small and these individuals are likely 
to be suffering from serious and similar health issues. Thus, we end up with a 4-point scale 
only (see figure 3.4), and we reverse the ranking, where ‘1’ refers to ‘very bad/bad’ health 
and ‘4’ refers to ‘excellent/very good’ health. According to the statistics (see figure 3.4), 
the majority of the private sector sample has reported ‘good’ health ranked ‘3’. 
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Figure 3.4: Self-Perceived Health Status – Private Sector Sample Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
In addition, respondents are asked whether health issues have limited their activities, 
whether they suffer from any longstanding or chronic illnesses, or have any mental or 
physical disabilities. Since we use health to proxy for productivity in chapter V, it is 
general health that is of interest and not a particular case, hence our use of the self-
perceived health measure.  
 
Generally, measures represented by scale rankings are met with scepticism in the literature, 
since they are regarded as subjective and likely to suffer from measurement error due to 
differences in respondents’ understanding of the scale. One way to evaluate the accuracy 
of this measure is to inspect correlations between it and actual health measures (see table 
3.5). We find a significant correlation between the variables, with a higher correlation 
between self-perceived health and longstanding/chronic diseases compared to limitations 
in daily activities due to health issues or disabilities (see table 3.5). It should be noted that 
disabled individuals are likely to compare themselves to others with disabilities as well. 
Thus, while they may perceive their health to be worse in general, their perception of their 
specific level of health may be better compared to others with worse disabilities.  
 
Table 3.5: Self-Perceived Health vs. Actual Health Variables - Correlation 
Coefficients: 
 Limited in Daily 
Activities due to Health 
Longstanding 
Illness/Chronic Diseases 
Disability 
Self-Perceived 
Health 
-0.358* -0.433* -0.133* 
* p<0.05 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
 34 
 
 
 
 
We also expect older individuals to experience and perceive their health states worse than 
younger ones. Indeed, we find a significant correlation coefficient of -0.263 between self-
perceived health and age, confirming our expectation that older individuals are more likely 
to rank their health states as worse.  
 
Finally, since views about health states may change over time, panel data would have been 
helpful in our analysis. As previously stated, however, the ELMPS provides health 
measures only in the 2012 round, thus no inferences can be drawn in this respect.  
 
3.4.4 Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction represents the fourth main variable of interest and the one we address in 
chapter VI. One of the job satisfaction variables provided by the ELMPS determines the 
individuals’ overall job satisfaction level, where individuals are asked to rank their overall 
satisfaction with their current jobs on a scale of 1-5, with ‘1’ representing the ‘fully 
dissatisfied’ and ‘5’ representing the ‘fully satisfied’. Similar to the sample distribution of 
health (see figure 3.4), the majority of the private sector sample reported the highest levels 
of satisfaction (see figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5: Overall Job Satisfaction – Private Sector Sample Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
The ELMPS provides eight other satisfaction variables that address certain aspects of the 
individuals’ jobs, which we will herein refer to as ‘components of job satisfaction’ 
measures. These include satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with wages, satisfaction 
with type of work, satisfaction with working hours, satisfaction with working schedule, 
satisfaction with working conditions/environment, satisfaction with distance to 
0
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work/commuting, and satisfaction with matching between qualifications and job. 
Respondents ranked their satisfaction with these aspects on a scale that resembles that of 
the overall job satisfaction discussed above with an additional category ‘6’ that represents 
‘not applicable’ (see figure 3.6).  
 
Figure 3.6: Components of Job Satisfaction Variables – Private Sector Sample 
Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
If the sixth category of  ‘not applicable’ is disregarded, as it does not inform us much about 
satisfaction levels, we find a similar trend in the frequency of observations over the 
different components of job satisfaction levels (see figure 3.6) to that of the overall job 
satisfaction levels (see figure 3.5). Most of the observations are clustered around the two 
highest levels of satisfaction (see figure 3.6), indicating that for the sample in study, most 
of the respondents have reported being satisfied with the different aspects of their jobs. 
Still, among the eight components of job satisfaction variables, the largest proportion of 
the sample that reported ‘fully dissatisfied’ is with respect to satisfaction with job security, 
which is not surprising for the private sector sample whose majority is employed 
informally, and thus less secure. Similarly, a large proportion of the sample has reported 
being ‘fully dissatisfied’ with wages (see figure 3.6). This indicates issues with wage levels 
in Egypt’s private sector. Conversely, figures generally imply that there are fewer 
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problematic issues with satisfaction with the type of work, working hours, working 
schedule, working conditions, commuting, and matching.  
 
These eight satisfaction variables could also be viewed as constituents of overall job 
satisfaction and a way of breaking down overall job satisfaction to its components. In order 
to understand the contribution of each aspect to the individual’s overall job satisfaction 
level, we inspect the correlation coefficients between overall job satisfaction and these 
components of job satisfaction variables. Table 3.6 shows that each component of job 
satisfaction is significantly correlated with overall job satisfaction. The largest correlation 
for the private sector sample is with ‘type of work’ followed by ‘wages’, highlighting the 
value of wages in the overall job satisfaction of private sector workers.  
 
Table 3.6: Overall Job Satisfaction vs. Components of Job Satisfaction – Correlation 
Coefficients: 
Job Aspect’s Satisfaction Variables Correlation 
Coefficients 
Satisfaction with Job Security 0.563* 
Satisfaction with Wages 0.600* 
Satisfaction with Type of Work 0.673* 
Satisfaction with Working Hours 0.535* 
Satisfaction with Working Schedule 0.504* 
Satisfaction with Working Conditions 0.582* 
Satisfaction with Commute to Work 0.424* 
Satisfaction with Matching Between Qualifications and Job 0.495* 
* p<0.05 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
Similar to the health measure previously discussed, job satisfaction is another factor that is 
likely to be affected by ‘time’. As more experiences are accumulated in the labour market, 
individuals’ perceptions of their jobs and in comparison to others may change as well, 
which makes panel data superior in capturing this effect. Still, job satisfaction data are only 
available in the 2012 round of the ELMPS, prohibiting us from gaining more insights into 
this issue at this point. 
 
3.4.5 Other Labour Characteristics 
A variety of individual, human capital, and job factors relevant to the analyses in the 
following chapters are discussed below, in order to describe our Egyptian private secor 
labour sample. 
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  3.4.5.1 Individual Characteristics:  
Our sample constitutes individuals between 15 and 65 years old. While there are 
differences between the age distribution in the ELMPS sample and that of the 2006 census 
and the 2010 LFS, differences are particularly relevant to younger age groups who are not 
involved with the labour market, and these differences are smaller between the 2012 round 
and other data sources compared to earlier ELMPS rounds, which could be the result of the 
larger sample size (Assaad & Krafft, 2013a). We continue our following discussion 
concentrating on data from the ELMPS’s 2012 round. 
 
The complete sample is divided into six regions17, including Greater Cairo18, Alexandria 
and Suez Canal19, Urban Lower Egypt20, Urban Upper Egypt21, Rural Lower Egypt22, and 
Rural Upper Egypt23  (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013). The largest proportion of the sample 
resides in the two rural areas (55.54%), and the smallest resides in Alexandria and Suez 
Canal (8.43%). Note that Greater Cairo and Alexandria/Suez Canal are counted towards 
the urban areas, thus combining these two regions along with the urban upper and urban 
lower regions represents 44.46% of the sample, illustrating that the sample is distributed 
almost evenly between the rural and urban areas.  
 
  3.4.5.2 Human Capital Characteristics: 
The complete sample of interest covers nine levels of educational attainment, including 
illiterate, literate with no diploma, elementary school degree, middle school degree, 
general high school degree, vocational high school degree, post-secondary degree, 
university degree, and post-graduate degree (see figure 3.7). The majority of our sample, 
representing roughly 36% of the private sector sample, has attained a vocational secondary 
degree, as opposed to the general high school and post-secondary degree holders, who each 
                                                        
17 See figure 3.9 in appendix 3, for a map of Egypt, which clarifies the geographical 
distribution of the major cities. 
18 Includes: Cairo, parts of Giza, and parts of Kalyoubia (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013). 
19 Includes: urban areas in Alexandria, Ismalia, Port-Said, and Suez (ERF & CAPMAS, 
2013). 
20  Includes: urban areas in Behera, Dakahlia, Damietta, Gharbeya, Kafr El-Sheikh, 
Menoufia, Sharkia, and remainder of urban Kalyoubia (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013). 
21  Includes: urban areas in Aswan, Asyout, Beni-Suef, Fayoum, Luxor, Menya, Qena, 
Suhag, and remainder of urban Giza (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013). 
22 Includes: rural areas in Behera, Dakahlia, Damietta, Gharbia, Kafr El-Sheikh, Menoufia, 
Sharkia, remainder of rural Kalyoubia, and remainder of rural Ismalia (ERF & CAPMAS, 
2013). 
23  Includes: rural areas in Aswan, Asyout, Beni-Suef, Fayoum, Luxor, Menia, Qena, 
Suhag, and remainder of rural Giza (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013). 
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represents only 3% of the sample (see figure 3.7). Also, we find that a relatively larger 
proportion of the sample, 14% and 13%, has attained an elementary school and a 
university degree, respectively (see figure 3.7). Still, illiterates constitute a significant 
proportion of the sample, about 20% (see figure 3.7). Note that we are only analysing the 
employed waged private sector sample in this discussion, but Assaad and Krafft (2013a) 
compared the ELMPS2012 complete sample’s educational distributions with the 2010 LFS 
and concluded that the general educational distributions are quite similar.  
 
Figure 3.7: Educational Attainment – Private Sector Sample Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
We also find that the average work experience within the private sector in our sample is 14 
years, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 58 years (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013), 
highlighting how the sample covers a wide range of labour market experiences. Note, 
however, that the figures might be inaccurate, as work experience is a derived variable 
(ERF & CAPMAS, 2013), which is calculated by deducting the respondents’ year of 
acquiring the first job from the year of data accumulation (2012). It may therefore fail to 
account for intermittent labour force participation through spells of unemployment, 
training, education, ill-health, or maternity. Accordingly, work experience might be highly 
correlated with age, and indeed we report a significant correlation coefficient between 
these two variables of 0.835. Consequently, in the analyses in the following chapters, we 
use age and drop work experience to avoid multicollinearity.  
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  3.4.5.3 Job Characteristics: 
In this section, we will consider two job characteristics, the occupational distribution of the 
sample and the stability of the job. To begin with, our sample is distributed across nine 
occupations, including managers, professionals, technicians/associate professionals, 
clerical support workers, service/sales workers, skilled agricultural/forestry/fishery 
workers, craft/trade workers, plant/machine operators, and elementary occupations. There 
is much variability with regards to sample sizes of the different occupations (see figure 
3.8). The biggest category of the private sector constitutes the craft/trade workers, 
representing roughly 33% of our sample. The agricultural/forestry/fishery workers, the 
plant/machine operators, and the service/sales workers follow, each representing between 
15 and 17% of the sample (see figure 3.8). The smallest two categories constitutes the 
managers and the clerical support workers, each representing around 1% of our sample, 
while the technicians constitute 4% of the sample, and the professionals and elementary 
occupations each constitute around 6%. 
 
Figure 3.8: Occupations – Private Sector Sample Distribution: 
 
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
Another factor of interest is the stability of the job, which is usually represented in the 
literature as either permanent or temporary employment. In the ELMPS, however, job 
stability includes two additional categories, namely seasonal and casual workers. The 
majority of the private sector sample is distributed between the permanent and casual 
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workers (see table 3.7), highlighting the importance of addressing casual workers in the 
private sector. Conversely, seasonal workers represent only 0.96% of the sample of interest 
(see table 3.7). Note that seasonal workers may opt for alternative jobs during seasons 
when their jobs are unavailable and may be either included in other types of employment 
or unemployed, thus their share of the sample may be dependent on when the data 
collection occurred, for instance, during periods of low seasonal employment.  
 
Table 3.7: Stability of the Job – Private Sector Sample Distribution: 
Stability Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Permanent 2,494 42.82 42.82 
Temporary 751 12.89 55.71 
Seasonal 56 0.96 56.67 
Casual 2,524 43.33 100.00 
Total 5,825 100.00  
Source: based on data extracted from the ELMPS2012 (ERF & CAPMAS, 2013)  
 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the ELMPS provides a nationally representative sample of Egyptian labour 
and allows us to utilise various measures to inspect a number of issues. We use STATA 
software to conduct our estimations in chapters IV, V, and VI, which enable us to address 
two significant labour market outcomes, namely wages and job satisfaction. Furthermore, 
we are able to draw conclusions and inferences regarding labour productivity, which is a 
critical issue in the Egyptian economy. Thus, our findings may prove useful in better 
understanding the Egyptian labour market and enhancing policy formulations. Note that 
the panel feature of the survey would have been beneficial for our analyses, but we 
remained confined to the 2012 round of the ELMPS because some of our main variables of 
interest are only available in that round. Finally, in terms of the sample we utilise, we have 
identified that the number of employed waged men exceeds that of women, and thus our 
analyses of the female sample separately proved problematic. Since it is not possible to 
compare the male and female samples, our analyses of the male sample in this thesis is 
only included to highlight any major differences between the complete labour sample and 
the male sample.  
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3.6 Appendix 3 
A map of Egypt is demonstrated below to clarify the regional distribution of the ELMPS.  
 
Figure 3.9: Map of Egypt: 
 
Source: CIA (2016) 
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Chapter IV 
Wage Determination and Sector of Employment Selection: 
Differences between the Formal and Informal Labour Markets 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse the differences in the factors that influence wages in the formal 
and the informal sectors in Egypt. Our interest is not so much on whether there is a 
difference in wages between these two sectors, but in whether the factors determining 
wages are different in the informal sector relative to the formal sector. We therefore 
address two research questions in this chapter, utilising data from the 2012 round of the 
Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS). The first question relates to the labour 
characteristics that influence selection into the formal sector in Egypt. The second question 
relates to the determinants of wages in the two sectors, and therefore requires us to 
estimate a wage model for each sector taking into account the probability of selection.   
 
Despite Egypt’s large informal sector, which employs approximately 51.2% of Egyptian 
labour (ILO, 2015), various authors highlighted the lack of studies addressing informality 
in Egypt. For instance, Wahba (2009) stated, “Overall, the limited literature on the 
informal sector in Egypt has focused on measuring the size of the informal sector and 
trying to understand its characteristics” (p.2). While Egypt’s informal labour market 
literature has expanded to some extent since Wahba’s (2009) research, Elsayed and Wahba 
(2016) still specified that, “There are a few studies on informality in Egypt” (p.3). Also, 
most of the recent studies have focused on the probabilities and determinants of transition 
from informal to formal employment (Wahba, 2009; Tansel & Ozdemir, 2014; Wahba & 
Assaad, 2015; Elsayed & Wahba, 2016) and on wage gaps between the two sectors (Tansel 
et al., 2015; Elsayed & Wahba, 2016). Few researchers have explicitly considered the 
differences of the effect of labour characteristics on the estimates of wages in each sector. 
Thus, this chapter concentrates on the determinants of wages in Egypt’s informal sector, 
and in doing so, it highlights how the factors influencing wages differ between the formal 
and informal sectors in Egypt. Starting from the literature’s findings of a wage gap 
between the formal and informal sectors in Egypt (Tansel et al., 2015; Elsayed & Wahba, 
2016), we aim to analyse why wages differ in the two sectors. What factors make formal 
sector wages higher than those in the informal sector? We are able to correct for selection 
bias, as do Tansel et al. (2015) in their analysis of the wage gap between the sectors, 
however, we go beyond their analysis in estimating separate wage models for each sector.  
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It is worth noting that a methodological challenge arises in estimating the sectoral wage 
equations. Due to the exclusion of observations for which wages are unobservable, 
resulting in a non-random subsample (Tansel et al., 2015), we might expect a bias in the 
sectoral wage equations’ estimates. Specifically, there might be systematic factors that lead 
to selection into a specific sector, which might also influence wages, biasing our estimates. 
We correct for this sample selection bias by taking selection into account in our estimation 
procedure.  
 
This chapter continues with a brief discussion of the definitions of informality as well as 
the different views of informality and the theoretical background of wage studies in section 
(4.2). This is followed by a review of the informal labour market literature in section (4.3). 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part discusses literature that addressed 
differences in wage determination between the formal and informal sectors in economies 
worldwide, while the second focuses explicitly on studies that addressed informal labour in 
Egypt. Section (4.4) then discusses the econometric model, while section (4.5) explains the 
selection bias issue and illustrates the methods used for conducting the estimations. Data 
utilised in the estimations are illustrated in section (4.6), while the results and their analysis 
are discussed in section (4.7). Finally, section (4.8) summarises the findings and concludes 
the chapter.  
 
 
4.2 Defining Informality and Theoretical Background 
To begin with, the different definitions of the informal sector and informal employment are 
reviewed. This is followed by a more specific discussion of some significant aspects of 
informality in the Egyptian context. This section concludes with a discussion of the 
different views proposed as to the existence of informal labour markets and the human 
capital theory, which represents the basis of wage determination studies. 
 
4.2.1 Defining Informality 
For a clearer understanding of the quantification of informal labour, it is important to begin 
by illustrating the diverse definitions of the informal sector and informal labour.  
 
  4.2.1.1 The Informal Sector: 
One of the earliest to coin the term ‘informal sector’ is Hart (1973). The ILO also 
popularised this term while addressing informality in a number of developing countries. 
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According to Lubell (1991), the ILO’s 1972 mission to Kenya instituted that informality 
revolved around characteristics such as smaller firms, family-owned businesses, lack of 
regulation, and ease of entry, among others (as cited in Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995). 
Castells and Portes (1989) later summarised a more general statement to capture the 
essence of informality, albeit vaguely, by stating, “It is unregulated by the institutions of 
society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated” (p.12). 
Still, Portes (1994) pointed out that noncompliance with legal regulations is of more 
significance than noncompliance with social regulations (as cited in Tansel, 1999). 
Pradhan and Van Soest (1995) elaborated on the differences between the formal and 
informal sectors, in which they explained the formal sector’s subjection to regulations, 
payment of taxes, and the prevalence of explicit contracts between employers and 
employees as opposed to the informal sector that is dominated by smaller firms and self-
employment.  
 
  4.2.1.2 Informal Employment: 
While attempts to clarify the definition of informality have continued, the definitions of 
informal employment increased in number and in diversity. For instance, Mezzera (1990) 
utilised firms’ sizes to define informal employment, while Roberts (1990) focused solely 
on the waged workers, identifying formal workers as those covered by social security, 
whereas informal workers lack this kind of coverage (as cited in Marcouiller et al., 1997). 
Other authors, such as Magnac (1991), differentiated between waged workers and self-
employed workers, considering the former as formal and the latter as informal. Pradhan 
and Van Soest (1995) used two definitions to identify informal labour, although they found 
both definitions leading to the same classification for the majority of the sample. The first 
definition resembled Magnac’s (1991), differentiating explicitly between waged and self-
employed workers. The second definition depended on firms’ sizes, specifying firms with 
less than six employees as informal, while larger firms and independent professionals, such 
as lawyers and doctors, as formal. It is worth noting that the differences in defining 
informal employment have complicated the accurate quantification of informal labour, and 
as Carneiro and Henley (2001) pointed out, estimates of informal employment often vary 
due to disagreements on what constitutes such employment.  
 
4.2.2 Informality in Egypt  
In the following discussion, we highlight the particular definition of informal labour 
utilised in our analysis and explain the main elements of the social security system in 
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Egypt. Additionally, we explain the role of the public sector in relation to informality in 
the Egyptian context, in order to justify our focus on the private sector.  
 
  4.2.2.1 Informal Labour and the Social Security System in Egypt: 
In our research, we identify informal labour as those uncovered by the social security 
system and have no formal labour contract with their employers (see section 3.4.2). This 
measure corresponds to the definition of informality in much of the Egyptian informal 
labour market literature (Wahba, 2009; Nazier & Ramadan, 2015; Tansel & Ozdemir, 
2014; Tansel et al., 2015) and to one of the measures of informal employment in the 
ELMPS (see section 3.4.2). For a better understanding of what social security coverage 
entails for Egyptian labour, we will briefly review the main elements of this system.  
 
According to Egyptian law, every employed person aged 18 years old (or 16 years old for 
government employees) and above should be covered by social security. Still, as our data 
shows, this is not necessarily the case. Various laws, governing the different types of 
workers covered, complicate this social security system. The 79/1975 law governs civil 
servants, public, and private workers, the 108/1976 law governs employers and self-
employed individuals, the 50/1978 law governs migrant workers, and the 112/1980 law 
governs seasonal workers (Selwaness, 2015). The contributions to social security are 
shared among workers, employers, and the government, and there are numerous benefits to 
redeem, such as old age pensions, disability pensions, survivor benefits, death grants, and 
funeral grants (Social Security Administration [SSA], 2011). Also, the 1975 social security 
law provides workers with additional benefits relevant to sickness, maternity, work injury, 
and unemployment (SSA, 2011). Nevertheless, contributions to these additional benefits 
are rare, employers carry the whole financial burden, and the self-employed remain 
uncovered across these benefits.  
 
Despite such an elaborate system, it still suffers from numerous drawbacks. Most 
importantly, the informal sector still falls between the gaps of all these laws, and informal 
workers remain uncovered and unable to benefit of all this system’s returns. Worse still, 
Loewe (2000) mentioned that the informal labour constituted 44.5% of the total labour 
force between the years 2000 and 2007. Later, Selwaness (2015) mentioned that only 53% 
of the employed labour is actually covered, implying the growth of the informal sector and 
the inadequacy of social security coverage in Egypt. Furthermore, this system’s 
deficiencies extend to the workers that are actually covered, due to the variety of social 
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insurance schemes and their inequality in terms of benefits, the lack of protection against 
serious risks, low coverage in reality, inadequate benefit levels, and low returns to 
contributions (Loewe, 2000).  
 
4.2.2.2 The Public Sector and Informality in Egypt: 
An important labour characteristic in wage studies is the organisational sector of 
employment, which according to the ELMPS identifies whether the individual works for 
the governmental, public, private, investment, international, or other sectors. Since the 
wage-setting processes in the public and private sectors are very different (see section 2.5), 
most studies analyse the two sectors separately (Assaad, 1997; El-Ghamrawy & Amer, 
2011; Tansel et al., 2015; Elsayed & Wahba, 2016; Nazier & Ramadan, 2015). This 
distinction is especially magnified when we consider the differences between formal and 
informal labour, since employment in the governmental and public sectors is required by 
law to be formal. Thus, we expect public sector workers to be hired through the correct and 
formal channels, and that most individuals should be formally employed. Based on our 
data and according to the definition of informality we utilise, we indeed find that only 2% 
of the public sector sample, which combines governmental and public sector labour, is 
employed in the informal sector.  
 
Accordingly, if we were to combine the samples, our wage estimates would be inaccurate 
as the different labour characteristics are likely to have a distinct impact on wages in each 
of the public and private sectors. Furthermore, our formal sector wage results would be 
largely affected by the public sector, while there would be little or no impact on the 
informal sector wages. Consequently, we focus solely on the private sector workers in our 
analysis and eliminate all other types of workers. Note that while we drop the 
governmental and public sectors for the above reasons, we also drop investment, 
international, and other sectors, since it is unclear under which category these would fall.   
 
 4.2.3 Theoretical Basis 
The following discussion of theory is divided into two parts. Firstly, we address the 
different views that explain why or how informal labour exists in the overall framework of 
labour markets. Secondly, we discuss the human capital theory, upon which wage 
determination studies are based.  
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4.2.3.1 Views about Informal Labour Markets: 
There are three different views as to the prevalence of informal employment in labour 
markets. The traditional view regards informal labour as a disadvantaged group in the 
labour market, whose potential productivity is likely to be equal to their counterparts in the 
formal sector, but still enjoy lower job security, benefits, and earnings. Thus, informality is 
viewed as a buffer, intermediary zone, or a refuge for those escaping unemployment. 
According to Dickens and Lang (1985), the informal sector is related to the dual labour 
market theory, which postulates the existence of two different wage-setting mechanisms in 
each sector and a queue for formal jobs. Another explanation is that informal sectors 
develop during restructuring and recession periods, which are characterised by large 
numbers of layoffs in the formal sector (Portes & Schauffler, 1993).  
 
Traditional development theorists (Lewis, 1954) have hypothesised that as economies 
develop, the informal sector would cease to exist. In reality, however, the informal sector 
has in many developing countries continued to thrive and grow. Accordingly, scholars 
began to examine the informal sector as an equally competitive sector to the formal one 
rather than an inferior last option to formality. This led to some researchers (Marcouiller et 
al., 1997; Maloney, 1999; Arias & Khamis, 2008) finding that the informal sector, mostly 
in Latin American economies, may be preferred in some instances rather than a last resort, 
which for example, may be due to the ineffectiveness of protection granted by the formal 
sector.  
  
Still, scholars could not agree that either view applies to all informal labour markets, which 
gave rise to a view relating to the heterogeneity of the informal sector employees. Fields 
(1990), who was among the pioneers of this idea, explained that the informal sector could 
be divided into two groups, the ‘easy-entry informal sector’ and the ‘upper-tier informal 
sector’. The former is characterised by easy-entry, low wages, and a preference for formal 
employment, while the latter is characterised by limited-entry, high wages, and the 
undesirability of formal employment. This implies that the ‘easy-entry informal sector’ 
represents a refuge from unemployment and is worse off than formal employment, while 
the ‘upper-tier informal sector’ is superior to formal employment. This view of the 
heterogeneity of informal labour is backed by many studies, such as Fields (1990), 
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002), Günther and Launov (2006), and Botelho and Ponczek 
(2011).  
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In Egypt’s context, there is significant research confirming the superiority of the formal 
sector (Wahba, 2009; Nazier & Ramadan, 2014; Tansel et al., 2015; Elsayed & Wahba, 
2016). Therefore, we do not dwell on this any further in this chapter. Instead, we turn to 
the differences between the labour characteristics’ impact on selection into the formal 
sector and on wages earned in each sector.  
   
4.2.3.2 The Human Capital Theory: 
The human capital theory, which is the basis for wage studies, is quite significant in 
Egypt’s context due to the perceived role of human capital in achieving sustainable 
economic growth (Schultz, 1961), which is one of the ultimate goals of this struggling 
economy. Jacob Mincer, one of the pioneers in the area of human capital theory, developed 
a model to analyse the impact of human capital on wages (Mincer, 1958). This immensely 
popular model, which came to be known as the Mincer wage equation, is perhaps one of 
the most widely used models in empirical researches of labour economics. Specifically, 
Mincer’s (1974) model represented wages or earnings as a function of years of schooling 
and work experience. Over time, the basic Mincer equation was extended to include many 
other potential determinants of wages, including age, gender, marital status, occupations, 
job formality, and others. 
 
 
4.3 Literature Review 
Our analysis touches upon two main issues in the labour market, selection into sector of 
employment and wage determination in these sectors. These two issues usually overlap, 
since selection is likely to have an effect on the earnings a worker can make. The below 
discussion begins by a review of the international literature that addressed the differences 
between the formal and informal wage determination and corrected for sample selection. 
This is followed by a review of literature that specifically addressed Egypt’s informal 
labour market. This review highlights how our research aims to fill a gap and contributes 
to Egypt’s labour market literature.  
 
4.3.1 Wages and Sector of Employment Selection 
Two main research questions were of interest in the relevant literature. First, how do the 
different labour characteristics affect the probability of being selected into a specific 
sector? And second, how do the determinants of wages in each sector differ after 
accounting for selection? Numerous authors addressed these two issues in various 
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economies around the world (Marcouiller et al., 1997; Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995; 
Funkhouser, 1996; Tansel, 1999; Carneiro & Henley, 2001), and some authors extended 
their research to examine wage differentials between the two sectors (Marcouiller et al., 
1997; Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995; Tansel, 1999). These wage differentials were calculated 
pre- and post-selection correction, and authors addressed whether selection is likely to 
affect these differentials. Authors who found significant wage differentials in favour of 
formal jobholders (Marcouiller et al., 1997; Tansel, 1999) have argued that such results 
confirm the traditional view of informality being inferior or a refuge for those who cannot 
find a formal job.  
 
More recently and after the continuous growth of informal sectors around the world, 
contradicting the postulations of Classical Economic theory of the disappearance of the 
informal sector as economies continue to develop, authors turned their attention to the 
examination of transition trends between the sectors. In this category of the literature, the 
two sectors were treated as equally competitive, where individuals may rationally choose 
an informal job rather than a formal one. Maloney (1999), among the earlier and popular 
studies that examined this newer view of informality, addressed worker mobility across 
sectors of employment in Mexico and found evidence that informal employment is a 
choice workers make rather than a refuge from unemployment. Marcouiller et al. (1997) 
have found the same evidence for Mexico, but they found the opposite for El Salvador and 
Peru. Conversely, Gong and Van Soest (2002), focusing on urban Mexico, concluded that 
formal jobs remain superior to informal ones. Thus, whether informality is an inferior 
option and a limitation or is equally competitive to formality remains questionable, with 
varying results across the economies.  
 
In estimating selection, methods utilised were dependent on the choice of employment 
statuses accounted for in the respective analyses. Some authors, similar to our study, 
considered only two states of employment (Funkhouser, 1996; Carneiro & Henley, 2001), 
and thus utilised a Probit model to analyse selection. Other authors considered additional 
states, such as unemployment, self-employed, etc., and for this purpose, a Multinomial 
Logit model was used (Tansel, 1999). A special case is Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), 
who utilised both a Multinomial Logit model and an Ordered Probit model. The authors 
explained that the Multinomial Logit model does not pose any ranking on the categories of 
employment, while the Ordered Probit model assumes a ranking of employment states, 
with non-participation as the lowest followed by informal employment and then formal 
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employment as the highest. The authors found that the difference between the models is 
insignificant for males, but that for females, the Multinomial Logit model was preferred.  
 
For the estimation of wages taking selection into account, authors essentially utilised a 
two-step approach, which began by estimating a selection equation. This estimation 
provided a selection correction term, which was then included in the second stage 
estimation of wages for each sector of employment. This was usually the Heckman 
Selection model (Tansel, 1999). Still, Carneiro and Henley (2001) utilised a three-step 
approach, following a model by Lee (1978), to extend their research to examine the impact 
of the sectoral wage differentials on sector choice. The first two stages of this model are 
similar to two-step approaches. In the third stage, a Probit model of the structural selection 
equation was estimated, which included a predicted earnings differential attained from the 
earnings functions in the second stage.  
 
The challenge with such multiple-stage models is to find the appropriate identifiers for the 
selection equation, as is the case with all methods that use instruments. These identifiers 
need to be significant in the estimation of selection, while irrelevant to the estimation of 
wages. Household characteristics are among the most popular identifiers of selection in the 
literature. Pradhan and Van Soest (1995) used variables relevant to family composition and 
other family income to identify selection. Similarly, Carneiro and Henley (2001) identified 
selection by including whether the individual is head of household, a spouse of head of 
household, and the prevalence of other household income. In addition, they included the 
size of employer, payment method, type of contract, and holding other jobs as identifiers, 
however, we remain sceptical about these latter identifiers as they may also affect wages. 
Marcouiller et al. (1997) also included similar identifiers, such as number of babies, 
number of inactive people in household, other labour income, and whether the individual is 
head of household.  
 
The findings of the literature have been relatively consistent. Generally, authors found age, 
household factors, and education to determine selection into sector of employment. 
Specifically, informal jobholders were found to be the youngest and the oldest, while 
higher educational attainment was found to increase the probability of formal employment 
(Marcouiller et al., 1997; Funkhouser, 1996; Tansel, 1999; Tansel et al., 2015). Note that 
while household factors were found to significantly impact selection, Funkhouser (1996) 
concluded that these were more significant for females than males.  
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In terms of wage determination, returns to schooling have been found to be higher for 
formal jobholders than informal ones (Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995; Marcouiller et al., 
1997; Funkhouser, 1996). Furthermore, sectoral wage gaps in favour of formal jobholders 
have been largely confirmed by the literature (Pradhan & Van Soest, 1995), and 
Marcouiller et al. (1997) added that these gaps are reinforced after selection correction. 
Similarly, selection correction has increased the gender wage gap (Tansel, 1999), however, 
whether informal employment is a choice or a limitation remains debatable due to mixed 
findings (Marcouiller et al., 1997; Tansel, 1999; Maloney, 1999; Carneiro & Henley, 
2001).  
 
 4.3.2 Egypt’s Informal Labour Market Literature 
Most authors who addressed the informal labour market in Egypt were consistent in their 
identification of informal workers. Many authors (Wahba, 2009; Nazier & Ramadan, 2015; 
Tansel & Ozdemir, 2014; Tansel et al., 2015) identified informal labour as those 
uncovered by the social security system and have no formal job contract, similar to our 
research. Still, some authors focused on the lack of a job contract only to identify informal 
labour (Wahba & Assaad, 2015; Elsayed & Wahba, 2016). This choice depended on the 
particular research question and interest of each study.  
 
Wahba (2009) addressed two research questions. First, whether individuals move from 
informal to formal employment. Second, what the determinants of making this transition 
were. The main objective of the study was to examine whether informality is a stepping-
stone or a dead end in the Egyptian labour market. The author reviewed informality trends, 
the characteristics of the movers, as well as constructed transitional matrices between the 
two sectors of employment between 1998 and 2006. She also estimated Probit models to 
examine the probability of moving out of informality. Wahba (2009) found that results 
differ with regards to education and gender, with informal employment being a stepping 
stone for highly educated men but a dead end for the uneducated and women.  
 
Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) also examined labour transitions across the sectors of 
employment in Egypt. They utilised panel data and identified a number of labour market 
states, including formal private wage work, informal private regular wage work, irregular 
wage work, government employment, agriculture self-employment, non-agriculture self-
employment, unemployment, and out of labour force. They utilised Markov transition 
process probabilities to consider the transition across the different states of employment, 
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and they estimated Multinomial Logit models by maximum likelihood to address the 
determinants of moving out of each labour market state. The authors concluded that the 
governmental workers and those out of the labour force are the most static labour in Egypt, 
while the informal private wage workers and the unemployed were the most mobile. They 
explained that the desirability of government employment is the reason behind the low 
mobility of government workers, while individuals out of labour force form the largest 
proportion of the sample, and therefore transitioning from this state is harder. This also 
holds for women because of their low labour force participation rates.  
 
Similarly, Elsayed and Wahba (2016) used panel data to investigate the dynamics of 
informality in Egypt as well as the value of holding a formal job contract. The authors 
estimated a Multinomial Logit model to address labour transitions from private formal or 
informal employment to other states of employment. They also estimated various wage 
equations to address wage gaps and the gains or losses from moving to formal 
employment. The authors found that the prevalence of working without a contract has 
increased over the last two decades. Also, they concluded that working without a contract 
(i.e. informally) is associated with a pay penalty, which has increased over time, and they 
added that moving from informal to formal employment is associated with a substantial 
wage premium.   
 
Other recent studies include Wahba and Assaad (2015), who addressed the flexibility of 
labour market regulations on the prevalence of formal job contracts. They focused on the 
years 1998 to 2008 to examine the impact of changes applied to the labour law in 2004, 
which introduced more flexibility to the processes of hiring and firing workers. The 
authors restricted their sample to the private non-agricultural workers, since they argued 
that changes in the law were mainly applicable to that group. The authors estimated the 
probability of acquiring new jobs with contracts as well as the probabilities of having a 
formal contract before and after the labour law modifications. They also used a Difference-
in-Differences approach to investigate whether the changes in law have increased the 
prevalence of job contracts. Their findings confirm that flexibility had promoted formal 
employment in Egypt.  
 
Another issue addressed by Nazier and Ramadan (2015) was the link between informality 
and poverty. The authors assumed that a case of reverse causality arises in estimating the 
likelihoods of informality or falling into poverty, and thus estimated Maximum Likelihood 
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Probit models for each equation, utilising instrumental variables to correct for this 
endogeneity. The authors instrumented informality by firm size, which is unlikely to affect 
poverty, though it would be a determinant of wages (as in our estimations). The authors 
found that informal employment is likely to increase poverty, however, they found that 
poverty is insignificant for the probability of informality, which they argued is a reason to 
believe that workers may choose informality rather than be forced into it to escape poverty.  
 
Conversely, Tansel et al. (2015) analysed the informal employment’s wage penalties, 
focusing on the private sector wage earners. They estimated a variety of wage equations to 
determine whether a wage penalty or premium exists for informal labour as well as 
employed panel data in their estimations and utilised a variety of methods, including 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects (FE). They also used Quantile Regression 
(QR) techniques to address differences across different points of the wage distribution. The 
authors concluded that the informal sector suffers from a wage penalty and this penalty is 
largest at the top of the wage distribution. Similar to Elsayed and Wahba (2016), the 
authors also identified that the wage penalty of informal employment has increased over 
time. Therefore, Tansel et al. (2015) argued that their findings propose that informal 
employment is not a choice in Egypt, but rather a constraint faced by Egyptian labour from 
entering the formal sector.   
 
On a final note, authors addressing wage determination often correct for the sample 
selection bias likely to arise due to participation in the labour force. Specifically, 
unobservable factors that influence individuals’ participation into the labour force may also 
impact how much pay these individuals get. Yet, we do not observe the wages of 
individuals out of the labour force, and thus our wage equations’ results may be biased. In 
Egypt’s context, this issue is of less significance, since labour force participation is more 
of a problem for women rather than men, whilst the majority of the labour force and the 
employed labour comprises men (see table 3.2). Accordingly, we do not address selection 
into participation in this chapter, similar to the literature’s (Tansel et al., 2015; Elsayed & 
Wahba, 2016) approach, but still address the sample selection bias likely to arise from 
sector selection.  
 
Our above review of the Egyptian informal labour market literature indicates that the 
informal sector is less attractive as an employment option than the formal sector. Few of 
these studies, however, considered how the wage determination process differs between 
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the two sectors of employment. This is our objective in this chapter. We aim to add to the 
literature an understanding of the specific factors that are likely to be better rewarded in 
each sector and how workers may improve their labour market outcomes in each sector of 
employment.  
 
 
4.4 Econometric Framework  
In this section, the selection equation and the sectoral wage equations, which are used to 
answer the relevant research questions, are demonstrated.  
 
4.4.1 Selection Equation 
To begin with, we estimate a selection equation to determine the impact of some labour 
characteristics on the probability of formal employment. This equation is based on the 
concept of utility achieved from employment in a specific sector. The model starts by 
classifying individuals into formal sector labour, which is identified by the superscript ‘F’, 
and informal sector labour, identified by the superscript ‘I’. A rational individual is 
assumed to choose the sector that provides them with the highest utility, which is 
dependent on the workers’ characteristics. Thus, the model is identified as follows,  
 
𝐏𝐫(𝑼𝒊
𝑭 − 𝑼𝒊
𝑰 ≥ 𝟎) = 𝐏𝐫[𝒂 + 𝜹(𝒁𝒊) + 𝜸𝒊 ≥ 𝟎] 
Where,  
𝑈𝑖
𝐹- Utility derived by individual i from formal employment (F) 
𝑈𝑖
𝐼 - Utility derived by individual i from informal employment (I) 
𝑍𝑖 - Explanatory variables of individual i 
𝛿 - Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝛾 - Error terms 
 
The above shows that the probability of the difference between an individual’s utility of 
formal employment (𝑈𝑖
𝐹) and utility of informal employment (𝑈𝑖
𝐼) equalling to 0 or higher 
is a function of the probability of a set of variables equalling to or exceeding 0. 
 
Based on the above utility function, the selection equation of interest is demonstrated as, 
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𝐏𝐫(𝒚𝒊 = 𝟏|𝒙𝒊) = 𝐏𝐫[𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑳𝒊) + 𝜸𝒊] (EQ.I) 
Where, 
𝑦𝑖 = 1 – Selection into formal employment for individual i  
𝑋𝑖 - Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 - Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝐿𝑖 – Selection-Specific characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 – Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝛾 - Error terms 
 
In EQ.I, the probability of being formally employed (y = 1), represented by the binary 
variable of whether the individual is employed formally (F) or otherwise, is regressed on 
four categories of variables, including individual (X), human capital (C), job (J), and 
selection-specific (L) characteristics. Note that the selection-specific characteristics (L) are 
used to identify the selection equation, thus these factors should significantly affect 
selection into sectors of employment, but have no direct effect on wages.  
 
 4.4.2 Wage Equations 
For wage determination, we utilise the extended form of a Mincer-type wage equation, 
where the logarithm of hourly wages is regressed on factors that are expected to affect 
wages. Since we are interested in understanding how the effect of the determinants of 
wages differs between the two sectors of employment, we estimate two wage equations, 
each utilising a separate subsample, the formal labour (F) and the informal labour (I), 
respectively. The estimated coefficients show the significance, direction, and magnitude of 
the effect of each wage determinant. The sectoral wage equations of interest are identified 
as follows, 
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Formal Sector Wage Equation: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊
𝑭) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊
𝑭) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊
𝑭) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊
𝑭) + 𝝁𝒊
𝑭  (EQ.II) 
 
Informal Sector Wage Equation: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊
𝑰) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊
𝑰) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊
𝑰) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊
𝑰) + 𝝁𝒊
𝑰   (EQ.III) 
Where,  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑖) – Logarithm of hourly wages of individual i 
𝑋𝑖 - Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 - Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 – Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝜇 - Error terms 
 
As shown in EQ.II and EQ.III, the logarithms of hourly wages [Log (w)] are regressed on 
individual (X), human capital (C), and job (J) characteristics. The variables included under 
each category are chosen based on their significance in the Egyptian labour market’s 
context and availability in datasets.  
 
 
4.5 Methodology 
This section illustrates the methods employed to conduct our estimations and discusses the 
selection problem we encounter in estimating the sectoral wage equations.  
 
4.5.1 Selection Equation Estimation Method 
Our first research question requires the estimation of a selection equation (EQ.I). Our 
dependent variable of interest, the probability of formal employment, is of a binary nature, 
thus we utilise a Probit model. Since this equation also represents the first-stage of the 
Heckman Selection Two-Step wage equations’ estimation method, which we utilise to 
correct for selection, we must include variables that are likely to affect selection, but 
unlikely to have any direct effect on wages, in order to properly identify the selection 
equation. For this purpose, we include the selection-specific variables, which consist of the 
unemployment rates stratified by educational attainment level and whether respondents’ 
fathers were working in the public or private sectors when respondents were 15 years old.  
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 4.5.2 Sample Selection Bias 
As previously stated, it is expected that individuals with particular characteristics be 
selected into specific sectors, which implies that the factors that determined selection, but 
are unobservable in the estimation of the sectoral wage equations, are also likely to affect 
wages earned. Due to this likely selection bias, the sectoral wage equations are no longer 
appropriately estimated by the commonly used OLS method. Thus, in the estimation of 
EQ.II and EQ.III, we should correct for selection, which requires computing a selection 
correction term that is incorporated in the estimation of the sectoral wage equations. The 
magnitude and significance of this selection correction term provide an idea of how 
important selection is in influencing wage determination in each sector.  
 
 4.5.3 Wage Equation Estimation Methods 
In order to demonstrate how selection affects estimates, two distinct estimation methods 
are utilised for the estimation of the sectoral wage equations. One method, namely the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, overlooks selection, while the other, the Heckman 
Two-Step Selection method (Heckman, 1979), corrects for selection.  
 
In the first stage of Heckman Two-Step Selection method, we estimate a selection equation 
(EQ.I). For simplification purposes, this equation is identified as,  
 
𝐏𝐫(𝒚𝒊 = 𝟏|𝒙𝒊) =  𝚽[𝚼(𝒁𝒊)]     (EQ.IV) 
 
Based on the estimation of EQ.IV, we are able to compute the selection correction term, 
known as the Inverse Mills Ratio or the IMILLS Ratio (IMR), as follows,  
 
𝑰𝑴𝑹𝒊 = 𝝓(?̂?𝒁𝒊)/𝚽[?̂?(𝒁𝒊)]     (EQ.V) 
Where,  
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖 - Selection correction term (Inverse Mills Ratio) 
 
Note that the above IMR is specific to the formal sector wage equation. In order to account 
for selection in the informal sector wage equation, we estimate the probability of 
informality and compute the IMR by repeating the estimation of EQ.V.  
 
In the second stage, we insert each IMR into the relevant structural wage equation as 
additional explanatory variables. The significance of the IMR in the second stage would 
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imply a selection bias in OLS estimates. The second stage estimations are identified as 
follows,  
 
Formal Sector Wage Equation with Selection: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊
𝑭) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊
𝑭) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊
𝑭) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊
𝑭) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑰𝑴𝑹𝒊
𝑭) + 𝝁𝒊
𝑭  (EQ.VI) 
  
Informal Sector Wage Equation with Selection: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊
𝑰) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊
𝑰) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊
𝑰) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊
𝑰) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑰𝑴𝑹𝒊
𝑰) + 𝝁𝒊
𝑰  (EQ.VII) 
 
 
4.6 Data 
This section begins by highlighting again the restrictions placed on the sample and any 
information relevant to the formal/informal divide, which is the focal point of this chapter. 
Thereafter, the variables utilised in each equation’s estimation and their descriptive 
statistics are discussed, focusing on the particular sample utilised in our models.  
 
4.6.1 Sample 
Only the employed non-agricultural private sector waged workers, which are particularly 
between the ages of 15 and 65 years old, are included in the analysis in this chapter. We 
concentrate on the private sector workers because there is very little informality in the 
public sector (see section 4.2.2.2) and because there is a significant difference in wage 
determination between the public and private sectors (see section 2.5). Additionally, the 
exclusion of the agricultural workers is based on the ILO’s definition of informal labour, 
which is quantified according to work associated with informal enterprises excluding those 
whose activities are usually associated with agriculture (International Labour Office [ILO], 
2013). Furthermore, we drop any observations with missing variables. This gives us a 
sample of 4,676 observations. In our analysis, this sample is divided between the formal 
and informal sectors.  
 
4.6.2 Variables  
While certain variables are common between the selection and wage equations estimated, 
at least one factor should be specific to each equation to adhere to the exclusion 
restrictions. Table 4.1 below summarises all variables utilised in the estimation of each 
equation of interest.  
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Table 4.1: Variables - by Equation: 
 Selection Equation (EQ.I) Wage Equations 
(EQ.II/EQ.III) 
Dependent Variables  
 Probability of Formal Employment Logarithm of Hourly Wages 
Explanatory Variables  
 
 
Individual 
Characteristics 
Age Age 
Age squared Age squared 
Gender* Gender* 
Marital Status* Marital Status* 
Region* Region* 
Parents’ Education* Parents’ Education* 
Human 
Capital 
Characteristics 
Education* Education* 
Training Received* Training Received* 
 
 
 
Job 
Characteristics 
Occupations* Occupations* 
………. Tenure 
………. Tenure Squared 
………. Stability of Job* 
………. Union Membership* 
………. Supervisory Roles* 
………. Night Work* 
………. Firm Size* 
Instrumental Variables  
Selection-
Specific 
Characteristics 
Educational Unemployment Rates24 ………. 
Fathers’ Public/Private Sector of 
Employment when respondent was 
15 years old* 
………. 
*Indicates the use of dummy variables 
 
4.6.2.1 Dependent Variables: 
For the selection equation, the dependent variable is a binary variable, representing 
whether the respondent is employed in the formal or informal sector, which is determined 
according to the primary job of the respondents. Formal jobholders are identified as those 
who have a formal job contract or are covered by social security as opposed to informal 
jobholders who have neither. For our sample of 4,676 observations and based on the 
definition of informality we utilise in this thesis, we have 3,475 individuals in the informal 
sector as opposed to only 1,201 individuals in the formal sector (see table 4.2). This is 
expected given that our sample comprises the private sector only, where informality is 
highly prevalent.  
 
                                                        
24  Data extracted from CAPMAS’s Statistical Year Book (Central Agency for Public 
Mobilisation and Statistics [CAPMAS], 2012). 
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The dependent variable for the wage equations is the logarithm of hourly wages of 
individuals, and according to the descriptive statistics (see table 4.2), the formal sample’s 
average logarithm of hourly wages is higher than that of the informal sample.  
 
Table 4.2: Dependent Variables - Descriptions and Statistics:  
Variables Description Statistics25 
Formal Informal 
LOG (WAGES/HR) Logarithm of hourly wages 1.597 
(0.752) 
1.359 
(0.655) 
FORMAL 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for formality 
of job,  
1 if job is formal, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: informal workers 
 
 
1,201 
3,475 
 
Testing for the significance of the difference between the average logarithms of hourly 
wages in each sector (see table 4.3) confirms that average logarithm of hourly wages in the 
formal sector is significantly higher than those in the informal sector. Measuring this 
sectoral wage gap has been the focus of many studies to date (Heckman & Hotz, 1986; El 
Badaoui et al., 2008; Arias & Khamis, 2008; Tansel et al., 2015).  
 
Table 4.3: T-test for Formal/Informal Means of the Logarithm of Hourly Wages:  
 Observations Means St. Error T-Statistic 
Formal 1,201 1.597 0.022  
10.435 Informal 3,475 1.359 0.011 
Difference  0.238 0.023 
 
4.6.2.2 Explanatory Variables: 
We turn our attention herein to the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
(individual, human capital, and job characteristics) utilised in the selection and wage 
equations, in order to illustrate the sample of interest, and we divide our sample according 
to the sector of employment, whether formal or informal (see table 4.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
25 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for [LOG (WAGES/HR)], while 
frequency of observations provided for (FORMAL).  
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Table 4.4: Individual, Human Capital, and Job Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Description Statistics26 
  Formal Informal  
Individual Characteristics 
AGE Age of respondents in years 34.04 (9.42) 30.55 (9.38) 
Gender: 
MALE 
Reference 
A dummy variable for gender,  
1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: females 
 
1,074 
127 
 
3,281 
194 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
Reference 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
Reference 
An interaction variable for marital status*gender,  
1 if male and married, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: females of all marital statuses and males less than minimum age, single, contractually married, divorced, or widowed(er) 
1 if female and married, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: males of all marital statuses and females less than minimum age, single, contractually married, divorced, or widowed(er) 
 
837 
364 
45 
1,156 
 
2,043 
1,432 
73 
3,402 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
Reference 
A categorical variable for region of residence,  
1 if rural lower area, 0 otherwise 
1 if urban upper area, 0 otherwise 
1 if urban lower area, 0 otherwise 
1 if Alexandria or Suez canal, 0 otherwise 
1 if Greater Cairo, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: rural upper region 
 
301 
120 
142 
174 
335 
129 
 
940 
501 
449 
295 
387 
903 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
Reference 
MOTHER EDUC 
Reference 
A dummy variable for parents’ education,  
1 if father has some degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: uneducated fathers 
1 if mother has some degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: uneducated mothers 
 
530 
671 
321 
880 
 
810 
2,665 
416 
3,059 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
Reference 
A categorical variable for educational attainment level of respondent,  
1 if literate with no diploma, 0 otherwise 
1 if elementary degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if middle school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if general high school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if vocational high school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if post-secondary degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if university degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if post-graduate degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: illiterates  
 
39 
105 
57 
31 
410 
54 
396 
14 
95 
 
173 
532 
298 
100 
1,300 
96 
306 
8 
662 
                                                        
26 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for continuous variables, while frequency of observations provided for categorical and dummy 
variables. 
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Table 4.4 (Continued):  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TRAINING 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether respondent received training other than formal education,  
1 if received training, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no training received 
 
140 
1,061 
 
68 
3,407 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
Reference 
A categorical variable for occupation of respondents, 
1 if professional, 0 otherwise 
1 if technicians/associate professionals, 0 otherwise 
1 if clerical support worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if service/sales worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if craft and related trades worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if plant/machine operator, 0 otherwise 
1 if elementary occupation, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: managers  
 
246 
131 
49 
152 
112 
371  
92 
48 
 
108 
76 
48 
684  
1,753 
513 
280 
13 
TENURE The length of employment at current job in years 9.48 (8.44) 9.43 (8.51) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
Reference 
A categorical variable for stability of job,  
1 if temporary worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if seasonal worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if casual worker, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: permanent workers  
 
183 
1 
92 
925 
 
505 
25 
1,614 
1,331 
UNION  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for union membership,  
1 if member in union, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-union members 
 
366 
835 
 
114 
3,361 
SUPERVISOR 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for supervisory roles,  
1 if respondent is a supervisor, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-supervisors  
 
248 
953 
 
215 
3,260 
NIGHT  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for working night (after 7 p.m.),  
1 if works nights, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no night work  
 
653 
548 
 
1,756 
1,719 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
Reference 
A categorical variable for size of firm,  
1 if firm with 50-99 workers, 0 otherwise 
1 if firm with 100+ workers, 0 otherwise 
1 if size of firm unknown, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: firms with less than 50 workers 
 
117 
474 
72 
507 
 
68 
155 
103 
3,001 
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To begin with, we find that the formal sample’s average age of individuals is higher than 
the informal sector’s sample (see table 4.4), implying older individuals’ transition to or 
preference for formal jobs. Also, gender may be very influential in both sector choice and 
wages due to the differences in the Egyptian society’s views regarding men and women in 
the labour market. Thus, we control for gender, but females constitute only 6.86% of our 
sample, and we find that 75.34% and 60.44% of men and women, respectively, are 
informally employed (see table 4.4). Thus, it is difficult to draw any conclusions with 
regards to gender based on the statistics.  
 
Since the effect of marriage on choices of men and women in the labour market may differ, 
we construct an interaction variable between marriage and gender, where we find that a 
significant proportion of married men are employed in either sector, while the opposite is 
true for women (see table 4.4). The region of residence is also quite important in our 
research. Individuals residing in urban areas may have access to better job opportunities 
and labour market outcomes. We find that out of our rural upper and rural lower regions’ 
samples, 87.5% and 75.7%, respectively, are employed in the informal sector, which are 
highest among the regions (see table 4.4). Additionally, drawing on Goldsmith et al.’s 
(2000) arguments, the home environment individuals are brought up in is likely to 
influence their values, beliefs, and perceptions, as well as affect their choices in the labour 
market. Accordingly, we control for respondents’ parents’ educational attainment in both 
equations, and we find that the majority of individuals with uneducated parents are 
informally employed.  
 
In terms of human capital (see table 4.4), we find that the majority of most degree-holders 
are informally employed, except for university and post-graduate degrees. Also, the 
majority of individuals with training are formally employed, although these are only 4.5% 
of our sample. 
 
Additionally, we control for a number of job characteristics. Occupations are the only job 
characteristic included in our selection equation (see table 4.1). Occupations may affect 
selection, since some occupations are likely to be operating in a larger informal framework 
than others. Indeed, we find that the proportion of managers, professionals, and technicians 
in the formal sector exceeds that in the informal one, while we find the opposite for 
service/sales and craft/trade workers (see table 4.4). Since occupations are also likely to 
affect wages, we control for this variable in the wage equations. Other job factors 
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controlled for in the wage equations include tenure and tenure squared, and we find that 
average tenure (i.e. the length of time the individual has been at current job) is slightly 
higher among the formal sector sample (see table 4.4). Similarly, we find that the majority 
of union members and those working in larger firms are in the formal sector (see table 4.4).   
 
Note that we omit some wage determinants from our analysis for methodological purposes. 
First, we do not control for the industrial classifications of individuals’ jobs, which are 
correlated with our control variable of occupations, in order to avoid multicollinearity. 
Second, we do not control for whether individuals work secondary jobs or their health 
states, since there is a potential endogeneity that might arise from including either variable. 
Specifically, individuals working a secondary job may earn less because they are rationing 
their labour time and effort between two jobs, but these individuals may have opted to take 
up a secondary job in the first place due to their primary jobs’ low wages. Similarly, 
healthier individuals may be capable of exerting more effort on the job and as a result earn 
more, whilst those who earn more may have the resources for maintaining a better state of 
health. Thus, secondary jobs and health are omitted to avoid biased results, and we 
introduce the health factor and deal with its endogeneity in the wage model in chapter V.  
 
4.6.2.3 Instrumental Variables: 
The selection-specific characteristics (see table 4.1), which include unemployment rates 
stratified by educational attainment level and whether respondents’ fathers were working 
in the public or private sector when respondent was 15 years old, are included only in the 
selection equation for its identification. In order to adhere to the exclusion restrictions, 
these two variables need to not have a direct impact on wages, as we explain below. 
 
Traditional views of informality and Classical Microeconomic theory dictate that higher 
unemployment rates would increase the likelihood of informal employment, where 
individuals would seek informal jobs to escape unemployment. On the other hand, the only 
impact unemployment may have on wages is through its impact on selection. Specifically, 
if unemployment rates were high, then there would be an excess supply of labour looking 
for formal employment and a lower probability of individuals being selected in the formal 
sector, which would push wages down. In addition, we have discussed in chapter II (see 
section 2.5) how wages in the Egyptian private sector are to a certain extent influenced by 
the public sector wage-setting policies, which are unlikely to react to unemployment 
levels.  Surprisingly, we find that average unemployment is higher among the formal 
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sample (see table 4.5), which requires regression results that controls for other factors that 
affect selection to confirm or refute this.  
 
Table 4.5: Selection-Specific Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics:  
Variables Description Statistics
27
 
Formal Informal 
UNEMP (EDUC) Unemployment rates stratified by educational level  30.10 
(16.58) 
24.77 
(19.56) 
FSEC 
 
 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for the organisational sector of 
respondents’ fathers, when respondents were 15 
years old,  
1 if in private/investment/foreign/non-profit non-
governmental/others/unknown/not working, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: fathers working in governmental/public 
sectors 
 
 
 
621 
 
580 
 
 
 
2,505 
 
970 
 
The other selection identifier relates to the respondents’ family and household aspects, 
specifically the respondents’ fathers’ sector of employment, whether public or private, 
when respondent was 15 years old. Individuals’ choices in the labour market are likely to 
be affected by their fathers’ experiences. This is especially the case with our sample given 
that the majority of our sample is men, and hence they are likely to look up to their fathers 
with respect to their labour market decisions. Also, their fathers are likely to provide the 
support and network required to obtain jobs in the sectors they already work in. Thus, we 
expect individuals whose fathers were working in more formal settings, such as the 
governmental and public sectors, to be steered more towards formality. Still, father’s sector 
of employment is unlikely to have any direct effect on an individual’s wages, since 
individuals are rewarded for their own characteristics and not their fathers’ characteristics. 
For this variable, we divide our sample into two. One subset includes individuals whose 
fathers were working in the governmental or public sectors, while the other includes those 
who were working in any other sector, including private, investment, foreign, non-profit 
non-governmental, others, unknown, or not working at all. Statistics show that a much 
bigger proportion of the sample whose fathers were working in the governmental or public 
sectors are formally-employed (see table 4.5), while the opposite is true for the sample 
whose fathers were working in the rest of the sectors or not working at all.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for [UNEMP (EDUC)], while 
frequency of observations provided for (FSEC).  
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4.7 Results and Analysis 
In this section, the results of the selection equation for the complete labour sample and the 
male labour sample are presented and discussed. This is followed by the discussion of the 
sectoral wage equations’ results for the complete labour sample then those for the male 
labour sample.  
 
4.7.1 Probability of Formal Employment  
The first two columns in table 4.6 present the selection results for the complete labour 
sample, while the last two columns present the results for the male labour sample 
separately. Since coefficients reported by the Probit models are useful mainly for showing 
the significance and direction of the relationship, but not the magnitude, average marginal 
effects are computed to show the effect of a change in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of formal employment. The complete labour sample constitutes 4,676 
observations, while the male labour sample constitutes 4,355 observations (see table 4.6), 
confirming the small female labour sample.  
 
Perhaps, the most important results to begin our discussion with are the selection 
identifiers. Surprisingly, we find that unemployment is insignificant for selection into the 
sector of employment for both samples (see table 4.6), implying that this factor cannot be 
used to identify selection into the formal or informal sector of employment. Despite this, 
we retain this variable in our model, which has no effect on our model or the other 
coefficients, to confirm that unemployment has no effect on informality. Conversely, we 
find that fathers’ public/private sector of employment when respondent was 15 years old is 
highly significant for selection into sector of employment for both samples (see table 4.6). 
This implies that respondents’ fathers’ characteristics are likely to have future effects on 
the respondents’ choice of employment sector, whether formal or informal. Furthermore, 
we find that the respondents whose fathers worked in any sector other than the 
governmental/public sectors or not worked at all have a lower probability of being 
formally-employed (see table 4.6), as expected. Note that one of the selection identifiers is 
highly significant for selection for both samples, thus we can conclude that selection is 
properly identified.  
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Table 4.6: Selection Equation Results (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Pr (FORMAL) 
 COMPLETE SAMPLE MALE SAMPLE 
Variables PROBIT 
MODEL 
AVERAGE 
MARGINAL 
EFFECTS 
PROBIT 
MODEL 
AVERAGE 
MARGINAL 
EFFECTS 
Selection-Specific Characteristics 
UNEMP (EDUC) -0.012 (0.010) -0.003 (0.002) -0.016 (0.011) -0.004 (0.002) 
FSEC -0.181*** (0.052) -0.042*** (0.012) -0.207*** (0.055) -0.047*** (0.013) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.075*** (0.017) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.076*** (0.018) 0.017*** (0.004) 
AGE SQUARED -0.001*** (0.0002) -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.001*** (0.0002) -0.0002*** (0.0001) 
MALE 0.028 (0.114) 0.006 (0.026) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.290*** (0.066) 
-0.104 (0.167) 
 
0.066*** (0.015) 
-0.024 (0.038) 
 
0.270*** (0.068) 
………. 
 
0.060*** (0.015) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
0.224*** (0.074) 
0.082 (0.090) 
0.133 (0.089) 
0.370*** (0.092) 
0.527*** (0.084) 
 
0.050*** (0.016) 
0.018 (0.019) 
0.029 (0.019) 
0.085*** (0.022) 
0.126*** (0.020) 
 
0.249*** (0.075) 
0.079 (0.092) 
0.182** (0.091) 
0.401*** (0.096) 
0.500*** (0.088) 
 
0.054*** (0.016) 
0.016 (0.019) 
0.039** (0.020) 
0.090*** (0.022) 
0.115*** (0.021) 
Parent’s Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.141** (0.063) 
0.109 (0.073) 
 
0.033** (0.015) 
0.025 (0.017) 
 
0.128* (0.066) 
0.046 (0.079) 
 
0.029* (0.015) 
0.010 (0.018) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
0.154 (0.129) 
0.204* (0.111) 
0.057 (0.130) 
0.642 (0.453) 
0.825* (0.432) 
0.433*** (0.145) 
0.907*** (0.316) 
0.664 (0.425) 
 
0.028 (0.025) 
0.038 (0.019) 
0.010 (0.022) 
0.137 (0.097) 
0.185* (0.094) 
0.087*** (0.031) 
0.207*** (0.065) 
0.143 (0.095) 
 
0.150 (0.133) 
0.193* (0.116) 
0.075 (0.135) 
0.759 (0.495) 
0.990** (0.474) 
0.421*** (0.153) 
0.977*** (0.345) 
0.629 (0.471) 
 
0.025 (0.023) 
0.033* (0.018) 
0.012 (0.021) 
0.156 (0.102) 
0.216** (0.100) 
0.078** (0.030) 
0.213*** (0.066) 
0.124 (0.098) 
TRAINING 0.590*** (0.102) 0.152*** (0.029) 0.631*** (0.111) 0.161*** (0.031) 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
-0.065 (0.207) 
-0.041 (0.215) 
-0.386 (0.235) 
-1.049*** (0.203) 
-1.549*** (0.206) 
-0.273 (0.205) 
-0.736*** (0.212) 
 
-0.023 (0.074) 
-0.015 (0.077) 
-0.135 (0.083) 
-0.329*** (0.072) 
-0.424*** (0.072) 
-0.097 (0.073) 
-0.246*** (0.075) 
 
-0.069 (0.212) 
-0.047 (0.221) 
-0.384 (0.246) 
-1.078*** (0.205) 
-1.607*** (0.208) 
-0.316 (0.207) 
-0.755*** (0.215) 
 
-0.025 (0.076) 
-0.017 (0.079) 
-0.136 (0.087) 
-0.342*** (0.073) 
-0.441*** (0.073) 
-0.112 (0.074) 
-0.255*** (0.076) 
 
Constant 
 
-2.116*** (0.393) ………. -1.993*** (0.389) ………. 
N 4,676 4,676 4,355 4,355 
Pseudo R2 0.2850 ………. 0.2860 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Other results show that a variety of the factors are highly significant for the probability of 
formal employment, and there are various similarities between the results of the complete 
labour sample and the male labour sample. For instance, we find that the probability of 
formal employment increases with age for both samples, however, this situation reverses 
for older individuals (see table 4.6). Thus, we infer that older individuals tend to find it 
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easier to obtain formal employment, but they are also likely to reverse back to informality 
as they progress further in age. This goes in line with literature that found the informal 
sector to include the youngest and the oldest (Marcouiller et al., 1997; Funkhouser, 1996; 
Tansel et al., 2015). Also, we find that married men and individuals with educated fathers 
have a significantly higher probability of formality than their respective categories for both 
samples (see table 4.6). With regards to the region of residence, our findings largely go in 
line with Tansel et al.’s (2015), where we find that for both samples, the probability of 
formal employment is highest in Cairo and lowest in rural upper regions (see table 4.6). 
While more explicit research would be required to understand the regional distribution of 
informality in Egypt, we postulate that our findings may be relevant to differences between 
the areas with respect to the level of development, the level of dependency on elementary 
industries, or perhaps an increased likelihood of smaller sized firms that usually operate in 
more informal contexts.  
 
In terms of human capital, we find that superior human capital, including the attainment of 
vocational, post-secondary, and university degrees as well as receiving training 
significantly increases the probability of formal employment for both samples (see table 
4.6), which matches findings of similar studies (Marcouiller et al., 1997; Pradhan & Van 
Soest, 1995; Funkhouser, 1996; Tansel, 1999; Saavedra & Chong, 1999; Tansel et al., 
2015).  Nonetheless, a particular finding is how the differential between illiterates and 
vocational degree holders exceed the differential between illiterates and post-secondary 
degree holders (see table 4.6), which implies that vocational degree holders have better 
chances of finding formal jobs in Egypt’s labour market. Additionally, we report wider 
differentials between the male labour sample’s illiterates and vocational or university 
degree-holders compared with the complete labour sample, while the opposite is true for 
the post-secondary degree holders (see table 4.6). Similarly, training increases the 
probability of formal employment by 16.1% for men (see table 4.6, column 4) as opposed 
to only 15.2% for the complete labour sample (see table 4.6, column 2).  
 
Finally, we find that service/sales, craft/trade, and elementary occupations have a lower 
probability of formality than managers, and these occupational differentials are wider for 
the male labour sample compared with the complete labour sample (see table 4.6).  
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4.7.2 Wage Determination  
The following discussion presents the results and analysis of the sectoral wage equations, 
beginning with models utilising the complete labour sample then the male labour sample’s 
models. 
 
  4.7.2.1 Complete Labour Sample: 
Our presentation of results (see table 4.7) constitutes two models, the OLS and the 
Heckman Selection models, each estimated across two samples (formal and informal 
labour). The OLS results are presented only for comparative purposes, but in what follows 
we will concentrate on the results of our preferred model, namely the Heckman Selection. 
 
To begin with, the higher R-squared values reported for the formal sample’s models 
compared with the informal ones (see table 4.7) imply that the formal sector’s wage model 
is a better model fit than that of the informal sector. Also, the formal sector’s significant 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) implies the presence of a selection bias (see table 4.7, column 
3), and the positive IMR indicates that selection increases wages. In this context, we find 
some differences between the results of the OLS and Heckman Selection models. 
Specifically, we find that the formal sample’s OLS model has reported the insignificance 
of married males, Cairo region, university degrees, and all occupations, which are all 
significant according to the Heckman Selection model, and the OLS model has under-
estimated the size of parents’ education and training coefficients (see table 4.7, columns 1 
and 3). While there are fewer differences between the two informal sample’s models, we 
still find that the informal sample’s OLS model has over-estimated the coefficients of 
gender, married males, and some educational degrees, while under-estimated the regional 
differentials (see table 4.7, columns 2 and 4). Accordingly, we infer that selection 
correction is important for our estimations, and we accept and prefer the Heckman 
selection model results.  
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Table 4.7: Wage Equation Results (Complete Labour Sample): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
 OLS HECKMAN SELECTION 
Variables  Formal Informal  Formal Informal 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.010 (0.018) 0.021*** (0.008) 0.033 (0.023) 0.018** (0.008) 
AGE SQUARED -0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0002* (0.0001) 
MALE 0.400*** (0.091) 0.359*** (0.060) 0.402*** (0.091) 0.347*** (0.060) 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.057 (0.058) 
0.277** (0.128) 
 
0.124*** (0.028) 
-0.014 (0.090) 
 
0.141* (0.076) 
0.259** (0.128) 
 
0.106*** (0.031) 
-0.008 (0.090) 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.161** (0.073) 
-0.098 (0.089) 
-0.113 (0.086) 
-0.050 (0.084) 
0.092 (0.077) 
 
-0.103*** (0.029) 
-0.097*** (0.034) 
-0.094** (0.037) 
-0.028 (0.044) 
0.001 (0.039) 
 
-0.087 (0.085) 
-0.064 (0.091) 
-0.068 (0.090) 
0.067 (0.108) 
0.240** (0.115) 
 
-0.117*** (0.031) 
-0.100*** (0.034) 
-0.100*** (0.037) 
-0.055 (0.047) 
-0.040 (0.047) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC  
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.119** (0.051) 
0.176*** (0.057) 
 
-0.011 (0.028) 
0.004 (0.036) 
 
0.170*** (0.059) 
0.203*** (0.059) 
 
-0.026 (0.029) 
-0.006 (0.036) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
-0.188 (0.131) 
0.039 (0.098) 
-0.023 (0.116) 
0.161 (0.150) 
0.026 (0.085) 
0.036 (0.127) 
0.161 (0.103) 
0.008 (0.210) 
 
0.105** (0.051) 
0.035 (0.036) 
-0.026 (0.043) 
0.146** (0.066) 
0.075** (0.031) 
0.204*** (0.068) 
0.172*** (0.051) 
0.269 (0.225) 
 
-0.133 (0.134) 
0.094 (0.103) 
-0.008 (0.117) 
0.233 (0.155) 
0.136 (0.107) 
0.179 (0.151) 
0.338** (0.145) 
0.128 (0.221) 
 
0.096* (0.052) 
0.028 (0.036) 
-0.024 (0.043) 
0.143** (0.066) 
0.056* (0.033) 
0.179** (0.069) 
0.128** (0.058) 
0.252 (0.225) 
TRAINING 0.117* (0.063) 0.111 (0.076) 0.252** (0.100) 0.037 (0.090) 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
0.120 (0.114) 
-0.018 (0.124) 
-0.079 (0.145) 
-0.097 (0.124) 
-0.023 (0.134) 
0.016 (0.125) 
-0.125 (0.138) 
 
-0.290 (0.182) 
-0.265 (0.184) 
-0.290 (0.191) 
-0.337* (0.173) 
-0.156 (0.173) 
-0.245 (0.174) 
-0.393** (0.176) 
 
0.125 (0.114) 
0.001 (0.125) 
-0.144 (0.150) 
-0.364* (0.198) 
-0.466 (0.290) 
-0.016 (0.126) 
-0.299* (0.171) 
 
-0.268 (0.183) 
-0.244 (0.184) 
-0.220 (0.196) 
-0.198 (0.195) 
0.011 (0.203) 
-0.176 (0.180) 
-0.277 (0.191) 
TENURE 0.020** (0.008) 0.003 (0.004) 0.018** (0.008) 0.003 (0.004) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0004* (0.0002) -0.00004 (0.0001) -0.0004 (0.0003) -0.00002 (0.0001) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-.0136** (0.058) 
0.346 (0.689) 
0.116 (0.084) 
 
-0.099*** (0.033) 
0.401*** (0.121) 
0.237*** (0.026) 
 
-0.134** (0.058) 
0.233 (0.691) 
0.118 (0.084) 
 
-0.096*** (0.033) 
0.402*** (0.121) 
0.237*** (0.026) 
UNION  0.187*** (0.048) 0.097 (0.063) 0.182*** (0.048) 0.090 (0.064) 
SUPERVISOR 0.216*** (0.056) 0.134*** (0.044) 0.216*** (0.056) 0.134*** (0.044) 
NIGHT  -0.065 (0.044) -0.056** (0.022) -0.062 (0.044) -0.054** (0.022) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.032 (0.073) 
0.111** (0.047) 
0.066 (0.089) 
 
0.187** (0.074) 
0.047 (0.051) 
-0.070 (0.060) 
 
0.036 (0.073) 
0.114** (0.047) 
0.071 (0.089) 
 
0.188** (0.074) 
0.045 (0.051) 
-0.073 (0.060) 
IMR ………. ………. 0.436* (0.253) 0.207 (0.132) 
 
Constant 
 
0.543 (0.359) 0.623*** (0.218) -0.538 (0.722) 0.551** (0.223) 
N 1,201 3,475 1,201 3,475 
R2 0.2179 0.1793 0.2199 0.1799 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Comparing the formal and informal sectors’ Heckman Selection models, we find numerous 
differences between wage determination in each sector. We find that age is significant for 
informal sector wages only, and increases these wages at a decreasing rate (see table 4.7, 
column 4). Unsurprisingly, we find that living in Cairo is highly significant for formal 
sector wages (see table 4.7, column 3), which is insignificant for informal sector wages 
(see table 4.7, column 4), while living in rural lower, urban upper, and urban lower regions 
are all significant for informal wages (see table 4.7, column 4) but insignificant for formal 
wages (see table 4.7, column 3). Also, having educated parents is significant for formal 
sector wages, but not informal ones. The larger coefficient reported for having educated 
mothers of 20.3% compared to that of having educated fathers of 17% (see table 4.7, 
column 3) indicates the value and roles of women in socialisation as well as the link 
between mothers and their children’s labour market outcomes. 
 
In terms of human capital, only university education is significant in determining wages in 
the formal sector, whereas most levels of education, including literacy, general high 
school, vocational, post-secondary, and university are significant in increasing informal 
sector wages (see table 4.7, columns 3 and 4). Note that vocational degrees, which increase 
the likelihood of formality (see table 4.6), are insignificant for formal sector wages (see 
table 4.7, column 3).  
 
Similarly, a number of job characteristics have exhibited differing roles in wage 
determination in each sector of employment. While occupations do not influence wages in 
the informal sector (see table 4.7, column 4), there is a small marginal impact on wages in 
the service/sales and elementary occupations, within which individuals earn less than 
managers in the formal sector (see table 4.7, column 3). Similarly, and not surprisingly, 
tenure, union membership, and large firms are all significant only for formal sector wages, 
(see table 4.7, column 3). Note that the contribution of unions to wages in Egypt highlights 
the value of unions in enhancing labour market outcomes, which may be going unnoticed, 
and may deserve a more thorough analysis and acknowledgment. Also, differences with 
respect to firm size may be driven by the likelihood that smaller firms are more prevalent 
in the informal sector, while larger firms may be more prevalent in the formal sector. 
Similarly, seasonal and casual workers, which reported positive and significant coefficients 
in the informal sector’s wage models, may not necessarily be less educated or employed in 
lower-status jobs, but their employment statuses are circumstantial to the nature of their 
sectors, such as the tourism sector. Such individuals usually have to acquire proper 
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specialised university degrees, but the demand for their services is only required during the 
seasons these sectors take off. 
 
On a final note, we conducted tests to examine the statistical significance of the differences 
between the formal and informal sectors’ Heckman Selection models’ coefficients. While 
the coefficients reported for the two sectors seem different, such as those of university 
degrees (see table 4.7), a Hausman-type test can formally confirm or refute the significance 
of these differences. According to our results of the overall model (see table 4.8), we can 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the differences between coefficients are 
statistically significant. Also, we tested for the isolated statistical significance of difference 
between the two sectors’ models’ coefficients of ‘male’, ‘married males’, ‘university’, 
‘temporary workers’, and ‘supervisors’, but we found that there are no statistically 
significant differences between these specific coefficients (see table 4.8).  
 
Table 4.8: Hausman Test Results (Complete Labour Sample): 
Hausman Test Results 
OVERALL MODEL  
Chi2 (41) = 111.45 Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000 
MALE 
Chi2 (1) = 0.28 Prob>Chi2 = 0.5996 
MARRIED*MALE 
Chi2 (1) = 0.21 Prob>Chi2 = 0.6433 
UNIVERSITY 
Chi2 (1) = 1.74 Prob>Chi2 = 0.1869 
TEMPORARY 
Chi2 (1) = 0.32 Prob>Chi2 = 0.5692 
SUPERVISOR 
Chi2 (1) = 1.35 Prob>Chi2 = 0.2452 
 
4.7.2.2 Male Labour Sample: 
With respect to the differences between the complete labour sample and the male labour 
samples’ models, the male labour sample is slightly lower, at 4,355 observations, and the 
IMR is insignificant for wages of both sectors (see table 4.9). This implies the 
insignificance of selection into sector of employment, and thus OLS results may not be 
biased. Still, the R-squared remains higher for the formally employed males (see table 4.9), 
implying a better model fit for the formal sample, similar to the case when the complete 
labour sample was utilised (see table 4.7).  
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Table 4.9: Wage Equation Results (Male Labour Sample): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
 OLS HECKMAN SELECTION 
Variables  Formal Informal  Formal Informal 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.007 (0.020) 0.025*** (0.008) 0.024 (0.024) 0.023*** (0.008) 
AGE SQUARED 7.30e-06 (0.0003) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0002** (0.0001) 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
 
0.040 (0.060) 
 
0.116*** (0.028) 
 
0.099 (0.075) 
 
0.103*** (0.031) 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.148* (0.075) 
-0.094 (0.093) 
-0.104 (0.089) 
-0.047 (0.088) 
0.084 (0.081) 
 
-0.096*** (0.029) 
-0.104*** (0.034) 
-0.104*** (0.037) 
-0.037 (0.045) 
-0.025 (0.040) 
 
-0.087 (0.089) 
-0.070 (0.094) 
-0.061 (0.095) 
0.048 (0.114) 
0.191* (0.115) 
 
-0.107*** (0.031) 
-0.106*** (0.034) 
-0.111*** (0.038) 
-0.058 (0.049) 
-0.051 (0.047) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.121** (0.054) 
0.169*** (0.062) 
 
-0.024 (0.028) 
0.006 (0.037) 
 
0.157** (0.061) 
0.179*** (0.063) 
 
-0.035 (0.030) 
0.002 (0.037) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
-0.209 (0.134) 
0.013 (0.102) 
-0.045 (0.120) 
0.058 (0.159) 
-0.002 (0.089) 
-0.044 (0.134) 
0.020 (0.110) 
-0.239 (0.242) 
 
0.101* (0.052) 
0.018 (0.036) 
-0.020 (0.043) 
0.132* (0.068) 
0.077** (0.031) 
0.233*** (0.070) 
0.133** (0.052) 
0.155 (0.238) 
 
-0.168 (0.138) 
0.048 (0.105) 
-0.036 (0.120) 
0.101 (0.162) 
0.077 (0.107) 
0.055 (0.154) 
0.142 (0.144) 
-0.184 (0.246) 
 
0.095* (0.052) 
0.015 (0.036) 
-0.019 (0.043) 
0.133** (0.068) 
0.064* (0.033) 
0.215*** (0.072) 
0.104* (0.058) 
0.163 (0.238) 
TRAINING 0.167** (0.068) 0.092 (0.082) 0.273** (0.106) 0.034 (0.096) 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
0.175 (0.120) 
-0.088 (0.131) 
-0.137 (0.156) 
-0.130 (0.129) 
-0.071 (0.138) 
-0.042 (0.130) 
-0.165 (0.143) 
 
-0.208 (0.184) 
-0.190 (0.186) 
-0.338* (0.194) 
-0.344** (0.171) 
-0.161 (0.171) 
-0.245 (0.172) 
-0.437** (0.174) 
 
0.174 (0.120) 
-0.075 (0.131) 
-0.186 (0.161) 
-0.334* (0.202) 
-0.412 (0.296) 
-0.074 (0.132) 
-0.298* (0.175) 
 
-0.194 (0.185) 
-0.177 (0.186) 
-0.286 (0.199) 
-0.240 (0.194) 
-0.035 (0.203) 
-0.191 (0.179) 
-0.350* (0.190) 
TENURE 0.017* (0.009) 0.001 (0.004) 0.016* (0.009) 0.001 (0.004) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0004 (0.0003) 3.73e-07 (0.0001) -0.0004 (0.0003) 0.00001 (0.0001) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.103 (0.063) 
0.316 (0.696) 
0.114 (0.085) 
 
-0.086** (0.034) 
0.351*** (0.121) 
0.226*** (0.026) 
 
-0.103 (0.063) 
0.231 (0.698) 
0.116 (0.085) 
 
-0.085** (0.034) 
0.352*** (0.121) 
.0225*** (0.026) 
UNION  0.207*** (0.051) 0.053 (0.066) 0.202*** (0.051) 0.046 (0.066) 
SUPERVISOR 0.284*** (0.061) 0.153*** (0.045) 0.285*** (0.061) 0.153*** (0.045) 
NIGHT  -0.068 (0.045) -0.056** (0.022) -0.066 (0.045) -0.054** (0.022) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.020 (0.082) 
0.099* (0.051) 
0.083 (0.095) 
 
0.208*** (0.076) 
0.054 (0.053) 
-0.082 (0.060) 
 
0.025 (0.082) 
0.102** (0.051) 
0.086 (0.095) 
 
0.209*** (0.076) 
0.053 (0.053) 
-0.084 (0.060) 
IMR ………. ………. 0.324 (0.248) 0.151 (0.132) 
 
Constant 
 
1.092*** (0.379) 0.953*** (0.208) 0.299 (0.716) 0.885*** (0.216) 
N 1,074 3,281 1,074 3,281 
R2 0.2151 0.1466 0.2164 0.1470 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In terms of differences between the complete labour and male labour samples’ models, we 
find that male union-members earn 20.2% more than non-members, and male supervisors 
earn 28.5% more than non-supervisors (see table 4.9, column 3), which are higher than the 
complete labour sample’s results of 18.2% and 21.6%, respectively (see table 4.7, column 
3). Furthermore, we find differences with respect to returns to education and occupations. 
First, we find that education is insignificant for men’s formal sector wages (see table 4.9, 
column 3), which were all significant for formal sector wages of the complete labour 
sample (see table 4.7, column 3). Second, we report narrower wage differentials in the 
informal sector between illiterate males and male general high school or university degree 
holders compared to those of the complete labour sample, while the opposite is true for 
vocational and post-secondary degree holders (see table 4.9, column 4; table 4.7, column). 
Third, we report the significance of elementary occupations for the male labour sample 
(see table 4.9, column 4), a category that reported insignificant results for the complete 
labour sample’s informal wages (see table 4.7, column 4). This implies that men 
experience distinct educational and occupational effects with respect to their labour market 
outcomes. Still, the overall differences between the results of the complete labour and male 
labour samples are minimal, which is sensible given that the complete labour sample’s 
majority comprises men.  
 
Similar to the complete labour sample’s models (see table 4.8), we find that the Hausman 
test reports the significance of the differences between the overall sectoral models’ 
coefficients (see table 4.10). Furthermore, we find that while the coefficient of 
‘supervisors’ is significant in both the male labour sample’s formal sector and informal 
sector models, the coefficients reported are statistically significantly different from each 
other (see table 4.10).  
 
Table 4.10: Hausman Test Results (Male Labour Sample): 
Hausman Test Results 
OVERALL MODEL  
Chi2 (39) = 92.21 Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000 
ELEMENTARY OC 
Chi2 (1) = 0.04 Prob>Chi2 = 0.8329 
SUPERVISOR 
Chi2 (1) = 2.99 Prob>Chi2 = 0.0838 
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4.8 Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, the formal/informal divide of employment is an important element in the 
Egyptian labour market. We know from previous research that it is likely to significantly 
affect wages an individual earns, especially in the formal sector of employment. 
Furthermore, our research results show that wage determination varies to some extent 
between the sectors of employment, and that some factors may be significant for one 
sector, but no so for the other. In addition, once the sample is restricted to males, some 
divergences have been identified that are worth acknowledging for achieving superior 
labour market outcomes.    
 
In terms of selection into formality, we found that respondents’ fathers’ sector of 
employment is significant for the individuals’ own selection into formality/informality. 
Furthermore, our results confirmed that higher educational attainment is significant for 
increasing the probability of formal employment. This emphasises the importance of 
enhancing Egyptian labour’s human capital to facilitate their achievement of formal jobs.  
 
When it comes to wages, we found that overlooking selection does bias the results 
obtained, particularly for the formal private sector workers, and therefore correcting for 
selection is important to obtain valid results. We also found that the impact of the various 
wage determinants differ to some extent between the two sectors of employment. For 
instance, rural lower, urban upper, and urban lower regions all significantly decrease 
informal sector wages, while Cairo region increases formal sector wages. Similarly, 
various educational degrees relative to illiteracy increase informal sector wages, whereas 
only university education increases formal sector wages. Differences between the wage 
determinants also extend to occupations, job stability, firm size, parent’s education, age, 
tenure, and union membership. Moreover, gender wage differentials in favour of men are 
evident in both sectors, and the reported coefficients are quite high. This adds to the 
importance of addressing female labour issues in the Egyptian labour market and 
emphasises the requirement of gender-specific policies to more effectively deal with labour 
market issues. Similarly, returns to superior human capital are further reinforced by the 
wage equations’ results. Still, men’s returns to specific educational degrees are distinct 
from the complete labour sample, implying that men should be motivated to pursue 
specific degrees to enhance their labour market outcomes.  
 
 76 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
Wage Determination in the Private Sector 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends our analysis in Chapter IV by concentrating on the impact that 
productivity has on wages in Egypt’s private sector. Labour productivity, however, is not 
observable, and we therefore use a measure of health to proxy for it. Health is likely to 
impact productivity levels, since healthier individuals are expected to exert more effort and 
be more productive in the labour market. In fact, a wide range of studies (Grossman, 1972; 
Grossman & Benham, 1974; Bloom & Canning, 2000; Cole & Neumayer, 2006; Glick & 
Sahn, 1998) found that health contributes to earnings through its impact on enhancing 
labour productivity levels. To analyse this issue, we utilise data from the 2012 round of the 
Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) to estimate a wage equation, controlling for 
various labour factors, which allows us to trace the effect of health on wages and permit us 
to draw inferences regarding labour productivity.  
 
There are two potential problems with analysing this relationship, reverse causality and 
sample selection. The first problem, reverse causality from wages to health, leads to an 
endogeneity bias. More specifically, better health may allow individuals to earn more by 
improving performance and productivity levels. Simultaneously, higher income should 
make it possible to invest more in healthcare and maintain a better state of health, feeding 
back into productivity and wages. In order to eliminate this bias and avoid inconsistent 
results, we utilise a simultaneous system of estimation techniques, namely Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) and Maximum Likelihood Estimations (MLE). The second problem 
relates to the potential selection bias in the estimation of wages. Since individuals who 
experience extreme bad health states are likely to opt out of the labour force altogether, 
leading to a non-random sample, the estimated coefficients may be biased due to the 
impact of the unobserved factors that have led to participation in the first place. Thus, we 
conduct our analysis taking both endogeneity and sample selection into consideration.  
 
Wage determination is important in Egypt for numerous reasons. Besides the obvious 
reason of earnings being the workers’ primary purpose of working, wage levels have often 
been raised as a problematic issue in the Egyptian economy (Kandil & Helmy, 2012), 
which negatively affects the population’s well-being. Furthermore, the majority of 
employment in Egypt (62.5% in the year 2015) comprises the waged and salaried workers 
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(WB, 2016b), thus this issue influences a large share of the employed labour. Similarly, 
since the majority of the employed labour is working in the private sector (see figure 3.1), 
and the Egyptian government is consistently applying reforms to strengthen the role and 
employment share of the private sector in the economy, as already-discussed (see section 
2.6), then understanding the factors that contribute to wages in the Egyptian labour market, 
and particularly in Egypt’s private sector, is of even more significance. Our particular 
focus on labour productivity is also important, since this measure has seldom been 
addressed in the wage determination literature. Despite Egypt’s large body of wage 
determination literature (Assaad, 1997; El-Ghamrawy & Amer, 2011; Said, 2007; 2015), 
little attention has been paid to the explicit analysis of the contribution of enhanced labour 
productivity levels to wages. This might be because there is no available individual-level 
data on individual labour productivity that is nationally-representative of the labour 
market. To get around this problem, we use the health measure to proxy for the unobserved 
individual labour productivity levels, which may also provide insights into potential 
channels for improving Egypt’s low labour productivity levels that weakened Egypt’s 
economic performance over the years (Radwan, 2002) and acted as a significant detriment 
to the growth of the economy.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows, section (5.2) introduces the theoretical 
postulations concerning the relationship between wages and productivity as well as the 
measure of health utilised in this analysis and the rationale behind this choice. Section 
(5.3) reviews some of the wage determination literature that addressed health, highlighting 
how our research fits in and fills the gap of this overall strand of literature. Section (5.4) 
illustrates the econometric model, while section (5.5) highlights the methodological issues 
with respect to our estimations and the methods used. Section (5.6) discusses the data 
utilised in the estimations, section (5.7) presents and discusses the results of the 
estimations, which represents the core of this chapter, and section (5.8) summarises and 
concludes this chapter. 
 
 
5.2 Wages, Productivity, and Health  
To start with, we discuss the theoretical relationship between wages and productivity. This 
is followed by a brief discussion of the relationship between health and productivity, which 
justifies our use of the health measure, as well as a discussion of health issues in Egypt and 
the specific health measure utilised in our analysis.  
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5.2.1 Wages and Productivity 
While higher productivity can improve wages, it is also likely that higher wages can lead 
to an increase in productivity. In reality, these opposing forces work simultaneously.  
 
5.2.1.1 Classical Microeconomic Theory: 
Classical Microeconomic theory 28  argues that wages are determined by labour 
productivity. This theory posits that firms should employ workers up to the point where the 
marginal benefit (i.e. labour productivity) of employing an additional unit of labour equals 
the marginal cost (i.e. wage rate) of employing that additional labour. Thus, Riveros and 
Bouton (1994) explained that a firm’s optimal decision is to equate marginal productivity 
with the given wage rate. However, this marginal rule is based on the assumptions of free 
markets and complete information, both of which are questionable. In reality, it is often the 
case that wages paid exceed marginal productivity of labour, which gave rise to new 
theories of the relationship between wages and labour productivity, such as Efficiency 
wages (Marshall, 1920; Leibenstein, 1957; Stiglitz, 1974; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Weiss, 
1980; Solow, 1979).  
 
5.2.1.2 Efficiency Wages Theory: 
History of the Efficiency Wages theory dates back to Alfred Marshall’s writings in the 
1920s. Marshall (1920) instituted the term ‘efficiency-wages’ or ‘efficiency-earnings’ to 
explain the idea of labour being paid according to the level of effort required from them. 
Also, in doing so, he contrasted efficiency earnings with ‘time-earnings’, dependent on the 
time-spent working and ‘piece-work earnings’, dependent on the amount of output 
produced. This represented the initial, yet brief, introduction of the concept that later 
developed into a vast array of models.  
 
Later on, Leibenstein (1957) revived the concept of efficiency wages in the development 
literature. The author posited that rather than wages rising or falling according to rises or 
falls in productivity levels, wages could be used as a tool to affect productivity (i.e. 
employers should offer higher wages to their employees to receive higher productivity 
levels). Decades later, the Efficiency Wages theory increased in popularity with several 
writings of Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof (1984), Katz (1986), and Yellen (1995), leading to the 
division of this theory into five distinct sub-models. Each sub-model differed in the 
                                                        
28  Review of microeconomic theory is available in any standard textbook, examples: 
Perloff (2012, chapter 4). 
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channel it used to link wages to productivity. These channels include better nutrition 
(Leibenstein, 1957), lower labour turnover (Stiglitz, 1974), less shirking (Shapiro & 
Stiglitz, 1984), attracting more productive workers (Weiss, 1980), and boosting morale 
among the employees (Solow, 1979).  
 
Accordingly, the main distinction between Classical Microeconomic theory and Efficiency 
Wages theory is in how the latter challenges the notion of the exogeneity of productivity 
increases (Meager & Speckesser, 2011). 
 
 5.2.2 Health and Productivity 
As previously mentioned, individual labour productivity measures are difficult to acquire. 
Accordingly, a potential method to inspect productivity is to use a proxy for it, similar to 
the approach used by some scholars (Goldsmith et al., 2000) when dealing with measures 
that are difficult to quantify, such as productivity or effort. Thus, we use a self-perceived 
health measure to proxy for labour productivity based on the theoretical relationship 
between health and labour productivity, as we discuss below.  
 
5.2.2.1 Theoretical Basis: 
Theory postulates a direct link between health and productivity. Grossman (1972) 
explained that health capital could be considered as both a consumption and an investment 
good. Health capital is a consumption good as it affects an individual’s utility directly, 
while it is an investment good as it affects an individual’s time spent in market and non-
market activities. This view of health as an investment good indicates that investment in 
health affects labour supply and productivity. In other words, superior health states should 
lead to an improvement in the labour’s participation in labour market activities and their 
performance on the job. Similarly, Bloom and Canning (2000) summarised other direct 
and indirect links between health and productivity, such as the impact of improved health 
states on increased productivity through enhanced physical and mental effort, and the 
increase in investment in education due to a longer life expectancy that would again affect 
productivity. Despite Becker’s (1962) arguments of health not necessarily being a major 
determinant of wages or at least not everywhere in the world, Mushkin (1962), Grossman 
(1972), Grossman and Benham (1974), Luft (1975), Berkowitz et al. (1983), Glick and 
Sahn (1998), and Cole and Neumayer (2006) have all identified this postulation that better 
health reflects in higher productivity and in turn increases wages an individual is offered.  
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5.2.2.2 Health Issues in Egypt: 
In Egypt’s context, there are numerous health issues that are likely to adversely affect the 
health states of individuals residing in Egypt, and hence productivity. Inadequate water 
sources and supply, air pollution, and noise pollution are all likely to affect health 
negatively (Abdel-Shafy & Aly, 2002; Kamal et al., 2010; Khaled, 2013; Hussein, 2014; 
“Study: Air Pollution Kills 35,000 a Year in Egypt, With Dust the Biggest Culprit,” 2015; 
Dakkak, 2016). In addition, poor levels of hygiene lead to the spread of diseases like 
Hepatitis C (Mezban & Wakil, 2006), which is estimated to kill around 40,000 Egyptians 
per year, and that 1 in 10 Egyptians between ages 15 and 59 are infected (World Health 
Organisation [WHO], 2014). Add to this the poor standards of health care (as highlighted 
in “Surprise Visits to Egypt Public Hospitals Land Officials in Trouble,” 2014) and of 
health facilities (Gadallah et al., 2003), and it is not surprising that health becomes a major 
determinant of the quality of human capital in Egypt. Egyptians are likely to suffer from 
more health problems, and these problems are likely to take longer to resolve (or 
sometimes not resolved at all). All of this is likely to have an impact on individual labour 
productivity levels in Egypt.  
 
5.2.2.3 Self-Perceived Health: 
To capture the above problems, we use a measure of self-perceived health to proxy for the 
unobserved individual labour productivity. In the ELMPS, this health measure is 
determined according to the answers respondents provide for the following question, ‘how 
is your health state in general?’ Respondents are given a 5-point scale that determines 
whether they view their health state as ‘excellent/very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘bad’, or ‘very 
bad’. Note that as previously-discussed (see section 3.4.3), we have combined ‘bad’ and 
‘very bad’ health states in a single category, ending up with a 4-point scale, and we 
reversed the original ranking of the health states so that the ‘1’ represents ‘bad/very bad’ 
health and ‘4’ represents ‘excellent/very good’ health.  
 
This measure is the most general individual-level representation of health available in the 
ELMPS, which is common to all individuals. Despite the usual criticisms towards self-
perceived measures in the literature based on their subjectivity and the possible differences 
among people’s understanding and evaluation of the rankings (see section 3.4.3), a 
subjective measure captures how people feel about their own health, which is ultimately 
very likely to influence their attitudes towards their ability to work. This measure is 
therefore popular in the literature that addresses health and wages (Contoyannis & Rice, 
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2001; Cai, 2009; Gambin, 2004; 2005; Hsieh et al., 2012). Moreover, the correlations 
between self-perceived health and actual health variables (see table 3.5) clearly indicate 
that individuals are consistent across their understanding of the variable and its rankings, 
which supports the potentiality of using this variable as a proxy.  
 
 
5.3 Literature Review 
Earlier literature’s attention largely owed to the impact of wages on individuals’ health 
(Hadley & Osei, 1982; Duleep, 1986; Ettner, 1996). While this relationship is not the focus 
of our study, it is nonetheless worth highlighting the health measures used in these studies. 
Hadley and Osei (1982) as well as Duleep (1986) used mortality rates to represent health, 
while Ettner (1996) utilised self-perceived health (similar to our analysis), alcoholism, and 
bed days, among other measures.  
 
As the health factor increased in popularity, the general wage determination literature 
expanded to explicitly consider the impact of improved health states on wages across many 
countries and in a wide range of samples (Contoyannis & Rice, 2001; Gambin, 2004; 
2005; Hsieh et al., 2012; Kedir, 2008; Thomas & Strauss, 1997; Cai, 2009; Pelkowski & 
Berger, 2004; Lee, 1982; Haveman et al., 1994; Berkowitz et al., 1983). Also, some 
authors extended their analysis to examine the effect of health on general labour market 
outcomes, such as labour supply and work hours (Pelkowski & Berger, 2004).  
 
One of the challenges that confronted authors addressing health is the choice and logic of 
the measure to use to account for individuals’ health. Similar to this research, Contoyannis 
and Rice (2001), Cai (2009), Gambin (2004; 2005), and Hsieh et al. (2012) used a scale-
measure of health states. The authors have used the complete scale, or constructed dummy 
variables, or used both in their estimations. Likewise, Jäckle and Himmler (2010) used a 
scale-measure of health satisfaction. Still, Kedir (2008) and Thomas and Strauss (1997) 
used measures of height and weight to represent health, Mullahy and Sindelar (1995) and 
Barrett (2002) examined the effect of alcoholism on labour market outcomes, and Baldwin 
and Johnson (1994), and Walker and Thompson (1996) used disability measures.  
 
Although all health measures used have a logical basis for their choice, they are all equally 
criticised. For instance, disability may represent a special case of health. Disabled people 
may not be less effective on the job if their disability does not interfere with their work 
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tasks. Also, there are numerous rules and laws governing the treatment of disabled workers 
to ensure fairness in the work place, and hence earnings may not be affected by disabilities. 
In fact, Walker and Thompson (1996) found that disabilities hardly affect wages. Yet, a 
counter to this would be that disabilities might deter a person’s accessibility to certain jobs 
that pay higher. Jäckle and Himmler (2010) have criticised the self-perceived health 
measure, stating that it may not be entirely representative of actual health and may result in 
a measurement error. Hence, finding the appropriate measure is challenging and requires a 
number of assumptions to be made. Additionally, the lagged effect of health could result in 
endogeneity (Jäckle & Himmler, 2010). This, as well as other unobserved factors’ biases 
and unobserved heterogeneity, could be corrected for by using panel data (Gambin, 2005; 
Jäckle & Himmler, 2010; Forbes et al., 2010). Unfortunately, we are unable to take 
advantage of the panel feature of the ELMPS, as health data is available in only one round. 
 
Besides finding the appropriate health measure, the methodology used to estimate the 
model is another challenge. Both endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity could affect 
the estimates (see Cai, 2009; Grossman, 1972). If better health could increase future 
income returns, then individuals as rational decision-makers would be keener on investing 
in health (Grossman, 1972). Similarly, unobserved heterogeneity that may result from 
unobserved factors that could affect wages and health, such as self-discipline, may also 
result in an endogeneity bias (Forbes et al., 2010).  
 
These aspects of the relationship between health and wages render single equation models, 
such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), biased. Contoyannis and Rice (2001), who utilise 
single-equation models, acknowledge this shortcoming of their research results. Similarly, 
Hsieh et al. (2012) fail to account for simultaneity, or even acknowledge it. On the other 
hand, Grossman and Benham (1974), Lee (1982), and Haveman et al. (1994) all utilised 
simultaneous equation frameworks to deal with this endogeneity. Goldsmith et al. (2000), 
for instance, estimated a wage equation and an effort equation simultaneously using a 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Still, these multiple-equation models pose a challenge 
with respect to the instrumentation of the endogenous variables. Health needs to be 
instrumented by factors that affect health, but not wages, and thus adhering to the 
exclusion restrictions. Cai (2009) used age, age squared, specific health conditions, and 
health risk behaviours to instrument health. Similarly, Thomas and Strauss (1997), 
Contoyannis and Rice (2001), and Jäckle and Himmler (2010) have all instrumented the 
relevant health measures, in order to deal with endogeneity and measurement biases.  
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Most of the studies to date have confirmed a positive relationship between health and 
wages. Numerous researchers have illustrated the significance of this positive relationship, 
and Swamy (1997) criticised the usual direction of ignoring the value of health in wage 
determination and productivity studies. Although the nature of the relationship is widely 
acknowledged and logical, the real question is how much more does health contribute to 
wages, or in other words, the magnitude of its impact relevant to other factors. This has 
varied across economies, and our analysis should allow an insight into the value and 
importance of health in Egypt. Additionally, while the analysis of the relationship between 
health and wages has been widely addressed in the literature, little has been done in 
regards to addressing this issue in the Egyptian labour market. This may be due to the lack 
of required data, especially representing a national sample. This reflects a gap in the 
literature that the analysis in this chapter aims to fill.   
 
 
5.4 Econometric Framework 
This section illustrates the equations to be estimated to answer the research question 
addressed in this chapter.  
 
5.4.1 Wage Equation 
The main equation of interest is an extended Mincer-type wage equation, similar to the 
model in chapter IV, although here we are no longer interested in the formal/informal 
divide. The equation to be estimated is identified as follows, 
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑯𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑱𝒊) + 𝝁𝒊  (EQ.I) 
Where,  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑖) – Logarithm of hourly wages of individual i 
𝐻𝑖 - Self-perceived health level of individual i 
𝑋𝑖 - Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 - Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 - Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝜇 - Error terms 
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As shown in EQ.I, the dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages [Log (w)], 
while the main independent variable is the self-perceived level of an individual’s health 
state (H). Additionally, we control for individual (X), human capital (C), and job (J) 
characteristics.  
 
5.4.2 Health Equation 
As already discussed, health (H) in EQ.I is likely to be endogenous. Therefore, we extend 
our model to a two-equation simultaneous model. The second equation models health (H) 
explicitly and this requires the identification of the health equation by including variables 
that do not appear in the wage equation. We model health (H) as,  
 
𝑯𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝒁𝒊) + 𝜺𝒊 (EQ.II) 
Where,  
𝐻𝑖 - Self-perceived health level of individual i 
𝑋𝑖 - Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 - Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝑍𝑖 – Health characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 - Coefficients 
𝜀 - Error terms 
 
Still, the same measure of health is used in EQ.II but as the dependent variable in this case. 
Also, the individual (X), human capital (C), and job (J) characteristics are similar to those 
in the wage equation (EQ.I). In addition to these variables, we include (Z), which include 
the prevalence of a work injury, dead sibling, and the respondents’ mothers’ employment 
status when respondent was 15 years old, as our health identifying variables, i.e. those that 
have a direct effect on health, but not wages.  
 
A further complication of the above system of equations is that while the logarithm of 
hourly wages is a continuous variable, health is a discrete ordered variable. Our 
methodologies should account for this distinction, which is particularly significant in 
obtaining accurate results.  
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5.4.3 Selection Equation 
Finally, we are also interested in correcting for the selection bias that may arise from 
individuals who drop out of the labour force because of ill-health, and therefore do not 
earn wages. To correct for this, we estimate a selection equation of the probability of 
participation as follows,  
 
𝐏𝐫(𝒚𝒊 = 𝟏|𝒙𝒊) = 𝐏𝐫[𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑳𝒊) + 𝜸𝒊]  (EQ.III) 
Where, 
𝑦𝑖 = 1 – Participation into the labour force for individual i  
𝑋𝑖 - Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 - Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝐿𝑖 – Selection-Specific characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 – Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝛾 − Error terms 
 
Similar to chapter IV, the dependent variable of the selection equation (EQ.III) herein is a 
binary variable (y = 1), but in this case representing whether the individual is participating 
in the labour market or not, based on the standard market definition. This variable is 
regressed over a set of individual (X), human capital (C), and selection-specific (L) 
characteristics. Again the selection-specific (L) characteristics, which include 
unemployment rates stratified by educational attainment level, the number of children in 
household, whether respondent is head of household, and the number of males in the 
household who are in the labour age (15-65 years old), are required to identify the 
selection equation and adhere to the exclusion restrictions, thus they are variables that 
affect selection, but not wages.  
 
 
5.5 Methodology 
As previously mentioned, we address two methodological issues in our analysis, which this 
section summarises below. Thereafter, a discussion of the methods employed in our 
estimations is provided.  
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5.5.1 Methodological Challenges 
In this analysis, we address sample selection into the labour force and the endogeneity of 
health in the estimation of wages, which are both likely to lead to inconsistent and biased 
results. As a result, correcting for them is essential for reaching more accurate findings.  
 
5.5.1.1 Sample Selection Bias: 
As discussed in chapter IV, sample selection bias may arise from disregarding a proportion 
of the sample, for which our dependent variable of interest is unobservable. In the analysis 
herein, individuals who suffer from extreme bad health may opt out of the labour market 
completely, and hence their wage levels are unobservable, and they are unaccounted for in 
the sample we utilise in the wage estimations. Since we expect unobservable factors that 
affect an individual’s choice in joining the labour market to also affect the wages that 
individual earns, we need to correct for any resulting bias from selection.  
  
5.5.1.2 The Endogeneity of Health: 
In addition, we address and correct for the endogeneity of health. We expect better health, 
which would reflect in productivity improvements, to improve wages received by labour. 
Meanwhile, individuals who earn more are likely to be more capable of maintaining and 
investing more in healthcare and health maintenance. Thus, this reverse causality is likely 
to result in an endogeneity bias in the wage equation’s estimates. Another related source of 
endogeneity, as explained by Jäckle and Himmler (2010), is that since workers are aware 
of the effect of better health on wages, rational individuals would increase their investment 
in human capital (i.e. health) to improve the wages they are offered in the future. Thus, to 
obtain unbiased and consistent estimates, we need to instrument the endogenous variable, 
which in this case is health.  
 
5.5.2 Methods of Estimation 
In the following discussion, we outline the different methods used in the estimation of the 
wage equation. Also, we highlight how each method improves on the estimates obtained.  
 
5.5.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
We start off by presenting the results of an OLS model of EQ.I, which is believed to yield 
biased and inconsistent estimates, as it overlooks both sample selection and endogeneity. 
The purpose for this model is only to highlight differences between results of models that 
address sample selection and endogeneity and the OLS model, which does not.  
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5.5.2.2 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS): 
The 2SLS method is one potential method for dealing with the endogeneity of health. 
Typically, the 2SLS approach involves a two-stage model to deal with endogeneity, but in 
our modified version of the model, we incorporate an additional stage to address selection 
into participation. Thus, our model begins with estimating a Probit model of the probability 
of labour force participation (EQ.III), from which we calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR), as we have done in chapter IV (see section 4.5.3). Note that the selection equation 
is assumed identified by the inclusion of the selection-specific variables (L). 
 
The following stage begins the typical 2SLS model estimation, which involves estimating 
a reduced-form health equation, regressing the endogenous variable on all of the 
exogenous variables and the IMR. This reduced-form health equation is identified as,  
 
𝑯𝒊 = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝒁𝒊) + 𝜷𝟓(𝑰𝑴𝑹) + 𝜺𝒊  (EQ.IV) 
 
Similar to the selection equation (EQ.III), the reduced-form health equation (EQ.IV) 
requires identification, which is done by the inclusion of the health characteristics (Z), 
representing factors that significantly affect health, but not wages.   
 
We use the results of EQ.IV to acquire the predicted values of health, which are then used 
to substitute the original health variable in the wage equation. Thus, the final stage 
involves the estimation of the wage equation, which is identified as, 
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(?̂?𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑱𝒊) +  𝜷𝟓(𝑰𝑴𝑹) + 𝝁𝒊  (EQ.V) 
Where,  
?̂?𝑖- Predicted value of self-perceived health level of individual i 
 
Note that STATA runs the typical 2SLS stages, which includes the estimation of EQ.IV 
and EQ.V, simultaneously, and hence corrects the standard errors. Yet, the IMR obtained 
from the Probit model (EQ.III) is included in the 2SLS model estimation (EQ.IV and 
EQ.V), thus we need to correct for any variation that may be unexplained by using 
estimates from one model into the other, for which we bootstrap the error formulas of the 
three equations.  
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5.5.2.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE): 
While 2SLS corrects for the endogeneity of health, it still fails to account for the discrete 
ordered nature of the health measure, as the estimation of EQ.IV utilises a linear approach. 
Thus, concerns may arise regarding the validity of the results due to the information lost by 
treating health as a continuous variable. Moreover, the 2SLS model (EQ.IV and EQ.V) 
cannot be estimated simultaneously when we add the selection equation (EQ.III).   
 
Therefore, we estimate the system using a Maximum Likelihood estimation (MLE) method 
within STATA, which allows mixing between different models to increase efficiency. 
Specifically, we use a conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator, which estimates a 
multi-equation mixed system, whereby endogenous variables can appear on the right side 
of other equations and their errors can be correlated. As Roodman (2015) explained, the 
possibility of mixing processes, implying that different equations are allowed to have 
different types of dependent variables, offers more flexibility in the model’s construction. 
Accordingly, the wage equation (EQ.I) utilises a linear approach for its estimation, the 
health equation (EQ.II) utilises an Ordered Probit model, while participation into the 
labour force (EQ.III) employs a Probit model. Since CMP estimates the equations of 
interest simultaneously, the relevant STATA command prevents the need for any further 
adjustments or corrections.  
 
Note that wages are only observed if participation > 0, and thus only a subset of the sample 
is used in the estimation of wages, while the selection estimation utilises the complete 
sample. CMP allows this kind of flexibility, since each equation can vary by observation.  
 
Still, this method requires the identification of the various equations, and hence the 
selection and health instruments are included in the selection and health equations, 
respectively. It should be noted that we use the same instruments as well as the same 
sample in the 2SLS and MLE models to allow for more accurate and consistent 
comparisons of results.  
 
 
5.6 Data 
This section highlights the main aspects of the sample and the variables utilised in the 
estimation of each equation. Some statistical data are presented along with a more detailed 
explanation of the identifiers of the selection and the health equations.  
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5.6.1 Sample 
As explained in the previous chapters, individuals under 15 or over 65 years old were 
dropped, in addition to any self-employed or unpaid workers. Furthermore, observations 
that did not provide information regarding any of the questions of interest were omitted. 
Similar to chapter IV, we restrict our sample to the private sector workers because wage 
determination in Egypt differs between the private and the public sectors (see section 2.5), 
and productivity is likely to affect wages only in the private sector. Thus, we are left with a 
sample of 21,319 observations, of which 14,383 observations are out of the labour force 
and 5,652 are waged workers employed in the private sector.  
 
5.6.2 Variables 
Table 5.1 below summarises the variables used in the estimation of each equation. Some 
variables are common between the equations, but for identification purposes, there must 
exist at least one variable that is specific to each equation. 
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Table 5.1: Variables - by Equation: 
 Wage Equation 
(EQ.I) 
Health Equation 
(EQ.II) 
Selection Equation 
(EQ.III) 
Dependent Variables 
 Logarithm of 
Hourly Wages 
Self-perceived 
Health  
Probability of Labour 
Force Participation  
Explanatory Variables 
 Self-perceived 
Health  
………. ………. 
 
 
Individual 
Characteristics 
Age Age Age 
Age Squared Age Squared Age Squared 
Gender* Gender* Gender* 
Marital Status* Marital Status* Marital Status* 
Region* Region* Region* 
Parents’ 
Education* 
Parents’ 
Education* 
Parents’ Education* 
Human 
Capital 
Characteristics 
Education* Education* Education* 
Training Received* ………. ………. 
 
 
 
Job 
Characteristics  
Occupations* ………. ………. 
Tenure ………. ………. 
Tenure Squared ………. ………. 
Stability of Job* ………. ………. 
Union 
Membership* 
………. ………. 
Supervisory Roles* ………. ………. 
Night Work* Night Work* ………. 
Formality of Job* ………. ………. 
Firm Size* ………. ………. 
Instrumental Variables29  
 
 
 
………. Incidence of Work 
Injury* 
Educational 
Unemployment Rates30 
………. Incidence of Dead 
Sibling* 
Head of Household* 
………. Mothers’ 
Employment Status 
when respondent 
was 15 years old* 
Number of Children in 
Household 
………. ………. Number of males in the 
labour age (15-65 years 
old) in household 
*Indicates the use of dummy variables 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 These represent health characteristics (Z) for the health equation (EQ.II) and selection-
specific characteristics (L) for the selection equation (EQ.III).  
30 Data extracted from CAPMAS’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2012). 
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5.6.2.1 Dependent Variables: 
Table 5.2 below shows some descriptive statistics with regards to the dependent variables 
of the three equations of interest. Note that the nature of the dependent variable of each 
equation is different. While the wage equation’s dependent variable, which is the logarithm 
of hourly wages, is a continuous variable, the dependent variables of the health and the 
selection equations are both discrete variables. Also, the self-perceived health measure, 
which is the health equation’s dependent variable, is an ordered discrete variable. 
Specifically, individuals were asked, ‘How is your health in general?’ and according to our 
modified scale (see sections 3.4.3; 5.2.2.3), answers were given on a scale of 1-4, with ‘1’ 
representing the worst state of health and ‘4’ representing the best. Conversely, the 
selection equation’s dependent variable, which represents whether the individual is 
participating in the labour market or not, is a binary discrete variable.  
 
As shown in table 5.2, our sample’s average logarithm of hourly wages of 1.410 falls in the 
middle of the range reported in chapter IV for the formal and informal sector samples of 
1.597 and 1.359, respectively (see table 4.2). Also, as illustrated in chapter III (see figure 
3.4), the majority of the employed waged private sector sample reported the highest levels 
of health. Finally, there are 14,383 non-participating individuals in the labour force out of a 
total sample of 21,319 individuals (see table 5.2), of which 80.5% are women. 
 
 Table 5.2: Dependent Variables - Descriptions and Statistics: 
Equation Variables31 Description Statistics32 
EQ.I: 
WAGES  
LOG (WAGES/HR) Logarithm of hourly wages 1.410 (0.662) 
EQ.II: 
HEALTH  
HEALTH An ordered discrete variable. 
Individuals asked, “how is your 
health in general?” and answers 
given on a 4-point scale as follows; 
1 – Very bad/bad 
2 – Fair 
3 – Good 
4 – Excellent/very good 
 
 
 
 
76 
565 
3,142 
1,869 
EQ.III: 
SELECTION  
LF 
 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether the 
individual is participating in the 
labour force or not,  
1 if participating, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-participating 
 
 
 
6,936 
14,383 
                                                        
31 Note that statistics for [LOG (WAGES/HR)] and (HEALTH) are provided for the 
private sector’s waged workers, while those of (LF) are provided for the complete sample 
in the labour age (15-65 years old).  
32 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for [LOG (WAGES/HR)], while 
frequency of observations provided for (HEALTH) and (LF). 
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5.6.2.2 Explanatory variables: 
In the following discussion we focus on the individual, human capital, and job 
characteristics controlled for in the three equations of interest. Note that these variables in 
relation to wages have been discussed in chapter IV (see section 4.6.2.2), thus we only 
briefly refer to the wage equation and instead focus on the health and selection equations. 
Furthermore, we report the statistics of most variables for two separate samples, the non-
participating and the employed waged private sector samples. 
 
Individual factors controlled for in the three equations of interest are all the same (see table 
5.1), since these factors, whose descriptive statistics are illustrated in table 5.3, are 
expected to equally affect wages, health, and selection, as we explain below.  
 
Table 5.3: Individual Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics:  
Variables Description Statistics33 
Non-
Participating 
Employed 
Waged 
AGE Age of respondents in years 31.60 (14.53) 31.61 (9.79) 
Gender: 
MALE 
Reference 
A dummy variable for gender,  
1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: females 
 
2,806 
11,577 
 
5,285 
367 
Marital Status*Gender: 
 
MARRIED*MALE 
Reference 
 
 
 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
Reference 
An interaction variable for marital 
status*gender,  
1 if male and married, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: females of all marital statuses and 
males less than minimum age, single, 
contractually married, divorced, or 
widowed(er) 
1 if female and married, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: males of all marital statuses and 
females less than minimum age, single, 
contractually married, divorced, or 
widowed(er) 
 
 
482 
13,901   
 
 
 
7,958 
6,425 
 
 
3,541 
2,111 
 
 
 
156 
5,496 
Region: 
 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
Reference 
A categorical variable for region of 
residence,  
1 if rural lower area, 0 otherwise 
1 if urban upper area, 0 otherwise 
1 if urban lower area, 0 otherwise 
1 if Alexandria or Suez canal, 0 otherwise 
1 if Greater Cairo, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: rural upper region 
 
 
3,758 
1,952 
1,534 
1,235 
1,731 
4,173 
 
 
1,615 
697 
614 
479 
719 
1,528 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
Reference 
MOTHER EDUC 
Reference 
A dummy variable for parents education,  
1 if father has some degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: uneducated fathers  
1 if mother has some degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: uneducated mothers  
 
4,756 
9,627 
3,177 
11,206 
 
1,410 
4,242 
762 
4,890 
 
                                                        
33 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for continuous variables, while 
frequency of observations provided for categorical and dummy variables. 
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We find that average age is roughly equal for both the non-participating and the waged 
workers samples (see table 5.3). In terms of gender, we find that the majority of the non-
participating sample constitutes women, while the majority of the waged employed sample 
constitutes men (see table 5.3). This confirms the higher likelihood of women opting out of 
the labour force completely. Expectedly, we find that married men make up a small 
proportion of the non-participating sample, while the number of non-participating married 
women is much larger (see table 5.3). Similarly, married males constitute the majority of 
the employed private sector workers as opposed to married women, whose proportion is 
significantly lower (see table 5.3). Region is again significant for wages, similar to chapter 
IV’s discussion (see section 4.6.2.2), as well as health, since individuals residing in urban 
regions are expected to have access to superior labour market outcomes and health 
services. Still, we find fewer differences in sample distributions with regards to region, 
which is similar to the statistics of parents’ education (see table 5.3), and thus require 
regression results to understand their impact in the Egyptian context.  
 
While we control for educational attainment and training received in the wage equation, 
we exclude training from the health equation, since training received is unlikely to have an 
effect on health, and from the selection equation, as such information is only provided for 
the sample participating in the labour force. Conversely, we expect education to affect 
health, since better-educated individuals are likely to be keener about maintaining a better 
state of health and may have the resources and knowledge to achieve this. Similarly, we 
may expect those with higher educational attainment to participate more in the labour 
force, and indeed we can see that illiterate individuals are a larger fraction of the non-
participating sample compared to the employed waged sample, while the opposite is true 
for university degree holders (see table 5.4). Note that those who received training make 
up a small proportion of our sample (see table 5.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Human Capital Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics:  
Variables Description Statistics34 
Non-
Participating 
Employed 
Waged 
Education: 
 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL  
POST-SEC 
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
Reference 
A categorical variable for educational 
attainment level of respondent,  
1 if literate with no diploma, 0 otherwise 
1 if elementary degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if middle school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if general high school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if vocational high school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if post-secondary degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if university degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if post-graduate degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: illiterates  
 
 
426 
1,726 
2,420 
1,403 
3,043 
281 
973 
31 
4,080 
 
 
256 
783 
415 
153 
2,008 
154 
732 
22 
1,129 
TRAINING 
 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether respondent 
received training other than formal 
education,  
1 if received training, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no training received 
 
 
 
………. 
………. 
 
 
 
211 
5,441 
 
Job Characteristics are mainly only included in the wage equation (see table 5.1), and the 
statistics below (see table 5.5) are provided only for the employed waged private sector 
sample, since these are the only individuals who provide information regarding these 
factors. These factors have already been discussed in chapter IV (see section 4.6.2.2), thus 
we limit our discussion here to any peculiarities regarding the specific sample in study.  
 
The health equation only controls for individuals working nights, since this factor may 
have a negative effect on an individual’s health, due to working abnormal hours to what 
the human physique is accustomed to. According to the statistics, a significant proportion 
of our sample is working nights (see table 5.5). The remaining job characteristics are 
hardly relevant to the health state of an individual. For instance, the size of firm or the 
sector of employment are unlikely to directly affect health, as individuals are generally 
assigned to certain work tasks, for which they should be appropriately compensated.  
 
Regarding the wage equation, we find that union members or supervisors are a relatively 
small proportion of our sample (see table 5.5). Also, we find that 
agricultural/forestry/fishery, which we dropped from our sample in chapter IV (see section 
4.6.1), comprises a large proportion of the sample, which is only preceded by ‘craft/trade’ 
workers and followed by ‘machine operators’ and ‘service/sales’ workers (see table 5.5). 
Note that the formality of the job is controlled for in the wage equation to highlight 
differences in wages owing to the sector of employment, since the sample is not stratified 
                                                        
34 Frequency of observations. 
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by sector of employment contrary to the analysis in chapter IV, and we find that the 
majority of our sample is informally employed (see table 5.5). In this context, we find that 
the majority of our sample works in small-sized firms (see table 5.5). This is unsurprising 
given our earlier analysis of the private sector sample in chapter IV, which showed that 
smaller-sized firms are likely to be more prevalent in the informal sector (see section 
4.6.2.2), which is the sector that represents the bigger proportion of our sample.  
 
Table 5.5: Job Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics: 
Variables Description Statistics35 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
Reference 
A categorical variable for occupation of respondents, 
1 if professional, 0 otherwise 
1 if technicians/associate professionals, 0 otherwise 
1 if clerical support worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if service/sales worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if agricultural/forestry/fishery worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if craft and related trades worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if plant/machine operator, 0 otherwise 
1 if elementary occupation, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: managers  
 
358 
210 
97 
834 
968 
1,851 
897 
375 
62 
TENURE The length of employment at current job in years 10.32 (9.20) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
Reference 
A categorical variable for stability of job,  
1 if temporary worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if seasonal worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if casual worker, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: permanent workers  
 
732 
49 
2,416 
2,455 
UNION  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for union membership,  
1 if member in union, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-union members 
 
484 
5,168 
SUPERVISOR 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for supervisory roles,  
1 if respondent is a supervisor, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-supervisors  
 
479 
5,173 
NIGHT  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for working night (after 7 p.m.),  
1 if works nights, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no night work  
 
2,617 
3,035 
FORMAL 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for formality of job,  
1 if job is formal, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: informal workers 
 
1,221 
4,431 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
Reference 
A categorical variable for size of firm,  
1 if firm with 50-99 workers, 0 otherwise 
1 if firm with 100+ workers, 0 otherwise 
1 if size of firm unknown, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: small-size firms (less than 50 workers)  
 
197 
658 
204 
4,593 
 
  5.6.2.3 Instrumental Variables: 
We turn our attention here to the statistics of the identifiers of the health equation (see 
table 5.6) and the selection equation (see table 5.7), which need to be significant in the 
estimation of health and selection, respectively, whilst not related to wages, to serve their 
purpose and meet the exclusion restriction requirement.  
                                                        
35 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for continuous variables, while 
frequency of observations provided for categorical and dummy variables.  
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To instrument health, we utilise measures of whether the individual has a work injury, 
dead sibling, and the professional status of the respondents’ mothers when respondent was 
15 years old (see table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.6: Health Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics:  
Variables Description Statistics36 
Non-
Participating 
Employed 
Waged 
INJURY 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether respondent 
has a work injury,  
1 if work injury prevalent, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no work injury  
 
 
………. 
………. 
 
 
364 
5,288 
DEADSIB 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether respondent 
has a dead sibling,  
1 if has dead sibling, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no dead sibling  
 
 
4,151 
10,232 
 
 
1,772 
3,880 
MOTHER NO-EMP  
 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether 
respondent’s mother was working when 
respondent was 15 years old,  
1 if mother not working, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: working mothers 
 
 
 
1,462 
12,907 
 
 
 
525 
5,127 
 
Having a work injury or a dead sibling may mirror a certain view about health. Individuals 
who have a work injury are likely to view their working conditions as more hazardous to 
their health, and hence their views and ranking of their health state may be worse. Upon 
inspection of the statistics, we find that individuals who have had a work injury represent a 
minor proportion of the sample (see table 5.6). Similarly, having a dead sibling is likely to 
implicate a person’s health state as well as their views of it, especially if that sibling has 
died at a younger age or due to a health condition. These individuals represent a more 
significant proportion of our sample, specifically 31.35% of the sample (see table 5.6). 
Note that both of the above factors are unlikely to affect the wages the individual is 
offered. Even in the case of a work injury, the individual is likely to have been 
compensated for it, but not received an increase in pay. Finally, we control for whether 
respondents’ mothers were working when the respondent was 15 years old, and thus at the 
time of growth and dependence on their parents for maintaining a better state of health. 
While this factor is unlikely to affect the wages an individual earns in the labour market, 
we may expect it to have an effect on the individual’s human capital, because mothers who 
had to ration their time between family caretaking and labour market activities might have 
had less time for their children’s health and education. Only 525 employed individuals and 
1,462 non-participating individuals have working mothers, as opposed to 5,127 and 12,907 
individuals, respectively, who do not (see table 5.6).  
                                                        
36 Frequency of observations. 
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Finally, we review the statistics of the selection identifiers (selection-specific 
characteristics). Again, these variables should impact selection directly, but not wages. Our 
selection identifiers (see table 5.1) are unemployment rates stratified by educational 
attainment level, whether respondent is head of household, the number of children in 
household, and the number of males in the labour age (15-65 years old) in household. 
Unemployment is expected to affect selection negatively, since those who face higher 
unemployment rates are likely to find it harder to find a job and may eventually give up 
and opt out of the labour force altogether. Conversely, unemployment is unlikely to affect 
wages directly, and any impact on wages would only be through its impact on selection 
(see section 4.6.2.3). More specifically, unemployment rates may affect the supply of 
labour in the market, and it is only through this channel that wages would react. For 
instance, higher unemployment may lead to an excess supply of labour if individuals chose 
to remain in the labour force, and as a result, wages may decline. Conversely, if this higher 
unemployment leads to non-participation in the labour market, then there would be little or 
no impact on wages. Similarly, household factors are likely to impact selection, but these 
are unlikely to have a direct effect on wages. Whether individuals are heads of household, 
the numbers of children in household, or the number of males in the labour age in 
household are not factors that employers would evaluate when hiring labour and offering a 
specific pay.  
 
Table 5.7: Selection-Specific Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics: 
Variables Description Statistics37 
UNEMP (EDUC) Unemployment rates stratified by educational level  22.52 (19.21) 
HEAD  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for head of household,  
1 if respondent is head of household, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: not head of household  
 
5,091 
16,228 
Number of Children: 
 
MALE*CHILD 
 
FEMALE*CHILD 
 
An interaction variable for gender*number of children in 
household, 
Males*number of children (below 15 years old) in household 
for males 
Females*number of children (below 15 years old) in 
household for females 
 
 
0.506 (1.050) 
 
0.882 (1.323) 
MALE (15-65) in HH  The number of males in the labour active age (15-65 years 
old) in the individual’s household 
1.092 (0.952) 
 
In terms of the statistics, we find that almost 24% of our sample is heads of households 
(see table 5.7). This represents a pressure on the individual to join the labour force, in order 
to provide for those in the household. Furthermore, we identify selection by the number of 
children (below 15 years old) in the household. Given that having young children increases 
                                                        
37 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for continuous variables, while 
frequency of observations provided for categorical and dummy variables.  
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pressure on adults to provide for their families, it is not surprising that this influences 
selection into the labour force but not wages. Still, we expect that the effect of the number 
of children to differ between men and women, especially since the male breadwinner norm 
is prevalent in Egypt. Thus, we construct two variables, MALE*CHILD and 
FEMALE*CHILD, which interact gender with the number of dependents below 15 years 
of age. We find that women’s average number of dependents exceed that of men (see table 
5.7). Similarly, we utilise the number of males in the labour age in household to identify 
selection, as having more men in the working age in the household is likely to add less 
pressure on the individual to join the labour force. According to our sample’s statistics (see 
table 5.7), the average number of males in the labour age in the individuals’ households is 
1. Lastly, the sample’s average unemployment rate is 22.5%.  
 
 
5.7 Results and Analysis 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of the equations of interest modelled for 
the complete labour sample and separately for the male labour sample. We start off with a 
discussion of the selection equations’ results (see section 5.7.1), followed by the results of 
the wage equations (see section 5.7.2). Note that the male labour sample, of 5,285 
observations, is only slightly smaller than the complete labour sample of 5,652 
observations.  
 
5.7.1 Probability of Labour Force Participation  
The selection equation results identify the effect of numerous labour factors on the 
probability of participating in the labour force. Note that the results reported by the 2SLS 
and MLE models (see table 5.8) are quite similar, implying that in dealing with selection, 
both models use the same approach and are equally acceptable. 
 
Our results indicate that most of the selection-specific characteristics are highly significant 
for the complete labour sample’s probability of participation in the labour force (see table 
5.8, columns 1 and 2). More specifically, being head of household increases the probability 
of participation into the labour force, while being in an educational category with higher 
unemployment decreases the probability of participation for the individual. Similarly, 
women with more children in the household and individuals in households with more 
males in the working age have lower probability of participation (see table 5.8, columns 1 
and 2). Conversely, in the males-only labour sample, the only variable that significantly 
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identifies selection is the number of males in the working age in the household (see table 
5.8, columns 3 and 4). Note that as mentioned in chapter III (see section 3.3), we are 
mainly interested in the models utilising the complete labour sample, and the male labour 
sample’s models are only illustrated to highlight major differences, if any. Thus, we model 
both samples utilising the same variables to provide comparable results.  
 
Table 5.8: Selection Equation Results38 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Pr (PARTICIPATION) 
 COMPLETE  LABOUR 
SAMPLE 
MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Selection-Specific Characteristics 
UNEMP (EDUC) -0.014** (0.007) -0.014** (0.006) -0.017 (0.013) -0.018 (0.016) 
HEAD 0.148** (0.059) 0.161*** (0.057) -0.068 (0.116) 0.074 (0.112) 
Number of Children: 
MALE*CHILD 
FEMALE*CHILD 
 
 
0.009 (0.015) 
-0.100*** (0.015) 
 
0.009 (0.015) 
-0.100*** (0.015) 
 
-0.025 (0.017) 
………. 
 
-0.026 (0.016) 
………. 
MALE (15-65) in HH  -0.034** (0.016) -0.033** (0.016) -0.067*** (0.025) -0.068*** (0.025) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.278*** (0.008) 0.277*** (0.008) 0.398*** (0.013) 0.399*** (0.012) 
AGE SQUARED -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.005*** (0.0002) -0.005*** (0.0001) 
MALE 1.255*** (0.046) 1.254*** (0.047) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
1.193*** (0.076) 
-0.709*** (0.045) 
 
1.180*** (0.068) 
-0.707*** (0.044) 
 
0.669*** (0.117) 
………. 
 
0.661*** (0.107) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
0.326*** (0.036) 
0.162*** (0.043) 
0.361*** (0.047) 
0.205*** (0.051) 
0.233*** (0.047) 
 
0.323*** (0.036) 
0.161*** (0.045) 
0.361*** (0.047) 
0.201*** (0.053) 
0.233*** (0.048) 
 
-0.0003 (0.056) 
0.054 (0.063) 
0.136* (0.070) 
0.057 (0.077) 
0.207*** (0.076) 
 
-0.003 (0.054) 
0.050 (0.066) 
0.128* (0.074) 
0.050 (0.079) 
0.204*** (0.071) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
-0.094*** (0.034) 
-0.258*** (0.041) 
 
-0.097*** (0.034) 
-0.256*** (0.039) 
 
-.0.158*** (0.049) 
-0.349*** (0.053) 
 
-0.158*** (0.050) 
-0.352*** (0.056) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
0.133* (0.072) 
0.046 (0.059) 
-0.429*** (0.064) 
-0.178 (0.295) 
1.078*** (0.288) 
0.601*** (0.085) 
1.273*** (0.205) 
1.088*** (0.294) 
 
0.136* (0.080) 
0.050 (0.062) 
-0.424*** (0.065) 
-0.180 (0.283) 
1.076*** (0.278) 
0.607*** (0.083) 
1.272*** (0.198) 
1.113*** (0.269) 
 
-0.056 (0.129) 
-0.246** (0.113) 
-0.794*** (0.112) 
-0.739 (0.579) 
0.537 (0.576) 
-0.188 (0.157) 
0.313 (0.406) 
-0.087 (0.518) 
 
-0.051 (0.122) 
-0.237** (0.115) 
-0.781*** (0.117) 
-0.711 (0.686) 
0.563 (0.685) 
-0.178 (0.155) 
0.335 (0.480) 
-0.080 (0.563) 
 
Constant 
 
-5.219*** (0.148) -5.217*** (0.138) -5.049*** (0.207) -5.061*** (0.199) 
N 21,319 21,319 8,517 8,517 
Pseudo R2 0.5491 ………. 0.5041 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                        
38 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Other results of the complete labour sample’s models (see table 5.8, columns 1 and 2) 
worth highlighting include the higher probability of participation of older individuals, 
which increases at a declining rate, and of men, which confirms the much lower female 
participation rates in the Egyptian labour market. Also, marriage impacts the participation 
of men and women differently, where it increases men’s participation but decreases 
women’s participation. This is sensible since married women would have to ration their 
time between household chores and labour market activities, while the primary purpose of 
men in the Egyptian context is to provide for their households. In terms of region of 
residence, we find that all regions significantly increase the probability of participation 
relative to the rural upper areas, and the highest differentials are reported for the rural 
lower and urban lower regions. Likewise, we report that literacy, vocational, post-
secondary, university, and post-graduate degrees significantly increase the complete labour 
sample’s probability of participation compared to the illiterate individuals. Thus, similar to 
our analysis in chapter IV, we have to again emphasise the importance placed on education 
on enhancing labour market outcomes, and thus the requirement for addressing education 
and human capital accumulation more effectively in the Egyptian economy. Finally, we 
find that having educated parents actually decreases the probability of participation, a 
result that may need further explicit analysis to understand, but goes beyond the scope of 
our research. Note that parents’ education may be correlated with other variables that have 
a significant effect on participation, such as education, and thus requires to be exclusively 
dealt with to reach more accurate results.  
 
There are some differences between the results reported for the complete labour sample 
and those of the male labour sample (see table 5.8). For instance, the impact of age and 
having educated parents are of a larger magnitude for males than the complete labour 
sample, while the impact of men’s marriage is of a smaller magnitude. In terms of region 
of residence, only the urban lower and Cairo regions are significant for the male labour 
sample, and the male labour sample’s coefficient of the urban lower region is much lower 
than that reported for the complete labour sample. Likewise, we find that among the male 
labour sample, only elementary degrees significantly increase the probability of labour 
force participation than illiterates (see table 5.8, columns 3 and 4).  
 
5.7.2 The Effect of Health on Wages  
We use three methods to estimate the wage equation (see section 5.5.2), OLS, 2SLS, and 
MLE. While the OLS results are presented solely for comparison purposes, as this model 
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overlooks selection into participation and the endogeneity of health in the wage model. To 
correct for these biases, we estimate the 2SLS and MLE models.  
 
  5.7.2.1 Health Equation Results: 
We begin by briefly reviewing the most important results of the health equation estimation 
(see table 5.9), in order to assess whether our instruments serve their purpose and are 
properly identifying health. This is especially significant since weak instruments may be 
more detrimental to the results we obtain than overlooking endogeneity altogether.  
 
One way of determining the weakness of instruments is to examine their significance in the 
estimation of the health equation. According to our results (see table 5.9), all the 
instruments/identifiers are highly significant across both models and for both samples. This 
implies that the models are properly identified, and hence results that correct for 
endogeneity are superior to the OLS results.  
 
Table 5.9: Health Equation39 - Identifiers Results40 (Complete/Male Labour 
Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: HEALTH 
 COMPLETE LABOUR 
SAMPLE 
MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables
41
 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Health Characteristics 
INJURY -0.161*** (0.035) -0.286*** (0.060) -0.165*** (0.035) -0.301*** (0.060) 
DEADSIB -0.041** (0.019) -0.085** (0.034) -0.043** (0.020) -0.091*** (0.034) 
MOTHER NO-EMP  
 
0.097*** (0.031) 0.157*** (0.055) 0.113*** (0.033) 0.195*** (0.058) 
IMR 0.090 (0.059) ………. 0.016 (0.068) ………. 
 
N 5,652 5,652 5,285 5,285 
R2 0.1063 ………. 0.1061 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                        
39 Bootstrapped 2SLS models do not report the health equation results, thus results of this 
model are acquired from a 2SLS model without bootstrapping. This seems reasonable 
since the outcome equation’s (the wage equation) coefficients are the same, but only the 
standard errors are different to a limited extent.  
40 For complete results of the health equations, see appendix 5, table 5.14. 
41 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parents are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), and working nights. Additional control variables only in the 2SLS 
model include: training received, occupational dummies (9), tenure, tenure squared, job 
stability dummies (4), union membership, supervisory roles, formality of job, and firm size 
dummies (4). 
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Our central concern in this analysis is not the determinants of health but rather the impact 
that health has on wages. We will therefore only comment briefly on the estimates of the 
health model. The coefficients of each model differ in magnitude and definition, and these 
differences owe to the fact that MLE treats the health variable as an ordered discrete 
variable and uses an Ordered Probit model to estimate the health equation, while the 2SLS 
model utilises a linear approach and treats the health variable as continuous. Thus, MLE 
may prohibit the loss of information, which is likely to occur with 2SLS models, providing 
us with more accurate results. Still, the impact of the health instruments on health are 
found to be similar across both models, where the prevalence of an injury and dead 
siblings decrease the health states reported, while the non-working mothers increase the 
health states reported (see table 5.9), all matching earlier postulations (see section 5.6.2.3). 
 
We have also conducted tests of weakness of instruments, which STATA allows post 
running a 2SLS model. The rule of thumb is that the F-test of the joint significance of 
instruments should exceed 10 for the instruments to be acceptable. Our F-test results of 
12.275 for the complete labour sample and 13.265 for the male labour sample (see table 
5.10) are thus acceptable.  
 
Table 5.10: Tests of Instruments (2SLS Model): 
Statistics Results 
 COMPLETE LABOUR  MALE LABOUR  
R-Squared 0.1063 0.1061   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0991 0.0988 
Partial R-Squared 0.0065 0.0075 
Bootstrap F (3,5606) = 12.275 F (3, 5241) = 13.265 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Other factors exhibit the expected relationships (see appendix 5, table 5.14), where married 
women report worse states of health, while married men report better states of health. We 
also find health differentials in favour of individuals residing in urban upper regions and 
Alexandria/Suez Canal, which also represents an urban region, compared with those living 
in rural upper regions. Quite unsurprisingly, higher educational attainment improves an 
individual’s reported health, although the differentials are wider for the complete labour 
sample than the male labour sample. Finally, mothers’ education is only significant for the 
male labour sample, and these individuals report better states of health. 
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5.7.2.2 Wage Equation Results: 
While the 2SLS and MLE models report very similar findings for the probability of 
selection into the labour force (see table 5.8), results are relatively distinct with respect to 
the effect of health on wages (see table 5.11), highlighting the importance of addressing 
the particular discrete ordered nature of the health variable. Furthermore, 2SLS and MLE 
results are greatly distinct from the OLS model, reinforcing the importance of dealing with 
the selection and endogeneity biases for achieving more accurate results.  
 
Our OLS model reports the insignificance of health for the private sector wages of both 
samples (see table 5.11, column 1). Yet, once endogeneity and sample selection are 
accounted for, health is found to have a significant and positive effect on wage levels of 
both samples according to the 2SLS and MLE models (see table 5.11, columns 2 and 3). 
This is perhaps the most important enhancement to the estimations. Furthermore, we find 
that the IMILLS ratio (IMR) is significant only for the male labour sample, implying that 
the selection bias is significant only for this sample. The negative IMR implies that the 
unobserved factors that affected men’s participation into the labour force have a negative 
impact on their wages.   
 
Similarly, the difference between the MLE and 2SLS health coefficient sizes may be 
explained by how the estimation takes into account the discrete ordered nature of the 
health measure, which 2SLS overlooks. Accordingly, we accept and particularly focus on 
results obtained from the MLE model, as these may be perceived to be the most precise, 
since the model deals with selection, endogeneity, and the discrete ordered nature of the 
health measure, and thus prevents the loss of information and corrects for the likely biases. 
MLE reports a significant increase of private sector wages for the complete labour sample 
of 19.9% and for the male labour sample of 24.2% as a result of one point increase in 
health states (see table 5.11, column 3). These coefficients are much lower than those 
reported by the 2SLS models for both samples (see table 5.11, column 2), implying that the 
loss of information as a result of overlooking the discrete ordered nature of the health 
variable over-estimates the effect of health on wages. Also, 2SLS reports a much lower R-
squared value than OLS (see table 5.11, column 2), implying that the variation in wages is 
probably better explained with the OLS rather than the 2SLS model, thus we remain 
favourable of the MLE results rather than 2SLS. 
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Table 5.11: Wage Equation42 - Health Results43 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
Variables
44
 OLS 2SLS MLE 
COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE 
HEALTH 
 
-0.011 (0.013) 0.308* (0.181) 0.199** (0.092) 
IMR 
 
………. -0.090 (0.066) ………. 
N 5,652 5,652 5,652 
R2 0.1721 0.0804 ………. 
MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
HEALTH 
 
-0.015 (0.013) 0.400** (0.164) 0.242*** (0.083) 
IMR 
 
………. -0.150** (0.069) ………. 
N 5,285 5,285 5,285 
R2 0.1520 ………. ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Still, the MLE findings imply that health plays a major role in determining wages in Egypt. 
Thus, if health represents productivity as we have postulated, then it is likely that healthier 
individuals will have higher productivity levels, and consequently get paid more, which 
indicates the great benefits that may be redeemed in terms of productivity and wage 
enhancements by improving health states. In comparison with similar findings for other 
countries in the literature, health seems to have a larger and more significant impact on 
wages in the Egyptian labour market than in other advanced economies, though the same 
relationship has also been identified in the latter. For instance, Jäckle and Himmler (2010) 
reported very small coefficients for German labour, albeit still positive and significant. 
These distinctions could be linked to a variety of factors. For instance, the Egyptian 
economy relies heavily on manual labour in numerous sectors and industries. While 
technological advancements are occurring, they lag much behind the level of technology 
commonly found in more advanced economies. Thus, enhancing productivity is perhaps 
most possible by improving workers’ health states. In addition, poor health services 
exacerbate the situation, and hence healthier individuals may be preferred by employers in 
order to cut costs, especially when medical insurance is involved with the job.  
                                                        
42 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
43 For complete results of the wage equations, see appendix 5, tables 5.12; 5.13. 
44 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parents are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), training received, occupational dummies (9), tenure, tenure 
squared, job stability dummies (4), union membership, supervisory roles, working nights, 
formality of job, and firm size dummies (4). 
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The rest of the results (see appendix 5, tables 5.12; 5.13) are limited in variability across 
the different models and samples. Therefore, we focus here on summarizing any 
significant results, and focus on the MLE results, which we perceive as most accurate.  
 
Certain wage gaps are reinforced by the results obtained in this analysis, such as the gender 
wage differentials, where men are found to earn more than women (see table 5.12, column 
3). This confirms again the perception of employers’ preference for offering men higher 
wages. Also, returns to education increase with general high school, post-secondary 
school, and university degrees for both samples (see table 5.12, column 3; table 5.13, 
column 3). Note that post-secondary school degree holders have a smaller differential 
relative to illiterates than general high school degree holders for both samples, implying 
that there is little incentive for individuals to attain a post-secondary school degree. 
Additionally, we find that men with university degrees have the smallest differential 
relative to illiterate individuals and compared to other degree holders (see table 5.13, 
column 3). Similarly, we find that training contributes positively to wages for both 
samples, but the male labour sample’s coefficient is larger than that of the complete labour 
sample (see table 5.12, column 3; table 5.13, column 3).  
 
Likewise, we find differentials between the occupations. All our coefficients for 
occupations use managers as the base category. For the complete labour sample, the 
smallest differential is between agricultural/forestry/fishery workers and our base category 
of managers, while the largest is between elementary workers and managers (see table 
5.12, column 3). Also, service/sales workers in the complete labour sample earn 20.8% 
less than managers. It should be noted that service/sales workers are often offered low 
basic wages as they mainly rely on commissions that might increase their total pay to a 
great extent. In this context, wage differentials in the male labour sample for all the above 
categories (see table 5.13, column 3) are higher than that in the complete labour sample 
(see table 5.12, column 3). Finally, in terms of differentials, results attained here further 
substantiate the wage differential in favour of formal labour (see table 5.12, column 3; 
table 5.13, column 3), highlighting again the superiority of formal employment in Egypt.  
 
Finally, wages are found to increase with tenure at a declining rate for both samples (see 
table 5.12, column 3; table 5.13, column 3), that is the longer the individuals remain in the 
same job, the lower the increase of their wages. Union membership again proved to be a 
significant factor in wage determination and the coefficients reported of 17% and 16.3% 
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for the complete and male labour samples, respectively, fall within the range of 
coefficients reported in more developed economies, which varied between 15-17% (Ewing 
& Payne, 1999; Rebitzer, 1995). Also for both samples, supervisors as well as those 
working in medium and large firms earn more than their respective categories, while those 
working night shifts earn less (see table 5.12, column 3; table 5.13; column 3).  
 
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, this chapter has addressed the impact of productivity on the Egyptian private 
sector’s wage levels. Due to the unavailability of individual labour productivity measures, 
we have used health as a proxy. This rests on the assumption that healthier individuals are 
more likely to exert more effort and perform better on the job, an issue that has been 
addressed and confirmed by various studies.  
 
In modelling wages, we expected two biases due to selection into participation in the 
labour force and the endogeneity of health. Accordingly, we utilised 2SLS and MLE 
approaches, and in both cases, we have corrected for selection into the labour force 
participation and the endogeneity of health biases. While we found that the impact of the 
selection bias on wages is limited, we found that correcting for the endogeneity of health 
significantly influences the health results. Specifically, once endogeneity is addressed, 
better health is found to significantly contribute to wages of both samples. Furthermore, we 
found that the 2SLS model, which overlooks the discrete ordered nature of health, over-
estimates the effect of health on wages relative to our preferred MLE model.  
 
Thus, we conclude that health plays an important role in enhancing the private sector’s 
wage levels. Furthermore, if health is indeed an appropriate proxy for productivity, then 
this effect of health is of even higher value, especially given Egypt’s high reliance on 
manual labour, poor health-care services, and the ease of diseases spreading. Accordingly, 
health should be viewed and evaluated from two angles (Cai, 2009). Health is an end in 
itself, as improving the population’s health is crucial for their well-being. In addition, 
health also plays an instrumental role in labour markets. Egyptian policy-makers and 
officials therefore need to review the role of health in economic development and labour 
markets. On a final note, it is important to recognise that one solution does not fit all in the 
Egyptian context. Policy-makers should formulate policies that target groups separately, 
such as men and women, different occupations, formal and informal jobholders, etc.  
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5.9 Appendix 5 
 
Table 5.12: Wage Equation Results (Complete Labour Sample): 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
Variables OLS 2SLS45 MLE 
HEALTH -0.011 (0.013) 0.308* (0.181) 0.199** (0.092) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.013** (0.006) 0.001 (0.012) 0.003 (0.009) 
AGE SQUARED -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
MALE 0.364*** (0.047) 0.312*** (0.068) 0.318*** (0.057) 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.103*** (0.023) 
0.161** (0.065) 
 
0.073** (0.033) 
0.244** (0.098) 
 
0.077*** (0.027) 
0.225*** (0.073) 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.108*** (0.023) 
-0.085*** (0.029) 
-0.097*** (0.031) 
-0.031 (0.035) 
0.061* (0.032) 
 
-0.101*** (0.024) 
-0.123*** (0.037) 
-0.097*** (0.033) 
-0.114* (0.059) 
0.058* (0.035) 
 
-0.106*** (0.024) 
-0.112*** (0.031) 
-0.101*** (0.032) 
-0.089** (0.044) 
0.055* (0.032) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.036 (0.023) 
0.061** (0.029) 
 
0.043* (0.025) 
0.059* (0.030) 
 
0.040* (0.023) 
0.060** (0.029) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
0.014 (0.042) 
0.016 (0.029) 
-0.014 (0.036) 
0.145*** (0.054) 
0.058** (0.025) 
0.137** (0.055) 
0.182*** (0.040) 
0.080 (0.137) 
 
0.008 (0.045) 
0.015 (0.032) 
-0.019 (0.041) 
0.166*** (0.059) 
0.015 (0.034) 
0.106 (0.067) 
0.130*** (0.049) 
0.068 (0.164) 
 
0.010 (0.043) 
0.017 (0.030) 
-0.012 (0.038) 
0.168*** (0.058) 
0.030 (0.028) 
0.116** (0.057) 
0.142*** (0.043) 
0.066 (0.140) 
TRAINING 0.102** (0.045) 0.137** (0.062) 0.103** (0.044) 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
-0.021 (0.087) 
-0.132 (0.091) 
-0.180* (0.102) 
-0.210** (0.087) 
-0.173* (0.089) 
-0.020 (0.087) 
-0.126 (0.087) 
-0.261*** (0.090) 
 
0.038 (0.121) 
-0.048 (0.124) 
-0.076 (0.142) 
-0.138 (0.118) 
-0.096 (0.122) 
0.055 (0.119) 
-0.051 (0.118) 
-0.167 (0.125) 
 
-0.021 (0.086) 
-0.131 (0.091) 
-0.183* (0.102) 
-0.208** (0.086) 
-0.170* (0.089) 
-0.018 (0.087) 
-0.125 (0.087) 
-0.257*** (0.090) 
TENURE 0.008*** (0.003) 0.008** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.132*** (0.027) 
0.332*** (0.088) 
0.209*** (0.022) 
 
-0.128*** (0.030) 
0.383*** (0.097) 
0.220*** (0.025) 
 
-0.134*** (0.026) 
0.332*** (0.088) 
0.209*** (0.022) 
UNION  0.170*** (0.034) 0.168*** (0.042) 0.170*** (0.034) 
SUPERVISOR 0.178*** (0.032) 0.184*** (0.037) 0.176*** (0.032) 
NIGHT  -0.070*** (0.018) -0.072*** (0.020) -0.072*** (0.018) 
FORMAL 0.133*** (0.027) 0.122*** (0.031) 0.132*** (0.027) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.087* (0.046) 
0.075** (0.030) 
-0.008 (0.044) 
 
0.085 (0.054) 
0.082** (0.034) 
0.003 (0.043) 
 
0.089* (0.046) 
0.076** (0.030) 
-0.006 (0.044) 
IMR ………. -0.090 (0.066) ………. 
 
Constant 
 
0.663*** (0.146) -0.198 (0.663) 0.202 (0.332) 
N 5,652 5,652 5,652 
R2 0.1721 0.0804 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                        
45 Bootstrapped standard errors.  
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Table 5.13: Wage Equation Results (Male Labour Sample): 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
Variables OLS 2SLS46 MLE 
HEALTH -0.015 (0.013) 0.400** (0.164) 0.242*** (0.083) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.016** (0.006) -0.008 (0.013) 0.003 (0.010) 
AGE SQUARED -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
 
0.096*** (0.023) 
 
0.070** (0.027) 
 
0.079*** (0.025) 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.108*** (0.023) 
-0.087*** (0.029) 
-0.103*** (0.032) 
-0.035 (0.036) 
0.031 (0.033) 
 
-0.088*** (0.025) 
-0.136*** (0.038) 
-0.097*** (0.035) 
-0.139** (0.057) 
0.033 (0.037) 
 
-0.098*** (0.024) 
-0.119*** (0.031) 
-0.104*** (0.033) 
-0.103** (0.043) 
0.027 (0.034) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.027 (0.023) 
0.055* (0.030) 
 
0.045* (0.026) 
0.055 (0.034) 
 
0.037 (0.024) 
0.053* (0.031) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
0.002 (0.043) 
-0.001 (0.030) 
-0.021 (0.036) 
0.118** (0.055) 
0.052** (0.026) 
0.145** (0.057) 
0.113*** (0.041) 
-0.104 (0.152) 
 
0.008 (0.047) 
0.007 (0.033) 
-0.014 (0.046) 
0.182*** (0.069) 
0.013 (0.031) 
0.117 (0.074) 
0.072 (0.048) 
-0.137 (0.190) 
 
-0.006 (0.044) 
0.004 (0.031) 
-0.017 (0.041) 
0.155** (0.064) 
0.030 (0.028) 
0.129** (0.059) 
0.081* (0.044) 
-0.136 (0.158) 
TRAINING 0.135*** (0.047) 0.170** (0.067) 0.135*** (0.047) 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
0.033 (0.089) 
-0.157* (0.094) 
-0.252** (0.106) 
-0.254*** (0.087) 
-0.228** (0.090) 
-0.069 (0.087) 
-0.164* (0.088) 
-0.325*** (0.091) 
 
0.106 (0.126) 
-0.064 (0.127) 
-0.117 (0.153) 
-0.163 (0.121) 
-0.130 (0.123) 
0.024 (0.120) 
-0.069 (0.120) 
-0.210* (0.124) 
 
0.037 (0.088) 
-0.156* (0.093) 
-0.257** (0.106) 
-0.252*** (0.087) 
-0.226** (0.089) 
-0.066 (0.087) 
-0.162* (0.087) 
-0.322*** (0.091) 
TENURE 0.005* (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0001* (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0001* (0.0001) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.107*** (0.028) 
0.274*** (0.090) 
0.202*** (0.022) 
 
-0.104*** (0.034) 
0.345*** (0.099) 
0.219*** (0.026) 
 
-0.108*** (0.028) 
0.274*** (0.089) 
0.202*** (0.022) 
UNION  0.163*** (0.036) 0.162*** (0.045) 0.163*** (0.036) 
SUPERVISOR 0.213*** (0.033) 0.217*** (0.038) 0.210*** (0.033) 
NIGHT  -0.066*** (0.018) -0.068*** (0.020) -0.069*** (0.019) 
FORMAL 0.105*** (0.028) 0.085** (0.032) 0.103*** (0.028) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.090* (0.049) 
0.069** (0.031) 
-0.012 (0.045) 
 
0.088 (0.059) 
0.090** (0.037) 
0.008 (0.048) 
 
0.092* (0.049) 
0.071** (0.031) 
-0.009 (0.044) 
IMR ………. -0.150** (0.069) ………. 
 
Constant 
 
1.061*** (0.139) -0.009 (0.635) 0.432 (0.337) 
N 5,285 5,285 5,285 
R2 0.1520 ………. ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
                                                        
46 Bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 5.14: Health Equation Results47 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: HEALTH 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Health Characteristics 
INJURY -0.161*** (0.035) -0.286*** (0.060) -0.165*** (0.035) -0.301*** (0.060) 
DEADSIB -0.041** (0.019) -0.085** (0.034) -0.043** (0.020) -0.091*** (0.034) 
MOTHER NO-EMP  0.097*** (0.031) 0.157*** (0.055) 0.113*** (0.033) 0.195*** (0.058) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.012 (0.010) 0.031* (0.019) 0.002 (0.013) 0.002 (0.036) 
AGE SQUARED -0.0004*** (0.0001) -0.001*** (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0004 (0.0005) 
MALE 0.017 (0.066) 0.130 (0.122) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.038 (0.031) 
-0.131* (0.078) 
 
0.124** (0.057) 
-0.325** (0.139) 
 
0.018 (0.027) 
………. 
 
0.049 (0.056) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.023 (0.024) 
0.114*** (0.030) 
-0.011 (0.033) 
0.245*** (0.037) 
-0.004 (0.033) 
 
-0.007 (0.042) 
0.226*** (0.054) 
0.027 (0.057) 
0.507*** (0.065) 
0.034 (0.057) 
 
-0.035 (0.025) 
0.114*** (0.031) 
-0.019 (0.034) 
0.238*** (0.039) 
-0.022 (0.035) 
 
-0.032 (0.042) 
0.231*** (0.055) 
0.014 (0.059) 
0.492*** (0.069) 
0.008 (0.060) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
  -0.018 (0.024) 
0.041 (0.031) 
 
-0.035 (0.042) 
0.076 (0.056) 
 
-0.024 (0.025) 
0.058* (0.033) 
 
-0.044 (0.046) 
0.124* (0.064) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
0.014 (0.044) 
0.005 (0.031) 
0.058 (0.040) 
0.003 (0.061) 
0.106*** (0.027) 
0.060 (0.058) 
0.117*** (0.043) 
0.003 (0.143) 
 
0.021 (0.078) 
-0.008 (0.054) 
0.061 (0.072) 
-0.081 (0.109) 
0.186*** (0.046) 
0.102 (0.101) 
0.252*** (0.066) 
0.048 (0.246) 
 
-0.0001 (0.045) 
0.009 (0.032) 
0.084* (0.043) 
0.034 (0.070) 
0.096*** (0.027) 
0.065 (0.060) 
0.099** (0.044) 
0.121 (0.162) 
 
-0.005 (0.081) 
-0.004 (0.059) 
0.131 (0.096) 
-0.024 (0.163) 
0.161*** (0.047) 
0.099 (0.106) 
0.215*** (0.066) 
0.284 (0.286) 
TRAINING -0.103** (0.047) ………. -0.084* (0.050) ………. 
Job Characteristics 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
-0.183** (0.091) 
-0.260*** (0.095) 
-0.327*** (0.106) 
-0.218** (0.091) 
-0.229** (0.093) 
-0.221** (0.091) 
-0.227** (0.091) 
-0.282*** (0.094) 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
 
-0.168* (0.094) 
-0.224** (0.100) 
-0.334*** (0.113) 
-0.214** (0.093) 
-0.233** (0.095) 
-0.215** (0.093) 
-0.224** (0.093) 
-0.273*** (0.097) 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
TENURE 0.002 (0.003) ………. -0.0001 (0.003) ………. 
TENURE SQUARED 0.00002 (0.0001) ………. 0.0001 (0.0001) ………. 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.018 (0.028) 
-0.154* (0.092) 
-0.033 (0.023) 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
 
-0.006 (0.030) 
-0.162* (0.095) 
-0.035 (0.023) 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
UNION  0.008 (0.036) ………. 0.002 (0.038) ………. 
SUPERVISOR -0.022 (0.034) ………. -0.016 (0.035) ………. 
NIGHT  0.009 (0.019) 0.016 (0.031) 0.008 (0.019) 0.022 (0.033) 
FORMAL 0.032 (0.028) ………. 0.042 (0.030) ………. 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.017 (0.048) 
-0.015 (0.031) 
-0.026 (0.046) 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
 
0.017 (0.052) 
-0.041 (0.033) 
-0.038 (0.047) 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
IMR 0.091 (0.059) ………. 0.016 (0.068) ………. 
 
Constant 
 
3.285*** (0.251) ………. 3.493*** (0.243) ………. 
N 5,652 5,652 5,285 5,285 
R2 0.1063 ………. 0.1061 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
                                                        
47 Results of 2SLS models without bootstrapping.  
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Chapter VI 
Determinants of Job Satisfaction: The Contribution of Wages to 
Job Satisfaction 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Contrary to the previous two chapters, which focused on the determinants of wages, we 
focus on the determinants of another important outcome of work in this chapter, which is 
job satisfaction. Specifically, we turn our attention to the determinants of job satisfaction in 
the Egyptian private sector, focusing on the impact of wages. Thus, the research question 
we address is, what is the effect of higher wages on job satisfaction? To answer this 
question, we utilise data from the 2012 round of the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS) to estimate a satisfaction equation that traces the effect of wage levels, among 
other labour factors, on various measures of job satisfaction in Egypt.  
 
It is important to analyse job satisfaction for a number of reasons. To begin with, job 
satisfaction, which represents the most accurate measure of utility derived from a person’s 
job, is expected to contribute significantly to the overall life utility of an individual, since a 
person’s job constitutes a major part of their lives. Thus, it has become an integral part of 
economic research (Brown & McIntosh, 2003). Additionally, job satisfaction is expected 
to significantly affect labour market outcomes. Clark (1996) explained that job satisfaction 
could impact labour market decisions in two ways. On the one hand, workers are likely to 
make their labour market participation, quits, and effort decisions based on how satisfied 
they are with their jobs, implying that job satisfaction is not merely relevant to wage 
issues, but also to labour effort and productivity. On the other hand, employers would like 
their employees to be satisfied to ensure better outcomes for their businesses. Thus, this 
topic may not only be a concern for employees, but also for employers and policy-makers. 
More pertinent to Egypt, job satisfaction issues have been largely disregarded by Egyptian 
literature, and its analysis in the Egyptian context is relatively in its infancy. This could be 
traced back to the lack of required data. Accordingly, this chapter aims to address job 
satisfaction more explicitly in the Egyptian labour market and uses nationally 
representative data that are relatively recent to do so.  
 
Similar to chapter V, we expect two biases in the estimation of the job satisfaction 
equation. A sample selection bias may arise because a proportion of individuals do not 
engage in the labour market at all. If this lack of engagement is caused by some systematic 
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factors that also influence job satisfaction, then a selection bias arises in the estimated 
coefficients. Also, an endogeneity bias is likely to prevail because while wages may 
improve job satisfaction, higher job satisfaction levels could themselves push workers to 
improve their performance, and hence earn more. Attempting to correct for both biases 
simultaneously is especially challenging because the job satisfaction measure is a discrete 
ordered variable.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows, section (6.2) comprises a brief discussion of the 
evolution of the concept of job satisfaction and its theoretical framework. Section (6.3) 
highlights the relevant literature of the empirical research in the area, which is followed by 
a discussion of the relevant formal econometric framework in section (6.4). Section (6.5) is 
comprised of three parts, beginning with a discussion of the various job satisfaction 
measures relevant to our analysis, followed by an explanation of the methodological 
challenges of sample selection and endogeneity, and finally an illustration of the methods 
utilised in the estimations. Section (6.6) follows and illustrates the variables utilised in the 
estimations. Finally, section (6.7) comprises the regression results and analysis, while 
section (6.8) summarises the most significant findings and concludes the chapter.  
 
 
6.2 The Concept of Job Satisfaction and Theoretical Background 
This section begins by defining job satisfaction and highlighting the criticisms 
accompanying this measure and then discusses the theoretical basis of job satisfaction 
studies.  
 
6.2.1 The Definition of Job Satisfaction 
Locke (1976), who provides one of the earliest thorough reviews of the concept of job 
satisfaction, initially defines job satisfaction as the positive feelings individuals experience 
towards their jobs in comparison to other labour market opportunities or some reference. 
While this definition highlights the subjective and behavioural aspect of the concept of job 
satisfaction, most scholars are in agreement when it comes to the general understanding of 
job satisfaction measures. Hamermesh (1999) stated, “All of the available sets of data 
describe job satisfaction (JS) as a categorical response that presumably maps the worker’s 
underlying feelings about his/her job to a few discrete choices” (p.3). Still, a distinction 
should be made between job satisfaction and morale, which are often used 
interchangeably. Locke (1976) highlighted that morale is future-oriented, while job 
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satisfaction is past- and present-oriented. This distinction highlights the importance of the 
factor of time and its impact on satisfaction levels that may be induced as more 
experiences are accumulated from the labour market.  
 
Job satisfaction measures, similar to numerous scale-ranked measures, have been met with 
numerous criticisms concerning their usefulness and accuracy in analytical studies. One 
criticism relates to the subjectivity of the job satisfaction measures. Since these measures 
represents individuals’ own appraisal of their jobs, it is plausible to expect that each 
individual would understand or view the rankings differently as well as compare their jobs 
to distinct alternatives. Thus, results may be distorted with each individual’s subjective 
view of satisfaction levels. Freeman (1978), who was among the earliest to economically 
address job satisfaction, began his paper by pronouncing the subjectivity of job satisfaction 
measures as well as addressing these concerns and the validity of this measure. Freeman 
(1978) concluded that while the measure represents complexities due to the psychological 
aspect involved, it still contains useful information.  
 
Another criticism of job satisfaction studies relates to the failure of acknowledging the 
adaptation theory, which is based on the Hedonic Treadmill model. Hanglberger and Merz 
(2015) explained that the Hedonic Treadmill model proposes that the impact of factors on 
job satisfaction may be short-lived, and eventually workers return to their baseline 
happiness level. Thus, changes owing to the factors that impact job satisfaction should not 
be viewed as permanent. Various studies have addressed this adaptation theory, but in 
relation to general life events, such as disability (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008) and 
divorce (Lucas, 2005).  
 
Despite the above criticisms in which authors remain inconclusive, the consistency of 
empirical results with respect to various influences (Brown & McIntosh, 2003; Clark, 
1997) eventually led to the general acceptance of job satisfaction studies, methods, and 
conclusions reached. Additionally, there has not been much progress in identifying an 
alternative variable to measure job satisfaction levels. Accordingly, the value and 
importance of this measure in informing us much about the labour market has not been 
compromised.  
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6.2.2 The Evolution of Job Satisfaction Theories 
Job Satisfaction, representing utility from work, stemmed from under the umbrella of 
utility maximisation issues. Utility is considered one form of welfare, and as Clark (1996) 
explained, the distribution of welfare represents one of the main interests for social 
scientists at large, and specifically economists. Locke (1976) explained that the roots of job 
satisfaction date back to the beginning of the 1900s, when Taylor (1914) became interested 
in how workers’ attitudes affect their performance, leading to various studies that 
addressed the impact of fatigue, boredom, and rest pauses on workers’ performance.  
 
Locke (1976) identified three major schools of thought or historical trends in job 
satisfaction studies. The first and oldest school, the physical-economic school, which 
corresponded with the work of Taylor (1914), highlighted the influence of working 
conditions or environment on job satisfaction. This was followed by the social or human 
relations school, which emphasised the impact of employer-employee relations on job 
satisfaction. One of the most popular studies that addressed this school’s ideas is known as 
the Hawthorne studies, which was later criticised and re-evaluated (Carey, 1967). Finally, 
the newest school of thought, the growth (work itself) school, highlighted the link between 
job satisfaction and growth in skill, efficacy, and responsibility. Recent economic studies 
can be viewed to link all of these ideas by producing a single framework that equally 
emphasises the various factors identified by the different schools. 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that the root of the theoretical basis of job satisfaction lies 
more in psychological and sociological theories. Locke (1976) had differentiated between 
process theories and content theories. Process theories determine the potential factors that 
could contribute to job satisfaction and their impact. Locke (1976) extended the discussion 
further to outline the main contributing factors to job satisfaction, including the nature of 
work, pay, promotions, recognition, and working conditions. He further reviewed some of 
the studies that addressed the impact of these factors on job satisfaction, whose 
significance lies in how they instituted the different variables relevant to job satisfaction, 
which future studies, specifically economic ones, have utilised and examined. Still, these 
studies are hardly relevant here as they are out-dated and not strictly economic. Moreover, 
they have addressed a single factor at a time, which contrasts empirical economic studies 
that aim to include and control for as many relevant variables as possible by estimating 
multivariate equations.  
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On the other hand, Content theories identify the specific needs and values that enhance job 
satisfaction. Locke (1976) highlighted two content theories, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
theory and Herzberg’s Motivator-Hygiene theory. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory 
ranks an individual’s five basic needs in a certain order, where one type will not satisfy a 
person unless the previous need has already been fulfilled. These five needs in order are 
physiological, safety, belongingness, esteem, and self-actualisation. Conversely, 
Herzberg’s Motivator-Hygiene theory differentiates between motivator factors and 
dissatisfaction factors. The former includes achievement, growth and advancement, 
recognition, nature of work, as well as responsibility, while the latter include company 
policies, working conditions, salary, status, security, supervision, and work relationships.  
 
Thus, regardless of the discipline considered, studies of job satisfaction have undergone a 
long process of evolution and development. This helped establish numerous consistencies 
with respect to findings, which validate the present studies and their analyses.  
 
 
6.3 Literature Review 
Based on the above discussion of theory, we note that job satisfaction studies go back a 
long way and across a range of disciplines, which preceded empirical economic research 
that mainly dates back to the 1970s (Hamermesh, 1976; Freeman, 1978). In this section, 
we review some of the economic job satisfaction studies.  
 
The main research question addressed in these studies revolved around identifying and 
inspecting the impact of the determinants of job satisfaction. Among the most popular 
studies in the area is Clark (1996), which examined the impact of various individual and 
job characteristics on job satisfaction levels in Britain. Over time, researchers began to 
focus on specific aspects of job satisfaction, including gender differentials (Bender et al., 
2005; Clark, 1997; Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2003), age (Kalleberg & Loscocco, 1983), 
job matching with education (Belfield & Harris, 2002), union membership (Gordon & 
Denisi, 1995; Schwochau, 1987; Bender & Sloane, 1998), sectoral differentials (Brown & 
McIntosh, 2003), occupational differentials (Shields & Ward, 2001; Laband & Lentz, 
1998; Ward & Sloane, 2000), regional differences (Jones & Sloane, 2009), part-time work 
effect (Booth & Van Ours, 2008), and returns to wages (Borjas, 1979; Igalens & Roussel, 
1999; Blaul, 1994; Chevalier & Lydon, 2002).  
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The literature that addressed the impact of wages on job satisfaction could be divided into 
two categories, studies focusing on the absolute wage (Albert & Davia, 2005) and those 
focusing on relative income, comparing an individual’s own wages with some benchmark 
(Clark & Oswald, 1996). Scholars supported the use of the relative income measure by 
explaining that absolute pay is usually only weakly significant to job satisfaction due to 
unobserved factors in the relationship between job satisfaction and wages, and thus argued 
that relative income is a more appropriate measure to use in job satisfaction studies (Clark, 
1996; Clark & Oswald, 1996). Also, Clark and Oswald (1996) substantiated their use of 
relative income by the ideas of ‘Relative Deprivation’ theory, which postulates that 
individuals evaluate their pay relative to a yardstick when determining their job 
satisfaction level. Nevertheless, Chevalier and Lydon (2002) argued that there was little 
basis to the above-discussed ideas, and that the effect of these unobserved factors is 
eliminated once endogeneity is addressed.  
 
Additionally, and similar to the ELMPS, a variety of other surveys employed in the 
literature included questions about the individuals’ levels of satisfaction with pay, 
promotion opportunities, and job content. This contributed to an extension of the literature 
in this area (Brown & McIntosh, 2003; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006). There are two potential 
methods for examining these additional job satisfaction measures, which we refer to as 
‘Components of Job Satisfaction’. One method analyses each job satisfaction component 
separately (Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006), while another method employs a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), which reduces the number of components to a small number 
of derived variable(s) that capture the most variation in the components. This is then used 
as a dependent variable in a typical satisfaction equation (Brown & McIntosh, 2003).  
 
In this context, Brown and McIntosh (2003) estimated a satisfaction equation by regressing 
overall job satisfaction on all of the different satisfaction variables along with the common 
individual and job characteristics utilised in such studies. One problem with this approach 
is that these satisfaction variables are likely to be components, rather than determinants, of 
overall job satisfaction. Additionally, the rest of the control factors they utilised may be 
determinants of these components of job satisfaction variables. In fact, Brown and 
McIntosh (2003) admitted that the high correlations between the control variables and the 
other components of job satisfaction measures could be the reason behind the insignificant 
results for the rest of the control variables. Thus, it may be more appropriate to examine 
the correlation between overall job satisfaction and the components of job satisfaction 
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variables (see table 3.6) separately from examining the impact of other variables on overall 
job satisfaction. 
 
Generally, there is a large degree of consistency in the job satisfaction literature in terms of 
data, methods, and findings. In terms of data, scholars have identified and examined a 
variety of job satisfaction determinants, including age, gender, health, education, race, 
housing tenure, region, income, hours, industry, occupation, firm size, union membership, 
and stability of job (Clark 1996; Clark & Oswald, 1996; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006; Sousa-
Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2003; Bender et al., 2005). As the literature developed, additional 
determinants were addressed, such as travel time and night work (Jones & Sloane, 2009), 
number of children (Kalleberg & Loscocco, 1983; Brown & McIntosh, 2003), and training 
(Shields & Ward, 2001; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006).  
 
Similarly, methods of estimation were somewhat consistent across the literature. Due to 
the discrete ordered nature of the job satisfaction variables, Ordered Probit models have 
been estimated to address job satisfaction, whether with cross-sectional data (Brown & 
McIntosh, 2003) or panel data (Jones & Sloane, 2009). Yet, this method fails to account 
for the potential endogeneity of wages in the estimation of job satisfaction. To correct for 
this endogeneity, Albert and Davia (2005) estimated a simultaneous model for wages and 
job satisfaction, in which job satisfaction was modelled as a continuous rather than a 
discrete variable. Chevalier and Lydon (2002), who also estimated a simultaneous model, 
have discussed the complexities of finding appropriate and strong identifiers/instruments 
for each equation, especially as most of the explanatory variables that go in the wage 
equation are also included in the job satisfaction equation. In fact, even Chevalier and 
Lydon (2002), who utilised the spouse’s characteristics to identify the wage equation, 
admitted that they could not find strong identifiers for the job satisfaction equation. Thus, 
correcting for endogeneity, whilst acknowledging the discrete nature of job satisfaction 
measures, complicates our model.  
 
In terms of findings, a number of relationships have been consistent across the literature. 
Most relevant to our analysis is the particular relationship highlighted between job 
satisfaction, wages, and productivity. Higher wages have been acknowledged to have a 
major role in improving labour’s morale and contentment with their jobs, as represented in 
job satisfaction measures (Locke, 1976; Bender et al., 2005; Clark, 1996; Chevalier & 
Lydon, 2002; Jones & Sloane 2009), which in turn should reflect in superior performance 
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and productivity levels. Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) specifically pointed out this 
relationship between job satisfaction and productivity, quits, and absenteeism, which are of 
utmost concern to all employers. Similarly, Clark et al. (1998) found that workers who 
reported lower levels of satisfaction in Germany were more likely to quit their jobs than 
others, and Oswald et al. (2009) found that happiness in the workplace leads to an increase 
in labour productivity, pinpointing the importance of job satisfaction in enhancing labour 
market outcomes.  
 
Other consistent findings among the different studies include differentials in job 
satisfaction based on gender, age, and education. Women are consistently found to report 
higher levels of job satisfaction compared to men (Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006; Sousa-Poza 
& Sousa-Poza, 2003; Bender et al., 2005). Also, the more educated have been found to 
report lower job satisfaction levels (Clark & Oswald, 1996; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006), 
while job satisfaction was found to be U-shaped in age (Brown & McIntosh, 2003; 
Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006). These differentials were mainly traced back to differences in 
expectations. For instance, younger or more educated individuals may have higher 
expectations than older ones with more labour market experience or those with fewer 
educational achievements. Brown and McIntosh (2003) also outlined a number of 
statistically significant relationships from the literature, such as the positive relationship 
between job satisfaction and marriage, good health, and senior occupations as opposed to a 
negative relationship with firm size.  
 
Turning to Egypt, we find that job satisfaction data for a nationally representative sample 
of Egyptian labour was only made available in 2012 and is yet to be utilised in analyses. 
Thus, with the exception of a minority of studies that were neither strictly economic nor 
empirical, and those that used actual data used small unrepresentative samples (Badran & 
Kafafy, 2008), a gap remains in the Egyptian literature. Accordingly, this research utilises 
the newly available nationally representative satisfaction data of Egypt to understand what 
contributes to job satisfaction, and in particular, to consider the impact of wages in 
determining job satisfaction.  
 
 
6.4 Econometric Framework 
As previously discussed, the concept of job satisfaction stems from utility maximisation. 
Thus, the discussion of the econometric framework begins by illustrating the utility 
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function, from which the job satisfaction equation, illustrated afterwards, is derived. This 
section illustrates the specific job satisfaction equation of interest, but the discussion of the 
wage and selection equations required to address the endogeneity of wages and selection 
into participation, respectively, are retained to the following section (see section 6.5), since 
these have already been discussed in chapter V (see section 5.4).  
 
 6.4.1 Utility Function 
Job satisfaction is considered to be the way workers view their utility from work, and a 
person’s utility from work is only one part of overall life utility. Accordingly, economists 
(Clark & Oswald, 1996) illustrate life satisfaction/utility as follows, 
 
𝒗 = 𝒗[𝒖(𝒚, 𝒉), 𝝁] 
Where,  
𝑣 - Life satisfaction 
𝑢 – Utility from work 
𝑦 – Income 
ℎ - Hours of work  
𝜇 - Utility from non-job related aspects 
 
The above model represents life utility (𝑣) as a function of utility from work (𝑢) and utility 
from other non-job related aspects (𝜇). Utility from work is determined by two main 
factors, which include income and hours of work. Clark (1997) summarised why such a 
model is appropriate and useful based on Argyle’s (1989) claim of the importance of job 
satisfaction in overall life satisfaction, the expected correlations between job satisfaction 
and variables such as quits, absenteeism, and productivity, as well as job satisfaction being 
the closest proxy for measurement of utility from work.  
 
As more studies were conducted, more variables were found to have an impact on this 
utility from work. Accordingly, the model was extended to account for more determinants 
of utility from work that can be categorised into a set of individual (x), human capital (c), 
and job (j) characteristics. Individual characteristics generally include demographic factors, 
such as age, gender, and region, while human capital factors include education, experience, 
and training. Job characteristics, on the other hand, may include any factor related to an 
individual’s job, such as occupations, firm size and location, union membership, and 
others. This extended model is demonstrated as follows, 
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𝒗 = 𝒗[𝒖(𝒚, 𝒉, 𝒙, 𝒄, 𝒋), 𝝁] 
Where,  
𝑥 - Individual characteristics 
𝑐 - Human capital Characteristics 
𝑗 - Job characteristics 
 
Thus, utility from work can be solely defined as a sub-utility function as follows, 
 
𝒖 = 𝒖(𝒚, 𝒉, 𝒙, 𝒄, 𝒋) 
 
Clark and Oswald (1996), who particularly concentrated on wages and hours of work, 
specified two assumptions concerning the above ‘utility from work’ function. Firstly, 
utility is increasing in wage levels. Secondly, utility is decreasing in hours of work. In 
other words, as wage levels increase, levels of job satisfaction should increase, while an 
increase in hours of work should reduce the reported levels of job satisfaction.  
 
6.4.2 Job Satisfaction Equation 
Based on the above functions, the specific job satisfaction equation to be estimated can be 
derived and is identified as, 
 
𝑺𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏[𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊)] + 𝜷𝟐(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑱𝒊) + 𝝁𝒊        (EQ.I) 
Where,  
𝑆𝑖 - Satisfaction level of individual i 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑖) – Logarithm of hourly wages of individual i 
𝑋𝑖 – Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 – Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 – Coefficients 
𝜇 – Error terms 
 
EQ.I represents a form of non-linear equation, where the discrete ordered dependent 
variable, which is the satisfaction level of individuals (S), is regressed on the individuals’ 
logarithm of hourly wages [Log (w)] and the control variables, including individual (X), 
human capital (C), and job (J) characteristics. Note that ‘hours of work’ is among the job 
characteristics (J) in our model as it represents one of the control variable in our analysis. 
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6.5 Methodology 
This section begins by discussing the various satisfaction variables used in our analysis. 
This is followed by an illustration of the methodological challenges of estimating the effect 
of wages on job satisfaction and the methods utilised in the estimation of the satisfaction 
equations.  
 
6.5.1 Job Satisfaction Measures 
As discussed in chapter III (see section 3.4.4), the ELMPS provides us with nine different 
job satisfaction variables. The ‘overall job satisfaction’ measure resembles the variable 
used in the various job satisfaction studies. The other eight variables, which we refer to as 
‘components of job satisfaction’ measures, include satisfaction with job security, 
satisfaction with wages, satisfaction with type of work, satisfaction with working hours, 
satisfaction with working schedule, satisfaction with working conditions, satisfaction with 
distance to work/commuting, and satisfaction with matching between qualifications and 
the job. Our objective would essentially require the estimation of a satisfaction equation 
for each satisfaction measure of interest to examine the determinants of these satisfaction 
variables and provide insights into which factors are the most influential in improving job 
satisfaction in Egypt.  
 
Four notes are worth making at this stage. First, overall job satisfaction may be estimated 
by a typical satisfaction equation (EQ.I), as is common in the literature. Second, the 
satisfaction with specific job aspects measures may be perceived as components of overall 
job satisfaction, as discussed in chapter III and verified by the significant correlation 
coefficients (see table 3.6). Third, ‘satisfaction with wages’ is likely to be highly correlated 
with our main independent variable of interest, which is wages, and thus may bring 
forward a host of different biases. Consequently, we omit this variable from our analysis, 
as our objective is to primarily examine the impact of wages on satisfaction levels. Fourth, 
the components of job satisfaction variables are likely to be highly correlated, thus 
examining each variable separately may provide redundant results and not very intuitive 
conclusions. Accordingly, we utilise the better-suited Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) method, whose main essence is to limit the number of dependent variables to only 
those with the most variation. This results in a derived variable(s), which is then examined 
by a typical satisfaction equation.  
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6.5.2 Methodological Challenges  
There are two methodological issues that we need to address in our estimations, namely the 
sample selection bias and the endogeneity of wages.  
 
6.5.2.1 Sample Selection Bias: 
Similar to chapter V, we expect a sample selection bias because some individuals may 
drop out of the labour force for many reasons, such as extreme dissatisfaction with labour 
market conditions. Since these individuals do not provide information regarding job 
satisfaction or wages and they are normally dropped out of the sample of interest, this 
unaccounted for sample may impact our estimations, leading to biased results. 
Accordingly, we need to to correct for this bias. This selection equation is identified as,  
 
𝐏𝐫(𝒚𝒊 = 𝟏|𝒙𝒊) = 𝐏𝐫[𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑳𝒊) + 𝜸𝒊]  (EQ.II) 
Where, 
𝑦𝑖 = 1 – Participation into labour force for individual i  
𝑋𝑖 – Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 – Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝐿𝑖 – Selection-Specific characteristics of individual i 
𝛽 – Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝛾 − Error terms 
 
6.5.2.2 The Endogeneity of Wages: 
Another methodological issue concerns the endogeneity of wages in the estimation of job 
satisfaction. Higher wages are expected to enhance an individual’s satisfaction level with 
the job. Yet, this increased job satisfaction may imply that workers are more content with 
their jobs, and therefore may exert more effort and contribute higher productivity, which 
would mirror in an individual’s pay, as postulated by economic theory. Thus, this reverse 
causality may lead to biased and inconsistent results. Consequently, to conduct accurate 
estimations and be able to make correct conclusions and inferences, we need to correct for 
this bias. Instrumenting the endogenous variable, which in this case is the individual’s 
wage level, is commonly used to do this, and we identify our wage equation as follows,  
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𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊) = 𝒂 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑰𝒊) + 𝜺𝒊  (EQ.III) 
Where,  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑤𝑖) – Logarithm of hourly wages of individual i 
𝑋𝑖 – Individual characteristics of individual i 
𝐶𝑖 – Human capital characteristics of individual i 
𝐽𝑖 - Job characteristics of individual i 
𝐼𝑖 – Wage identifiers of individual i  
𝛽 – Coefficients 
𝑎 - Constant term 
𝜀 - Error terms 
 
Note that we have dropped the health variable from the wage equation (EQ.III), to avoid 
any further biases, as we have seen in chapter V that health is endogenous to wages.  
 
6.5.3 The Estimation of Overall Job Satisfaction 
A variety of differentiated methods are utilised to answer our research question. 
Specifically, we utilise Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Ordered Probit (OPROBIT), Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), which we 
explain in this section. The methods and results are organised in such a way as to trace the 
effect of relaxing assumptions on the results obtained by the different models. 
 
6.5.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):  
Firstly, a basic OLS model of EQ.I is estimated. This model is based on the linearity 
assumption, which treats the dependent variable as a continuous variable. In addition, it 
overlooks sample selection and assumes the exogeneity of wages. We therefore only use 
the OLS results for comparison purposes.  
 
6.5.3.2 Ordered Probit (OPROBIT):  
This second approach, which is more evident across the literature, relaxes this linearity 
assumption and instead utilises a non-linear model to estimate EQ.I to account for the 
discrete ordered nature of job satisfaction. However, it fails to correct for sample selection 
and the endogeneity of wages, and therefore similar to OLS, we might expect the results of 
this estimation to also be biased and inconsistent. They are therefore only included for 
comparison purposes.   
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6.5.3.3 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS):  
Similar to the 2SLS model estimated in chapter V (see section 5.5.2.2), we estimate a 
2SLS model of job satisfaction to address the endogeneity of wages and sample selection. 
The model begins by estimating a selection equation (EQ.II), from which we calculate the 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), as we have done in previous chapters, to be included in the job 
satisfaction equation to correct for the likely sample selection bias. The model continues 
with the typical two stages of 2SLS models, incorporating a selection correction term. We 
estimate a reduced-form wage equation (EQ.IV) as follows.  
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝒘𝒊) = 𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑱𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑰𝒊) +  𝜷𝟓(𝑰𝑴𝑹) + 𝝁𝒊  (EQ.IV) 
 
As shown in EQ.IV, the logarithms of hourly wages [Log (w)] are regressed on all of the 
exogenous individual (X), human capital (C), and job (J) characteristics, the IMR, and the 
wage identifiers (I), which should be significantly correlated with wages, but not job 
satisfaction, to adhere to the exclusion restrictions. The variables (I) include the private 
sectors’ average weekly wages in the respondents’ industries stratified by gender, 
occupations, tenure, and tenure squared.  
 
The above allows us to obtain a predicted value for wages, which is then inserted into the 
job satisfaction equation as a substitute to the original observed wage variable, and we 
correct for any variation that may be unexplained by using estimates from one model into 
the other by bootstrapping the whole procedure. Thus, the wage equation we estimate is,  
 
𝑺𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏[𝑳𝒐𝒈 (𝒘𝒊)̂ ] + 𝜷𝟐(𝑿𝒊) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒊) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑱𝒊) + 𝜷𝟓(𝑰𝑴𝑹) + 𝝁𝒊 (EQ.IV) 
Where,  
𝑳𝒐𝒈 (𝒘𝒊)– Predicted Logarithm of hourly wages of individual i 
 
While the 2SLS method allows us to correct for the endogeneity of wages in the estimation 
of job satisfaction, this method takes us back to the linearity assumption and treats job 
satisfaction as a continuous variable, since the job satisfaction equation is estimated 
utilising a linear method. Drawing on Heckman’s (1977; 1979) arguments, Goldsmith et al. 
(2000) explained that the coefficients obtained by this model are consistent, while standard 
deviations are not, and hence are not problematic for the purpose of similar research. Still, 
we remain sceptical about the results due to the nature of the dependent variable of job 
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satisfaction. Accordingly, we need to correct for selection and instrument wages, whilst 
utilising a non-linear estimation method, such as the OPROBIT model.  
 
6.5.3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE):  
Our preferred estimation method, the MLE, allows us to estimate an Instrumental Variable 
Ordered Probit model that includes selection. This method relaxes the linearity assumption 
by acknowledging the discrete ordered nature of the job satisfaction measure and allows 
the instrumentation of wages and selection to deal with the endogeneity and sample 
selection biases, respectively. Thus, the method is similar to 2SLS, but more fitting for the 
discrete ordered dependent variable and should provide more efficient results, as argued by 
Roodman (2015).  
 
We use the conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator to estimate a multi-equation 
simultaneous system, which allows us to mix between models with linear and discrete 
dependent variables, as explained in chapter V (see section 5.5.2.3). Thus, we specify that 
our three equations of interest, the satisfaction equation (EQ.I), the selection equation 
(EQ.II), and the wage equation (EQ.III), be estimated by Ordered Probit, Probit, and OLS, 
respectively. The estimation is conducted taking into account that equations may vary by 
observation, thus the selection equation utilises the complete sample, while the wage and 
job satisfaction equations utilise only the subset with complete observations (i.e. the 
employed individuals who provide information regarding their wages and job satisfaction 
levels). Note that in order to promote consistency of the results, we use the same sample 
and instruments in the 2SLS and MLE models to facilitate comparisons of results.  
 
6.5.4 The Estimation of Components of Job Satisfaction  
While all of the above methods can be used to estimate the satisfaction equation regardless 
of what the satisfaction variable is, there may be a more efficient way to estimate the 
components of job satisfaction equations, precisely by using a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA).  
 
  6.5.4.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA): 
As illustrated earlier (see section 6.5.1), we are interested in the impact of wages on seven 
components of job satisfaction variables, including satisfaction with job security, 
satisfaction with type of work, satisfaction with working hours, satisfaction with working 
schedule, satisfaction with working conditions, satisfaction with distance to 
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job/commuting, and satisfaction with matching between qualifications and the job. 
Inspecting the correlations between these variables, we find that all variables are highly 
and significantly correlated (see table 6.1), indicating that the variables may be showing 
similar or related aspects of the job and the likelihood that results of separate estimations 
of these variables may be repetitive and not very intuitive to analyse. For instance, we can 
observe a very high and significant correlation between satisfaction with working hours 
and satisfaction with working schedule, equal to 0.798 (see table 6.1). Thus, it may be 
more sensible and efficient to produce a combined measure(s) that captures all the 
variation in the least possible number of variables.  
 
Table 6.1: Correlation Coefficients – Components of Job Satisfaction Measures:  
 Job 
Security 
Type of 
Work 
Work 
Hours 
Work 
Schedule 
Work 
Conditions 
Commuting Matching 
Job Security 1.0000       
Type of 
Work 
0.584* 1.0000      
Work Hours 0.533* 0.632* 1.0000     
Work 
Schedule 
0.512* 0.607* 0.798* 1.0000    
Work 
Conditions 
0.564* 0.660* 0.643* 0.664* 1.0000   
Commuting 0.390* 0.475* 0.492* 0.520* 0.529* 1.0000  
Matching 0.468* 0.623* 0.515* 0.522* 0.570* 0.452* 1.0000 
p<0.05 
 
  6.5.4.2 Preparation of the Principle Components Measure(s):  
A PCA approach allows us to derive that combined variable. The first step of this 
procedure is to determine how many components or variables should be retained, and this 
depends on how many components illustrate the most variation. Since we address seven 
variables, there are equally seven components. The rule of thumb is to retain the 
component(s) that has an eigenvalue above 1. Out of the seven components, only one is 
retained as it exceeds 1 (see figure 6.1) and represents 62.6% of the variance.  
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Figure 6.1: Eigenvalues after PCA: 
 
 
In order to understand this new variable, we inspect the loading of each of the original 
components of job satisfaction variables on the retained component. All of the seven 
variables load roughly equally on the retained component (see table 6.2), although working 
hours, schedule, and conditions load the most followed closely by the type of work. Still, 
the new variable can be explained as a combination of the seven original components of 
job satisfaction variables. This component is then used to predict the new variable in the 
second step.  
 
Table 6.2: Components of Job Satisfaction Variables’ Loading on Retained 
Component: 
Variable Loading Unexplained 
Satisfaction with Job Security 0.347 0.471 
Satisfaction with Type of Work 0.398 0.306 
Satisfaction with Working Hours 0.403 0.290 
Satisfaction with Working Schedule 0.403 0.287 
Satisfaction with Working Conditions 0.403 0.290 
Satisfaction with Commute to Job 0.327 0.531 
Satisfaction with Matching (Qualifications & Job) 0.356 0.444 
 
To strengthen the argument of why the utilisation of such an approach is superior to 
running separate satisfaction equations for each variable, a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling 
adequacy test can be conducted. The rule of thumb is that the result of this test needs to 
exceed 0.5. As table 6.3 illustrates, the result of 0.899 far exceeds 0.5, and accordingly 
using PCA is justified in our case.  
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Table 6.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 
Variable KMO 
Satisfaction with Job Security 0.940 
Satisfaction with Type of Work 0.904 
Satisfaction with Working Hours 0.852 
Satisfaction with Working Schedule 0.848 
Satisfaction with Working Conditions 0.924 
Satisfaction with Commute to Job 0.952 
Satisfaction with Matching (Qualifications & Job) 0.924 
Overall 0.899 
 
Finally, we inspect the correlation coefficient between overall job satisfaction and the 
derived variable of components of job satisfaction, and we find that the two variables are 
significantly correlated at the 0.05 significance level, with a correlation coefficient equal to 
0.739. This mirrors the high correlation between the overall job satisfaction variable and 
the original components of job satisfaction variables (see table 3.6), from which this 
derived variable is obtained.  
 
  6.5.4.3 Methods of Estimation:  
Finally, it should be noted that PCA does not allow us to estimate the satisfaction equation 
of interest, but only allows us to construct the dependent variable that is to be utilised in 
the estimation. By inspecting the values obtained of the predicted variable, which serves as 
the dependent variable in our estimation, it turns out that unlike the original components of 
job satisfaction variables, the predicted variable is continuous with a minimum of -4.859 
and a maximum of 3.046. Consequently, it is more appropriate to utilise linear models that 
deal with continuous variables. In addition, the likelihoods of the prevalence of 
endogeneity and sample selection biases still hold, thus we use the 2SLS and MLE 
approaches explained previously (see sections 6.5.3.3; 6.5.3.4) to deal with both biases and 
compare these results with those of an OLS model (see section 6.5.3.1), which is presumed 
biased and inconsistent. Note that while we use the same instruments as the ones used for 
the estimation of overall job satisfaction, the sample is slightly different, as we explain 
below (see section 6.6.1). 
 
 
6.6 Data 
This section illustrates our sample followed by the demonstration of the dependent, 
explanatory, and instrumental variables, along with their statistical descriptions.  
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6.6.1 Sample 
Similar to chapters IV and V, the sample of interest drops individuals younger than 15 or 
older than 65 years old, self-employed and unpaid workers, as well as any individuals who 
did not provide information with regards to all variables of interest. Also, we focus our 
analysis on private sector workers, in order to facilitate comparisons between the findings 
of this chapter and previous ones, and since wage determination, which is also involved 
with our estimations herein, differs between the public and private sectors (see section 
2.5). The entire employed sample of interest has provided information regarding the 
overall level of job satisfaction. Yet, some respondents have stated in relation to 
components of job satisfaction variables that these were not applicable to their jobs, and 
thus treated as missing observations. Accordingly, the sample size differs contingent on 
what the dependent variable of interest is.  
 
6.6.2 Variables  
Table 6.4 summarises the dependent, explanatory, and instrumental variables of each 
equation of interest. Note that many variables that determine wages also determine job 
satisfaction.  
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Table 6.4: Variables - by Equation: 
 Satisfaction 
Equation (EQ.I) 
Selection Equation 
(EQ.II) 
Wage Equation 
(EQ.III) 
Dependent Variables 
 Job Satisfaction 
Level 
Probability of Labour 
Force Participation  
Logarithm of Hourly 
Wages 
Explanatory Variables 
 Logarithm of Hourly 
Wages 
………. ………. 
Individual 
Characteristics 
Age Age Age 
Age Squared Age Squared Age Squared 
Gender* Gender* Gender* 
Marital Status* Marital Status* Marital Status* 
Region* Region* Region* 
Parents’ Education* Parents’ Education* Parents’ Education* 
Human 
Capital 
Characteristics 
Education* Education* Education* 
Training* ………. Training* 
Job 
Characteristics  
Logarithm of Hours 
Worked Weekly 
………. ………. 
Stability of Job* ………. Stability of Job* 
Union Membership* ………. Union Membership* 
Supervisory Roles* ………. Supervisory Roles* 
Night Work* ………. Night Work* 
Formality of Job* ………. Formality of Job* 
Logarithm of Time to 
Reach Job 
………. ………. 
Firm Size* ………. Firm Size* 
Instrumental Variables48 
 ………. Educational 
Unemployment 
Rates49 
Private Sector 
Average Weekly 
Wages by 
Gender/Industry50 
………. Head of Household* Tenure 
………. Number of Children 
in Household 
Tenure Squared 
………. Number of males in 
the labour age (15-65 
years old) in 
household 
Occupations* 
*Indicates the use of dummy variables 
 
 
 
                                                        
48 These represent selection-specific characteristics (L) for the selection equation (EQ.II) 
and the wage identifiers (I) for the wage equation (EQ.III).  
49 Data extracted from CAPMAS’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2012).  
50 Data extracted from CAPMAS’s Statistical Year Book (CAPMAS, 2012). 
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6.6.2.1 Dependent Variables: 
We focus our discussion here on the main dependent variables of interest, which represent 
the job satisfaction variables. Note that we have discussed wages and labour force 
participation, the dependent variables of the wage equation (EQ.III) and the selection 
equation (EQ.II), respectively, in previous chapters (see sections 4.6.2.1; 5.6.2.1). Since 
the sample utilised in our analysis herein is very similar to the samples utilised in previous 
chapters, we refrain from discussing these variables again and only provide some 
descriptive statistics in table 6.18 in appendix 6.  
 
In terms of the dependent variables of the job satisfaction equations, we are interested in 
examining eight satisfaction variables. The first variable represents the overall job 
satisfaction level of the individual. Individuals were asked, ‘How satisfied are you with 
your current job?’ and their answers were given on a scale of 1-5, where ‘5’ represents the 
highest level of satisfaction and ‘1’ represents the lowest level of satisfaction. After 
dropping all missing observations, we are left with a total sample of 21,060 individuals, 
out of which 5,396 individuals are waged workers employed in the private sector. Table 
6.5 illustrates the overall job satisfaction variable’s sample distribution, which shows that 
the majority of our sample has reported being satisfied with their jobs.  
 
Table 6.5: Overall Job Satisfaction – Sample Distribution: 
Ranking Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
1 – Fully Dissatisfied 753 13.95 13.95 
2 – Rather Dissatisfied 658 12.19 26.15 
3 – Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 939 17.40   43.55 
4 – Rather Satisfied 1,714 31.76 75.32 
5 – Fully Satisfied 1,332 24.68 100.00 
Total 5,369 100.00  
 
As for the rest of the satisfaction variables, individuals were asked similar questions to the 
one above concerning the overall job satisfaction, but with regards to the different job 
aspects such as job security, type of work, etc. Respondents also rated their satisfaction 
levels according to a similar scale to the one illustrated in table 6.5, however, an additional 
rank ‘6’ was added to the scale to represent a ‘not applicable’ option. Inspecting each 
variable’s sample size after dropping this sixth rank, we find that that the largest proportion 
of the sample that reported ‘not applicable’ is with regards to satisfaction with job security 
followed by satisfaction with matching between qualifications and job (see table 6.6). 
Since this additional rank does not inform much about satisfaction, we resolved to treat 
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them as missing observations and drop them from our sample. Consequently, in relation to 
the examination of the components of job satisfaction, we restrict our total sample to 
20,411 observations of which 4,747 observations are waged workers in the private sector.  
 
Table 6.6: Sample Size - by Components of Job Satisfaction Variables: 
Variables Sample Size 
Satisfaction with Job Security 4,957 
Satisfaction with Type of Work 5,392 
Satisfaction with Working Hours 5,321 
Satisfaction with Working Schedule 5,239 
Satisfaction with Working Conditions 5,366 
Satisfaction with Commute to Job 5,336 
Satisfaction with Matching (Qualifications & 
Job) 
5,131 
 
Similar to the sample distributions of scale-ranked variables and the overall job satisfaction 
variable, whose observations are usually clustered around a specific rank, the majority of 
the sample reported the highest levels of satisfaction for all components of job satisfaction 
(see figure 6.2). Still, the proportion of individuals who reported ‘fully satisfied’ with job 
security is the smallest compared to the other variables. For instance, 19.5% of the sample 
reported ‘fully satisfied’ with job security as opposed to 32.5% with regards to matching.  
 
Figure 6.2: Components of Job Satisfaction Variables - Sample Distribution: 
 
 
6.6.2.2 Explanatory variables: 
We turn our discussion here to the explanatory variables (individual, human capital, and 
job characteristics) used in our estimations. Most of these variables have been discussed in 
the previous two chapters in the context of their relation to wages (see sections 4.6.2.2; 
5.6.2.2), thus we refocus the below discussion of these on their relation to job satisfaction.  
0
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 Table 6.7 illustrates the explanatory variables and their descriptive statistics. We restrict 
the sample reviewed below to 5,396 observations, which is the sample utilised in the 
estimation of the overall job satisfaction equation. Rather than presenting general statistics, 
which may be similar to the previous two chapters, we focus on the cross-tabulation of the 
overall job satisfaction measure with the various explanatory variables, which 
demonstrates the average level of satisfaction reported by each category and the percentage 
of sample that reported the highest level of overall job satisfaction. 
 
To begin with, average job satisfaction levels increase with higher hourly wages, though as 
wages increase beyond 41 EGP, the situation reverses and job satisfaction begins to 
decrease (see table 6.7). In terms of individual characteristics, statistics show that most go 
in line with major findings in the literature. Average satisfaction of women and married 
individuals are higher than those reported by men and individuals of other marital statuses, 
respectively, and a large proportion of women and married individuals reported the highest 
overall job satisfaction level (see table 6.7). In the context of this chapter’s analysis, 
regions are particularly significant, as urban areas are perceived to offer better job 
opportunities. Consequently, we can expect job satisfaction to be higher in an area like 
Greater Cairo than other regions, which our statistics verify (see table 6.7). Also, we find 
that average satisfaction levels increase with age (see table 6.7), which implies that older 
individuals are more satisfied with their jobs. We also control for respondents’ parents’ 
education. Having educated parents may imply that individuals were better prepared for 
the labour market and for better prospective opportunities and labour market outcomes in 
the future, and thus may lead to higher satisfaction levels. Indeed, we find that average 
satisfaction levels are higher among individuals with educated parents (see table 6.7).  
 
In terms of human capital characteristics, we find puzzling statistics, which require the 
regression results that controls for other variables. For example, we find that with some 
higher levels of education and training received, average job satisfaction levels are higher 
(see table 6.7), which goes against popular results of satisfaction levels declining with 
superior human capital (Clark & Oswald, 1996; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006). Note that 
training is one of the determinants that had not been examined as much in the literature, 
and Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) found that undertaking training improved job satisfaction 
levels, thus the outcome may differ across the human capital factors.  
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Table 6.7: Explanatory Variables (Individual, Human Capital, and Job 
Characteristics) – Descriptions and Statistics: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Description Means51 % Fully 
Satisfied52 
LOG (WAGES/HR) Logarithm of hourly wages 
Hourly Wages < 2 Egyptian pounds (EGP) 
2 ≥ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 < 6 
6 ≥ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 < 17 
17 ≥ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 < 26 
26 ≥ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 < 41 
41 ≥ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 ≤ 100 
Hourly Wages >100 
 
 
3.307 
3.348 
3.597 
4.151 
3.972 
3.360 
 
 
23.04 
22.94 
29.09 
45.28 
47.22 
20.00 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE Age of respondents in years 
15 ≥ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 ≤ 22 
23 ≥ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 ≤ 32 
33 ≥ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 ≤ 50 
51 ≤ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 ≤ 60 
Age > 60 
 
3.236 
3.332 
3.538 
3.763 
3.983 
 
20.98 
23.02 
27.03 
34.07 
38.33 
Gender: 
MALE 
Reference 
A dummy variable for gender,  
1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: females 
 
3.387 
3.769 
 
23.94 
35.93 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
Reference 
 
 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
Reference 
An interaction variable for marital 
status*gender,  
1 if male and married, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: females of all marital statuses and 
males less than minimum age, single, 
contractually married, divorced, or widowed(er) 
1 if female and married, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: males of all marital statuses and 
females less than minimum age, single, 
contractually married, divorced, or widowed(er) 
 
 
3.495 
3.268 
 
 
3.806 
3.400 
 
 
26.09 
22.34 
 
 
32.09 
24.50 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
Reference 
A categorical variable for region of residence,  
1 if rural lower area, 0 otherwise 
1 if urban upper area, 0 otherwise 
1 if urban lower area, 0 otherwise 
1 if Alexandria or Suez canal, 0 otherwise 
1 if Greater Cairo, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: rural upper region 
 
3.343 
3.348 
3.522 
3.772 
3.781 
3.166 
 
20.76 
25.00 
27.57 
35.70 
40.58 
16.23 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
Reference 
MOTHER EDUC 
Reference 
A dummy variable for parents education,  
1 if father has some degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: uneducated fathers  
1 if mother has some degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: uneducated mothers  
 
3.477 
3.388 
3.569 
3.385 
 
30.75 
22.62 
34.18 
23.15 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL  
POST-SEC 
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
Reference 
A categorical variable for educational 
attainment level of respondent,  
1 if literate with no diploma, 0 otherwise 
1 if elementary degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if middle school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if general high school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if vocational high school degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if post-secondary degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if university degree, 0 otherwise 
1 if post-graduate degree, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: illiterates  
 
 
3.482 
3.435 
3.475 
3.053 
3.253 
3.529 
3.622 
3.727 
3.522 
 
 
20.41 
22.77 
26.75 
16.00 
20.86 
26.80 
37.85 
31.82 
24.95 
                                                        
51 Cross tabulation of mean value of overall job satisfaction by explanatory variable. 
52 Percentage of respondents in each category who reported the highest level of overall job 
satisfaction ‘fully satisfied’. 
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Table 6.7 (Continued):  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TRAINING 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether respondent 
received training other than formal education,  
1 if received training, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no training received 
 
 
3.626 
3.402 
 
 
34.48 
24.30 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WK) Logarithm of weekly hours worked 
Weekly Hours < 20 
20 ≥ 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 < 40 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 = 40 
40 > 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 ≤ 80 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 > 80 
 
2.956 
3.170 
3.389 
3.522 
3.324 
 
13.31 
17.41 
26.28 
27.66 
22.40 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
Reference 
A categorical variable for stability of job,  
1 if temporary worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if seasonal worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if casual worker, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: permanent workers  
 
3.235 
3.234 
3.036 
3.826 
 
17.78 
25.53 
14.06 
36.92 
UNION  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for union membership,  
1 if member in union, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-union members 
 
4.013 
3.354 
 
45.32 
22.77 
SUPERVISOR 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for supervisory roles,  
1 if respondent is a supervisor, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-supervisors  
 
3.860 
3.369 
 
43.01 
22.99 
NIGHT  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for working night (after 7 
p.m.),  
1 if works nights, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no night work  
 
 
3.443 
3.382 
 
 
26.46 
23.17 
FORMAL 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for formality of job,  
1 if job is formal, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: informal workers 
 
4.011 
3.242 
 
44.66 
19.09 
SKILL 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether job requires 
any skill 
1 if job requires skill, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: no skill required 
 
 
3.580 
3.300 
 
 
29.83 
21.35 
LTRAVEL Logarithm of time (minutes) to reach job 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 ≤ 15 
15 > 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 ≤ 30 
30 > 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 ≤ 60 
60 > 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 ≤ 120 
Minutes > 120 
 
3.380 
3.394 
3.446 
3.511 
3.676 
 
24.46 
23.06 
25.95 
28.16 
32.37 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
Reference 
A categorical variable for size of firm,  
1 if firm with 50-99 workers, 0 otherwise 
1 if firm with 100+ workers, 0 otherwise 
1 if size of firm unknown, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: small-size firms (less than 50 workers)  
 
3.801 
3.858 
3.446 
3.326 
 
38.78 
38.81 
22.05 
21.10 
  
Finally, a number of job characteristics are controlled for in the estimations (see table 6.4). 
We report higher average job satisfaction levels for those working 40 hours a week, which 
is a normal full-time workload of a week, compared with those working less (see table 
6.7). This implies that those who work less and may be considered part-timers are not as 
satisfied with their jobs, which is not surprising, since part-time jobs are usually worse and 
individuals working part-time are usually doing so out of necessity rather than choice. 
Surprisingly, average job satisfaction levels are higher for those working between 40 to 80 
hours a week, while this average declines beyond 80 hours (see table 6.7). This may be 
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relevant to overtime pay, where individuals may be happier if they work overtime as they 
may earn more, but up to a certain point. Note that the statistics show that individuals 
would rather work overtime than working less than a normal full-time workload. Also, the 
time it takes to reach work reported mixed findings with higher means for those who spend 
more time travelling to work (see table 6.7). This again requires regression results, but a 
possible explanation could relate to the possibility that people may choose jobs that require 
more travelling if that job is considered a better labour market opportunity, such as jobs 
found in major cities. Similarly, individuals who work in larger firms have higher average 
job satisfaction levels (see table 6.7), which may oppose some of the literature’s findings, 
however, it may imply better job opportunities in these firms. Note that average job 
satisfaction is higher for the medium-sized firms’ workers than the large-sized ones (see 
table 6.7), which may imply that individuals are happier in bigger firms, but up till a 
certain point.  
 
The rest of the variables provide sensible statistics, where average satisfaction levels 
reported increase with more stable jobs, union membership, supervisory roles, skill 
requirement, and formality, while declines with night work (see table 6.7).  
 
6.6.2.3 Instrumental Variables:  
We use four variables to instrument wages, including the private sector’s average weekly 
wages stratified by gender and industry, as well as occupations, tenure, and tenure squared 
(see table 6.4). These variables are likely to affect wages earned, but not job satisfaction, 
and thus adhere to the exclusion restrictions rule. Specifically, average weekly wages are 
likely to be the guidelines around which wages are set, however, it is unlikely that 
individuals compare their wages to these aggregate measures, but rather actual available 
labour market opportunities or those of similar workers that they know of. Also, we have 
seen that some occupations may affect wages in the previous chapters. Still, occupations 
are not normally expected to affect job satisfaction, since individuals take up jobs that are 
available and match their education, training, and preferences. Similarly, wages are 
normally implicated by how long an individual has been in a certain job, where workers 
would be getting pay raises the longer they are on the job, and thus wages may be affected 
by tenure. Conversely, how long an individual has spent on the job is not likely to affect 
whether these individuals are happier with their jobs.  
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Table 6.8 provides the descriptive statistics for these variables. We report an average 
weekly wage of 390.73 EGP for our sample and an average tenure of roughly 10 years. 
Additionally, a significantly large proportion of our sample comprises the craft/related 
trades workers, similar to agricultural/forestry/fishery, plant/machine operators, and 
service sales, while the smallest are the managers.  
 
Table 6.8: Wage Identifiers - Descriptions and Statistics: 
Variables Description Statistics53 
WAGE REF Private average weekly wages stratified by gender and 
industry 
390.728 
(139.404) 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
Reference 
A categorical variable for occupation of respondents, 
1 if professional, 0 otherwise 
1 if technicians/associate professionals, 0 otherwise 
1 if clerical support worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if service/sales worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if agricultural/forestry/fishery worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if craft and related trades worker, 0 otherwise 
1 if plant/machine operator, 0 otherwise 
1 if elementary occupation, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: managers  
 
351 
208 
94 
813 
943 
1,787 
822 
318 
60 
TENURE The length of employment at current job in years 10.312 (9.215) 
 
Table 6.9 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the selection equation identifiers, which 
were discussed in detail in chapter V (see section 5.6.2.3), thus we do not repeat their 
elaborate discussion here. These variables include whether the respondent is head of 
household, number of children in household, number of males in the labour age (15-65 
years) in household, and unemployment rates stratified by educational attainment level.  
 
 
Table 6.9: Selection-Specific Characteristics - Descriptions and Statistics: 
Variables Description Statistics54 
UNEMP (EDUC) Unemployment rate stratified by educational level  22.55 (19.21) 
HEAD  
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for head of household,  
1 if respondent is head of household, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: not head of household  
 
4,931 
16,129 
Number of Children: 
 
MALE*CHILD 
 
FEMALE*CHILD 
An interaction variable for gender*number of children in 
household, 
Number of children (below 15 years old) in household for 
males 
Number of children (below 15 years old) in household for 
females 
 
 
0.494 (1.041) 
 
0.890 (1.326) 
MALE (15-65) in HH The number of males in the labour age (15-65 years old) in 
the individual’s household 
1.089 (0.954) 
 
                                                        
53 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for continuous variables, while 
frequency of observations provided for categorical and dummy variables. 
54 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for continuous variables, while 
frequency of observations provided for categorical and dummy variable.  
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6.7 Results and Analysis  
Our models address two main job satisfaction variables, the overall job satisfaction 
variable and the components of job satisfaction derived variable. We model these variables 
utilising a variety of methods (see section 6.5). Note that as previously explained, the 
overall job satisfaction is a discrete ordered variable, while the components of job 
satisfaction derived variable is a continuous variable, and hence requires non-linear and 
linear methods, respectively, for their estimations. The sample utilised in the analysis of 
each variable slightly differs in size due to differences with respect to the missing 
observations. Our overall job satisfaction models utilise a complete sample of 21,060 
observations and a subset of employed private sector workers of 5,396 observations, while 
our components of job satisfaction models utilise a complete sample of 20,413 
observations and a subset of 4,747 observations. Also, the sample sizes decline once the 
models are limited to the male labour sample only. We divide our discussion into three 
main sections. Section 6.7.1 discusses the results of the selection equations estimated to 
address sample selection, while section 6.7.2 focuses on the results of the wage equations 
estimated to deal with the endogeneity of wages in job satisfaction. Finally, section 6.7.3, 
which represents the core of our analysis, presents and discusses the results of the 
satisfaction equations.  
 
6.7.1 Probability of Labour Force Participation 
Unsurprisingly, the results reported by the selection equations of the models addressing 
overall job satisfaction are almost identical to those of models addressing components of 
job satisfaction, since the samples utilised in the estimation of each variable are very 
similar. Thus, we focus our discussion on the selection equation’s results of the models 
utilised in the estimation of overall job satisfaction, while we present results for the 
selection equations of the components of job satisfaction models in appendix 6 (see table 
6.20). Also, since the results for the selection equation are similar to those in chapter V 
(see table 5.8), we only present and discuss the most important results in this chapter (see 
table 6.10).  
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Table 6.10: Selection Equation55 (Overall Job Satisfaction Models) - Selected 
Results56 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Pr (PARTICIPATION) 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables
57
 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Selection-Specific Characteristics 
UNEMP (EDUC) -0.014** (0.006) -0.014** (0.006) -0.017 (0.013) -0.017 (0.016) 
HEAD  
Number of Children: 
0.128** (0.060) 0.128** (0.058) 0.057 (0.119) 0.045 (0.112) 
MALE*CHILD 
FEMALE*CHILD 
 
0.007 (0.016) 
-0.102*** (0.015) 
0.007 (0.015) 
-0.104*** (0.015) 
-0.026 (0.017) 
………. 
-0.026 (0.016) 
………. 
MALE (15-65) in HH -0.035** (0.016) -0.036** (0.016) -0.068*** (0.026) -0.070*** 
(0.025) 
 
Constant 
 
-5.257*** (0.152) -5.261*** (0.140) -5.152*** (0.212) -5.170*** 
(0.202) 
N 21,060 21,060 8,291 8,291 
Pseudo R2 0.5492 ………. 0.5051 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to chapter V’s findings (see section 5.7.1), the 2SLS and MLE models’ selection 
equation’s results are quite similar, since the selection equations’ methods of estimation 
are essentially the same across both models. In summary, almost all the selection 
identifiers are highly significant for the complete labour sample, as opposed to only one 
significant identifier for the male labour sample. More specifically, we find that 
individuals facing higher educational unemployment rates, women with more children in 
the household, and individuals with more males in the labour age (15-65 years old) in the 
household have a lower probability of selecting into the labour force, while heads of 
households have a higher probability of participation (see table 6.10, columns 1 and 2). On 
the other hand, the only significant factor for the male labour sample’s participation is the 
number of males in the labour age in the household, and men who have more males in the 
labour age in their households have a lower probability of participation (see table 6.10, 
columns 3 and 4). Again, this is not surprising and picks up the extent to which the ‘male 
breadwinner’ norm prevails in Egypt. 
                                                        
55 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
56 For complete results of the overall job satisfaction models’ selection equations, see 
appendix 6, table 6.19. 
57 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parent’s are educated, and respondents’ 
educational attainment dummies (9). 
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6.7.2 Wage Equation Results 
We start our discussion with the wage equations estimated in the models that address 
overall job satisfaction (see section 6.7.2.1), which is followed by highlighting any 
differences between these results and those of the wage equations estimated in the models 
that address components of job satisfaction (see section 6.7.2.2). Note that we focus our 
discussion only on the wage identifiers as the rest of the variables in relation to wages have 
already been discussed in the previous two chapters.  
 
  6.7.2.1 Wage Equations - Overall Job Satisfaction Models: 
According to the 2SLS and MLE models for the complete and male labour samples, most 
of the identifying variables for wages are highly significant in the estimations of wages 
(see table 6.11). 
 
Our identifying variables for wages are the private sector’s average weekly wages in the 
gender/industry category that the individual belongs to, length of tenure of employment, 
and also occupation type (see table 6.11). We find that average weekly wages are highly 
significant in influencing wages for both samples and across both models. We also find 
that wages significantly increase as tenure increases, but at a decreasing rate. Similarly, we 
find that there is a statistically significant wage differential in favour of managers relative 
to other occupations for both samples. We prefer the MLE method of estimation to 2SLS, 
as it deals with all the methodological issues we are concerned with, acknowledges the 
discrete ordered nature of the overall job satisfaction variable, and estimates the model as a 
simultaneous system, which 2SLS does not once selection correction is included in the 
analysis.  
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Table 6.11: Wage Equation58 (Overall Job Satisfaction Models) - Selected Results59 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables
60
 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Wage Identifiers  
WAGE REF 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 
TENURE 0.007** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.0001* (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
-0.053 (0.085) 
-0.152* (0.089) 
-0.212** (0.100) 
-0.148* (0.085) 
-0.102 (0.088) 
-0.010 (0.085) 
-0.116 (0.085) 
-0.235*** (0.089) 
 
0.020 (0.084) 
-0.128 (0.088) 
-0.182* (0.099) 
-0.189** (0.085) 
-0.158* (0.090) 
-0.046 (0.088) 
-0.161* (0.086) 
-0.292** (0.090) 
 
0.006 (0.087) 
-0.175* (0.092) 
-0.286*** (0.104) 
-0.199** (0.085) 
-0.172* (0.089) 
-0.065 (0.086) 
-0.163* (0.086) 
-0.286*** (0.090) 
 
0.083 (0.082) 
-0.146* (0.087) 
-0.255** (0.098) 
-0.244*** (0.081) 
-0.237*** (0.085) 
-0.125 (0.083) 
-0.210** (0.082) 
-0.353*** (0.085) 
IMR -0.082 (0.054) ………. -0.167*** (0.062) ………. 
 
Constant 
 
2.029*** (0.244) 0.700*** (0.201) 2.641*** (0.242) 1.161*** (0.179) 
N 5,396 5,396 5,062 5,062 
R2 0.2366 ………. 0.2175 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition to the above, we also find that the F-test of the joint significance of the 
instruments is high, 8.842 for the complete labour sample and 9.362 for the male labour 
sample (see table 6.12), but does not exceed the critical value of 10 for the instruments to 
be acceptable. Once again, therefore, we prefer the MLE model.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
58 Bootstrapped 2SLS models do not report the wage equation results, thus results of this 
model are acquired from a 2SLS model without bootstrapping. This seems reasonable 
since the outcome equation’s (the satisfaction equation) coefficients are the same, but only 
the standard errors are different to a limited extent.  
59 For complete results of the overall job satisfaction models’ wage equations, see 
appendix 6, table 6.25. 
60 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parent’s are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), training received, job stability dummies (4), union membership, 
supervisory, roles, working nights, formality of job, and firm size dummies (4). Additional 
control variables only in the 2SLS model include: logarithm of weekly hours worked, skill 
requirement, and logarithm of time to reach job. 
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Table 6.12: Tests of Instruments61 (Overall Job Satisfaction Models) – 2SLS 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
Statistics Results 
 COMPLETE LABOUR 
SAMPLE 
MALE LABOUR 
SAMPLE 
R-Squared 0.2366 0.2175 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2301    0.2106 
Partial R-Squared 0.0179 0.0201 
Bootstrap F (11,5349) = 8.842 F (11, 5017) = 9.362 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
 
  6.7.2.2 Wage Equations – Components of Job Satisfaction Models: 
With respect to the wage equations estimated in the models that address satisfaction with 
individual aspects of job satisfaction, results reported (see table 6.13) are very similar to 
the wage equation results of the models addressing overall job satisfaction (see table 6.11), 
except for some slight differences. Specifically, we find differences in the significance of 
tenure for wages and some differences in the coefficients of individuals’ occupations. Once 
again, the F-test of joint significance of the wage instruments is high, but not above the 
critical value. Therefore, we prefer the MLE in this case too.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
61 Test conducted post-2SLS model estimation. 
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Table 6.13: Wage Equation62 (Components of Job Satisfaction Models) - Selected 
Results63 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables
64
 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Wage Instruments  
WAGE REF 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) 
TENURE 0.010*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.003) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
 
-0.055 (0.086) 
-0.129 (0.091) 
-0.215** (0.101) 
-0.117 (0.087) 
-0.070 (0.090) 
0.005 (0.087) 
-0.089 (0.087) 
-0.219** (0.091) 
 
0.009 (0.075) 
-0.136* (0.079) 
-0.181** (0.090) 
-0.224*** (0.076) 
-0.220*** (0.081) 
-0.130 (0.080) 
-0.221*** (0.077) 
-0.358*** (0.079) 
 
0.010 (0.088) 
-0.144 (0.093) 
-0.295*** (0.105) 
-0.168* (0.088) 
-0.139 (0.092) 
-0.049 (0.088) 
-0.138 (0.088) 
-0.266*** (0.092) 
 
0.063 (0.076) 
-0.148* (0.080) 
-0.252*** (0.093) 
-0.263*** (0.075) 
-0.264*** (0.079) 
-0.170** (0.077) 
-0.247*** (0.076) 
-0.389*** (0.079) 
IMR -0.074 (0.057) ………. -0.163** (0.066) ………. 
 
Constant 
 
2.009*** (0.261) 0.787*** (0.219) 2.655*** (0.265) 1.269*** (0.194) 
N 4,747 4,747 4,443 4,443 
R2 0.2474 ………. 0.2277 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6.14: Tests of Instruments65 (Components of Job Satisfaction Models) – 2SLS 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
Statistics Results 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
R-Squared 0.2474 0.2277 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2400    0.2200 
Partial R-Squared 0.0175 0.0195 
Bootstrap F (11,4700) = 7.596 F (11, 4389) = 7.954 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
                                                        
62 Bootstrapped 2SLS models do not provide the wage equation results, thus results of this 
model are acquired from a 2SLS model without bootstrapping. This seems reasonable 
since the outcome equation’s (the satisfaction equation) coefficients are the same, but only 
the standard errors are different to a limited extent.  
63 For complete results of the components of job satisfaction models’ wage equations, see 
appendix 6, table 6.26. 
64 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parent’s are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), training received, job stability dummies (4), union membership, 
supervisory, roles, working nights, formality of job, and firm size dummies (4). Additional 
control variables for 2SLS model only include: logarithm of weekly hours worked, skill 
requirement, and logarithm of time to reach job. 
65 Test conducted post-2SLS model estimation. 
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6.7.3 Satisfaction Equations 
This final section begins with the discussion of the overall job satisfaction results (see 
section 6.7.3.1) followed by those of the components of job satisfaction (see section 
6.7.3.2).  
 
6.7.3.1 Overall Job Satisfaction:  
In estimating overall job satisfaction, we have utilised four distinct models, OLS, 
OPROBIT, 2SLS, and MLE, which is our preferred model. The various models utilise a 
complete labour sample of 5,396 observations and a male labour sample of 5,062 
observations (see table 6.15).  
 
Our first model, the OLS model assumes linearity and overlooks the endogeneity of wages 
and the sample selection biases that we are concerned with. Our second model, the 
OPROBIT model, which relaxes the linearity assumption, still overlooks both biases. Thus, 
these two models provide biased and inconsistent results and are only presented for 
comparison purposes. According to both models (see table 6.15, columns 1 and 2), wages 
significantly increase overall job satisfaction levels, whether for the complete labour 
sample or the male labour sample separately.  
 
The 2SLS and MLE models correct for both the sample selection and the endogeneity 
biases. According to these models’ results, we find that wages still significantly increase 
the levels of overall job satisfaction for both samples (see table 6.15, columns 3 and 4), 
however, the magnitude of these coefficients is much larger than those reported by the 
OLS and OPROBIT models. Thus, overlooking endogeneity and selection seems to impose 
a downward bias on the results obtained.  
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Table 6.15: Overall Job Satisfaction Equation66 – Wages Results67 (Complete/Male 
Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION 
Variables
68
 OLS OPROBIT 2SLS MLE 
COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 
 
0.183*** (0.029) 0.155*** (00251) 0.580** (0.262) 0.661*** (0.190) 
IMR 
 
………. 0.079 (0.121) ………. ………. 
N 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 
R2 0.1379 ………. 0.1086 ………. 
Pseudo R2 ………. 0.0517 ………. ………. 
MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 
 
0.184*** (0.031) 0.155*** (0.026) 0.880*** (0.264) 0.879*** (0.154) 
IMR 
 
………. 0.339** (0.144) ………. ………. 
N 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 
R2 0.1336 ………. 0.0467 ………. 
Pseudo R2 ………. 0.0496 ………. ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note that we cannot compare the coefficients reported by the 2SLS and MLE models, 
since each model is based on a different assumption (linearity vs. non-linearity), and thus 
the coefficients are not equivalent. Observing the average marginal effects of each 
outcome, which is obtained after non-linear methods of estimation like MLE, is likely to 
provide more intuitive understanding into the subject. They are also more comparable to 
the coefficients reported by 2SLS as they show the effect of the percentage change in the 
explanatory variables that leads to individuals reporting a particular outcome. According to 
the MLE model, an increase in wages of 18.4% and 24.1% for the complete labour and the 
male labour samples, respectively (see table 6.16; columns 4 and 5), leads to the 
respondents reporting the highest level of satisfaction ‘fully satisfied’. These average 
marginal effects are much lower than the 2SLS model coefficient of wages (see table 6.15; 
column 3).  
 
 
                                                        
66 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors.  
67 For complete results of the overall job satisfaction equations, see appendix 6, table 6.21. 
68 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parent’s are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), training received, logarithm of weekly hours worked, job stability 
dummies (4), union membership, supervisory roles, working nights, formality of job, skill 
requirement, logarithm of time to reach job, and firm size dummies (4). 
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Table 6.16: Average Marginal Effects69 - Overall Job Satisfaction MLE70 Models 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables
71
 Outcome 
(1) 
Outcome 
(2) 
Outcome 
(3) 
Outcome 
(4) 
Outcome 
(5) 
COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 
 
 
-0.148*** 
(0.049) 
-0.052*** 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
0.184*** 
(0.053) 
N 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 
MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 
 
 
-0.213*** 
(0.045) 
-0.057*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.059*** 
(0.005) 
0.241*** 
(0.044) 
N 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As a consequence to the aforementioned differences highlighted between the 2SLS and 
MLE models, we remain favourable of the MLE model, which relaxes the linearity 
assumption of the 2SLS model, thus prohibiting the loss of information, while still 
addresses the endogeneity and sample selection biases. According to our MLE results, we 
can safely deduce the importance of wages in determining overall job satisfaction levels in 
Egypt, which reports a larger coefficient than other significant control variables that have a 
positive impact on satisfaction levels, such as formality of the job and weekly hours 
worked. This indicates the value workers place on the wage rate they receive from their 
jobs. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect of wages on overall job satisfaction is even 
bigger with respect to the male labour sample compared with the complete labour sample, 
highlighting the importance that Egyptian men place on the wages they earn.  
 
Focusing on the MLE model, the rest of the results (see appendix 6, table 6.21, columns 4 
and 8) are in line with the findings of the literature. For the complete labour sample’s 
model, we find that overall job satisfaction levels is lower for early labour market enterers 
and then increases as they progress in age, and females report higher levels of satisfaction 
                                                        
69 For complete results of marginal effects of the MLE models, see appendix 6, table 6.22 
(complete labour sample) and table 6.23 (male labour sample). 
70 For complete set of results of marginal effects of the OPROBIT models, see appendix 6, 
table 6.22 (complete labour sample) and table 6.23 (male labour sample). 
71 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parent’s are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), training received, logarithm of weekly hours worked, job stability 
dummies (4), union membership, supervisory roles, working nights, formality of job, skill 
requirement, logarithm of time to reach job, and firm size dummies (4). 
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than men. We find that married men report higher levels of overall job satisfaction 
compared to women and also compared to unmarried or single men. Also, individuals 
residing in urban areas, including urban upper, urban lower, Alexandria/Suez canal, and 
Cairo regions, all report higher levels of overall job satisfaction. In terms of human capital 
factors, education and training are both negative and highly statistically significant in 
determining overall job satisfaction. In fact, we find that the level of satisfaction is lowest 
for the higher levels of education. Thus, our results confirm the literature’s findings 
concerning the effect of education on overall job satisfaction levels (Clark, 1996; Clark & 
Oswald, 1996).  
 
Finally, in terms of job characteristics, many variables turned out to be insignificant in 
determining overall job satisfaction, especially after accounting for endogeneity. 
Nevertheless, an interesting result is that of the logarithm of weekly hours worked. We 
find that those who worked longer hours per week report significantly higher levels of 
satisfaction. While it is puzzling to find such a result, it might due to the correlation 
between hours and other explanatory variables, such as wages, stability, and formality of 
the job. Another plausible explanation is due to reverse causality since more satisfied 
employees are likely to work longer hours.  
 
Other results are less surprising, where we find that less stable jobholders, such as 
temporary, seasonal, and casual workers, report lowers levels of overall job satisfaction, 
while formal jobholders and individuals whose jobs require a skill report higher levels of 
overall job satisfaction. Note that the coefficient of formality of job is relatively high, 
indicating the importance and value of formal employment in the Egyptian labour market, 
which has been addressed in the previous two chapters. 
 
On a final note, the results of the male labour sample’s model are generally very similar to 
those of the complete labour sample. Particularly, the factors that are significant for 
determining overall satisfaction of the complete labour sample are mostly also significant 
for the male labour sample’s overall job satisfaction. The only exception is age, which is 
insignificant in the male labour sample’s model. The main differences between the 
samples’ results are with respect to the magnitudes of the coefficients reported (see 
appendix 6, table 6.21, column 8). For instance, differentials based on education, marital 
status, weekly hours worked, formality of job, skill requirement are narrower in the male 
labour sample’s model. Similar to the previous chapters’ findings, we emphasise the 
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requirement of gender-based policies, since labour market outcomes are different for the 
male labour sample than the complete labour sample.  
 
6.7.3.2 Components of Job Satisfaction:  
We turn our attention to the components of job satisfaction variable, which captures 
satisfaction with certain aspects of an individual’s job. Individuals were asked about the 
various components of job satisfaction separately and we derived a combined variable for 
their responses using a principle components analysis (PCA) framework. In this section, 
we will discuss the impact of wages on satisfaction as captured by this variable.  
 
Wages are highly significant for components of job satisfaction, and the wage coefficients 
are larger once the endogeneity and sample selection biases are addressed. According to 
our MLE model, we report an increase in components of job satisfaction levels of the 
complete labour sample by roughly 66%, which is higher than the 2SLS model’s wage 
coefficient of 58% (see table 6.17, columns 2 and 3). The wage coefficients reported by the 
MLE and 2SLS models for the male labour sample are roughly equal at 58%.  
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Table 6.17: Components of Job Satisfaction Equation72 - Wages Results73 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DERIVED VARIABLE OF 
SATISFACTION WITH COMPONENTS OF JOB 
Variables
74
 OLS 2SLS75 MLE 
COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 
 
0.183*** (0.029) 0.580** (0.262) 0.661*** (0.190) 
IMR 
 
………. 0.132 (0.188) ………. 
N 5,396 5,396 5,396 
R2 0.1379 0.1086 ………. 
Pseudo R2 ………. ………. ………. 
MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 
 
0.184*** (0.031) 0.880*** (0.264) 0.879*** (0.154) 
IMR 
 
………. 0.490** (1.382) ………. 
N 5,062 5,062 5,062 
R2 0.1336 0.0467 ………. 
Pseudo R2 ………. ………. ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
With regards to the rest of the control variables, there are some differences between the 
components of job satisfaction models and those of the overall job satisfaction. In 
particular, two variables, namely the time it takes to reach job and supervisory roles, have 
reported significant results for the components of job satisfaction according to the MLE 
models (see appendix 6, table 6.24), which were insignificant for the MLE models 
addressing overall job satisfaction (see appendix 6, table 6.21). The logarithm of time to 
reach work has reported a negative coefficient, which is plausible to expect as the more 
time it takes to reach the job, the less likely workers would be satisfied (see appendix 6, 
table 6.24). Surprisingly, we find that supervisors are also less satisfied than non-
supervisors (see appendix 6, table 6.24), though this might relate to increased stress of the 
roles without commensurate remuneration.  
 
 
                                                        
72 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
73 For complete results of the overall job satisfaction equations, see appendix 6, table 6.21. 
74 Control variables include: age, age squared, male (only in the complete labour sample 
models), married males, married females (only in the complete labour sample models), 
region dummies (6), whether respondents’ parent’s are educated, respondents’ educational 
attainment dummies (9), training received, logarithm of weekly hours worked, job stability 
dummies (4), union membership, supervisory roles, working nights, formality of job, skill 
requirement, logarithm of time to reach job, and firm size dummies (4). 
75 Bootstrapped standard errors. 
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6.8 Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, in this chapter, we analyse the impact of higher wages in alleviating levels of 
job satisfaction. In doing this, we correct for both sample selection and endogeneity of 
wages. We also consider job satisfaction as a response to a single question relating to how 
satisfied individuals are with their overall job as well as a variable constructed from 
responses to a range of questions regarding their satisfaction with certain aspects of the 
job.  
 
We find that wages are highly significant in increasing job satisfaction for all samples, and 
across all models. We find that the magnitude of this effect is higher for men compared to 
the complete labour sample, highlighting the importance of pay for men. This is plausible 
as men are regarded as the main financial supporters of their households, and hence wages 
are likely to have a strong impact on their happiness with their jobs. Similarly, we find that 
even when individuals are asked about their satisfaction with specific aspects of their jobs, 
wage levels still play a significant role in determining these satisfaction levels. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the impact of wages on the components of job satisfaction 
is even higher than that reported for overall job satisfaction.  
 
Another valuable finding is the role of formal employment in leading to higher job 
satisfaction. Our findings indicate the value Egyptian labour places on formal employment, 
which is often associated with fixed contracts for a minimum period of a year, more 
difficulty of firing without just cause, compensation in case of being laid off, as well as 
social insurance and health insurance. Thus, workers seem to value the job security and 
benefits accompanied by working in the formal sector more than many of the other factors. 
Consequently, policy-makers and employers should seek ways to utilise this factor in 
improving satisfaction levels.  
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Table 6.18: Wages and Labour Force Participation - Descriptions and Statistics: 
Variables Description Statistics76 
  (1)77 (2)78 
LOG (WAGES/HR) Logarithm of hourly wages 1.413 (0.659) 1.414 (0.666) 
LF 
 
 
Reference 
A dummy variable for whether the individual is 
participating in the labour force or not,  
1 if participating, 0 otherwise 
Omitted: non-participating 
 
 
6,677 
14,383 
 
 
6,028 
14,383 
 
Table 6.19: Selection Equation Results79 - Overall Job Satisfaction Models 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT  VARIABLE: Pr (Participation) 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Selection-Specific Characteristics 
UNEMP (EDUC) -0.014** (0.006) -0.014** (0.006) -0.017 (0.013) -0.017 (0.016) 
HEAD  
Number of Children: 
0.128** (0.060) 0.128** (0.058) 0.057 (0.119) 0.045 (0.112) 
MALE*CHILD 
FEMALE*CHILD 
 
0.007 (0.016) 
-0.102*** (0.015) 
0.007 (0.015) 
-0.104*** (0.015) 
-0.026 (0.017) 
………. 
-0.026 (0.016) 
………. 
MALE (15-65) in HH -0.035** (0.016) -0.036** (0.016) -0.068*** (0.026) -0.070*** (0.025) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.277*** (0.009) 0.277*** (0.008) 0.401*** (0.013) 0.402*** (0.012) 
AGE SQUARED -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.005*** (0.0002) -0.006*** (0.0001) 
MALE 1.245*** (0.049) 1.246*** (0.048) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
1.217*** (0.078) 
-0.711*** (0.046) 
 
1.216*** (0.069) 
-0.711*** (0.044) 
 
0.671*** (0.117) 
………. 
 
0.680*** (0.107) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
0.348*** (0.037) 
0.164*** (0.044) 
0.370*** (0.050) 
0.212*** (0.051) 
0.231*** (0.047) 
 
0.348*** (0.037) 
0.163*** (0.046) 
0.368*** (0.048) 
0.210*** (0.054) 
0.232*** (0.049) 
 
0.025 (0.055) 
0.066 (0.063) 
0.170** (0.072) 
0.077 (0.080) 
0.229*** (0.077) 
 
0.022 (0.054) 
0.061 (0.066) 
0.164** (0.075) 
0.072 (0.079) 
0.231*** (0.072) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
-0.090*** (0.034) 
-0.248*** (0.042) 
 
-0.090*** (0.034) 
-0.249*** (0.039) 
 
-0.158*** (0.049) 
-0.340*** (0.053) 
 
-0.158*** (0.050) 
-0.343*** (0.056) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
0.153** (0.071) 
0.053 (0.061) 
-0.394*** (0.066) 
-0.141 (0.286) 
1.119*** (0.279) 
0.642*** (0.088) 
1.315*** (0.199) 
1.125*** (0.291) 
 
0.152* (0.082) 
0.054 (0.063) 
-0.390*** (0.066) 
-0.139 (0.283) 
1.121*** (0.277) 
0.643*** (0.083) 
1.317*** (0.197) 
1.126*** (0.269) 
 
-0.035 (0.129) 
-0.242** (0.113) 
-0.758*** (0.112) 
-0.700 (0.584) 
0.569 (0.582) 
-0.150 (0.163) 
0.344 (0.411) 
-0.057 (0.525) 
 
-0.042 (0.122) 
-0.242** (0.115) 
-0.751*** (0.116) 
-0.720 (0.683) 
0.550 (0.681) 
-0.153 (0.154) 
0.325 (0.478) 
-0.068 (0.560) 
 
Constant 
 
-5.257*** (0.152) -5.261*** (0.140) -5.152*** (0.212) -5.170*** (0.202) 
N 21,060 21,060 8,291 8,291 
Pseudo R2 0.5492 ………. 0.5051 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                        
76 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) provided for [LOG (WAGES/HR)], while 
frequency of observations provided for (LF). 
77 Statistics for the sample utilised in the estimation of overall job satisfaction.  
78 Statistics for the sample utilised in the estimation of components of job satisfaction. 
79 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 6.20: Selection Equation Results80 - Components of Job Satisfaction Models 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Pr (Participation 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Selection-Specific Characteristics 
UNEMP (EDUC) -0.015** (0.007) -0.015** (0.006) -0.018 (0.015) -0.018 (0.016) 
HEAD 
Number of Children: 
0.148** (0.061) 0.147** (0.058) 
 
0.081 (0.120) 0.064 (0.114) 
MALE*CHILD 
FEMALE*CHILD 
 
0.007 (0.016) 
-0.103*** (0.015) 
0.007 (0.016) 
-0.103*** (0.015) 
-0.027 (0.018) 
………. 
-0.027 (0.017) 
………. 
MALE (15-65) in HH -0.038** (0.017) -0.039** (0.017) -0.069** (0.027) -0.073*** (0.026) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.278*** (0.009) 0.278*** (0.008) 0.404*** (0.013) 0.405*** (0.012) 
AGE SQUARED -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.004*** (0.0001) -0.006*** (0.0002) -0.006*** (0.0001) 
MALE 1.193*** (0.047) 1.194*** (0.049) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
1.218*** (0.077) 
-0.710*** (0.044) 
 
1.218*** (0.070) 
-0.710*** (0.045) 
 
0.665*** (0.118) 
………. 
 
0.675*** (0.109) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
0.347*** (0.038) 
0.179*** (0.045) 
0.362*** (0.049) 
0.205*** (0.052) 
0.240*** (0.049) 
 
0.346*** (0.038) 
0.178*** (0.047) 
0.361*** (0.049) 
0.204*** (0.055) 
0.241*** (0.050) 
 
0.018 (0.058) 
0.080 (0.067) 
0.151** (0.071) 
0.087 (0.081) 
0.248*** (0.079) 
 
0.018 (0.056) 
0.075 (0.068) 
0.146* (0.077) 
0.083 (0.082) 
0.248*** (0.074) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
-0.090** (0.035) 
-0.225*** (0.042) 
 
-0.090*** (0.034) 
-0.227*** (0.040) 
 
-0.152*** (0.051) 
-0.317*** (0.056) 
 
-0.153*** (0.051) 
-0.323*** (0.058) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
0.212*** (0.075) 
0.074 (0.064) 
-0.338*** (0.067) 
-0.060 (0.295) 
1.186*** (0.288) 
0.704*** (0.086) 
1.379*** (0.204) 
1.169*** (0.298) 
 
0.212** (0.083) 
0.075 (0.065) 
-0.335*** (0.068) 
-0.057 (0.284) 
1.189*** (0.278) 
0.703*** (0.084) 
1.382*** (0.198) 
1.172*** (0.270) 
 
0.018 (0.133) 
-0.220* (0.122) 
-0.697*** (0.122) 
-0.598 (0.657) 
0.655 (0.656) 
-0.089 (0.168) 
0.444 (0.461) 
0.054 (0.565) 
 
0.020 (0.125) 
-0.216* (0.118) 
-0.687*** (0.119) 
-0.586 (0.693) 
0.667 (0.692) 
-0.089 (0.158) 
0.452 (0.485) 
0.056 (0.566) 
 
Constant 
 
-5.343*** (0.159) -5.344*** (0.144) -5.317*** (0.227) -5.326*** (0.208) 
N 20,413 20,413 7,674 7,674 
Pseudo R2 0.5404 ………. 0.5073 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                        
80 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 6.21: Overall Job Satisfaction Equation Results81 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables OLS OPROBIT 2SLS MLE OLS OPROBIT 2SLS MLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 0.183*** (0.029) 0.155*** (0.025) 0.580** (0.262) 0.661*** (0.190) 0.184*** (0.031) 0.155*** (0.026) 0.880*** (0.264) 0.879*** (0.154) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE -0.045*** (0.012) -0.039*** (0.010) -0.043** (0.021) -0.036** (0.017) -0.044*** (0.012) -0.039*** (0.010) -0.006 (0.026) -0.017 (0.019) 
AGE SQUARED 0.001*** (0.0002) 0.001*** (0.0001) 0.001* (0.0003) 0.0004* (0.0002) 0.001*** (0.0002) 0.001*** (0.0001) 0.00002 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0003) 
MALE -0.351*** (0.099) -0.311*** (0.086) -0.461*** (0.162) -0.439* (0.126) ………. ………. ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.198*** (0.048) 
0.141 (0.142) 
 
0.160*** (0.041) 
0.097 (0.124) 
 
0.184*** (0.067) 
0.027 (0.170) 
 
0.127** (0.057) 
-0.061 (0.147) 
 
0.200*** (0.049) 
………. 
 
0.164*** (0.042) 
………. 
 
0.186*** (0.061) 
………. 
 
0.107** (0.050) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.039 (0.049) 
0.152** (0.061) 
0.60 (0.066) 
0.194** (0.075) 
0.124* (0.068) 
 
-0.028 (0.041) 
0.139*** (0.052) 
0.065 (0.056) 
0.192*** (0.064) 
0.150** (0.058) 
 
0.018 (0.064) 
0.187*** (0.070) 
0.111 (0.074) 
0.217*** (0.076) 
0.111 (0.071) 
 
0.041 (0.049) 
0.177*** (0.053) 
0.124** (0.059) 
0.215*** (0.064) 
0.121** (0.060) 
 
-0.028 (0.050) 
0.155** (0.062) 
0.043 (0.068) 
0.192** (0.078) 
0.117 (0.071) 
 
-0.015 (0.042) 
0.144*** (0.053) 
0.050 (0.058) 
0.196*** (0.067) 
0.144** (0.061) 
 
0.061 (0.062) 
0.221*** (0.071) 
0.135* (0.075) 
0.234** (0.081) 
0.123 (0.075) 
 
0.073 (0.045) 
0.196*** (0.052) 
0.128** (0.058) 
0.220*** (0.066) 
0.119* (0.061) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
-0.054 (0.048) 
-0.007 (0.060) 
 
-0.030 (0.041) 
-0.009 (0.051) 
 
-0.068 (0.051) 
-0.039 (0.066) 
 
-0.048 (0.041) 
-0.049 (0.053) 
 
-0.053 (0.050) 
0.045 (0.063) 
 
-0.027 (0.042) 
0.032 (0.054) 
 
-0.090 (0.055) 
-0.035 (0.071) 
 
-0.058 (0.042) 
-0.041 (0.065) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
-0.167* (0.090) 
-0.182*** (0.062) 
-0.120 (0.076) 
-0.529*** (0.113) 
-0.361*** (0.052) 
-0.311*** (0.113) 
-0.464*** (0.075) 
-0.408 (0.278) 
 
-0.159** (0.076) 
-0.159*** (0.053) 
-0.087 (0.064) 
-0.437*** (0.096) 
-0.296*** (0.045) 
-0.264*** (0.096) 
-0.356*** (0.064) 
-0.364 (0.241) 
 
-0.159* (0.085) 
-0.185*** (0.066) 
-0.133* (0.080) 
-0.595*** (0.136) 
-0.364*** (0.056) 
-0.336*** (0.121) 
-0.514*** (0.097) 
-0.403* (0.235) 
 
-0.148* (0.076) 
-0.158*** (0.053) 
-0.097 (0.068) 
-0.511*** (0.102) 
-0.292*** (0.046) 
-0.298*** (0.098) 
-0.410*** (0.070) 
-0.382 (0.241) 
 
-0.164* (0.092) 
-0.186*** (0.064) 
-0.108 (0.077) 
-0.575*** (0.117) 
-0.365*** (0.054) 
-0.284** (0.119) 
-0.458*** (0.078) 
-0.588* (0.316) 
 
-0.155** (0.077) 
-0.161*** (0.054) 
-0.073 (0.066) 
-0.476*** (0.099) 
-0.298*** (0.045) 
-0.239** (0.101) 
-0.343*** (0.067) 
-0.528* (0.269) 
 
-0.166* (0.090) 
-0.217*** (0.070) 
-0.201** (0.090) 
-0.825*** (0.160) 
-0.400*** (0.058) 
-0.369*** (0.131) 
-0.568*** (0.098) 
-0.566** (0.267) 
 
-0.144* (0.077) 
-0.164*** (0.054) 
-0.123* (0.071) 
-0.625*** (0.110) 
-0.303*** (0.045) 
-0.314*** (0.100) 
-0.416*** (0.066) 
-0.483* (0.266) 
TRAINING -0.189** (0.094) -0.178** (0.081) -0.225** (0.098) -0.235*** (0.083) -0.225** (0.102) -0.205** (0.088) -0.315** (0.113) -0.304*** (0.087) 
 
  
                                                        
81 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
 1
5
3
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.21 (Continued): 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WEEK) 0.190*** (0.039) 0.170*** (0.033) 0.333*** (0.107) 0.162*** (0.032) 0.192*** (0.040) 0.171*** (0.034) 0.440*** (0.110) 0.153*** (0.032) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.400*** (0.056) 
-0.410** (0.188) 
-0.618*** (0.046) 
 
-0.365*** (0.047) 
-0.315** (0.160) 
-0.515*** (0.039) 
 
-0.337*** (0.073) 
-0.455** (0.205) 
-0.664*** (0.055) 
 
-0.265*** (0.065) 
-0.460*** (0.166) 
-0.605*** (0.045) 
 
-0.398*** (0.060) 
-0.426** (0.192) 
-0.612*** (0.047) 
 
-0.357*** (0.050) 
-0.330** (0.163) 
-0.511*** (0.040) 
 
-0.311*** (0.073) 
-0.480** (0.230) 
-0.693*** (0.057) 
 
-0.223*** (0.062) 
-0.498*** (0.162) 
-0.619*** (0.041) 
UNION  0.178** (0.071) 0.163*** (0.062) 0.109 (0.084) 0.061 (0.075) 0.156** (0.075) 0.143** (0.065) 0.037 (0.089) -0.013 (0.074) 
SUPERVISOR 0.084 (0.067) 0.109* (0.058) 0.002 (0.086) -0.0004 (0.073) 0.073 (0.071) 0.097 (0.061) -0.094 (0.096) -0.091 (0.074) 
NIGHT  -0.064* (0.037) -0.054* (0.032) -0.048 (0.038) -0.006 (0.037) -0.081** (0.038) -0.069** (0.032) -0.057 (0.040) 0.0003 (0.036) 
FORMAL 0.436*** (0.056) 0.404*** (0.049) 0.386*** (0.065) 0.316*** (0.063) 0.436*** (0.059) 0.403*** (0.051) 0.364*** (0.065) 0.279*** (0.062) 
SKILL 0.123*** (0.037) 0.105*** (0.032) 0.088** (0.044) 0.067** (0.034) 0.135*** (0.038) 0.114*** (0.033) 0.073 (0.046) 0.055* (0.032) 
LOG (TRAVEL) 0.019 (0.020) 0.013 (0.017) 0.008 (0.023) 0.010 (0.017) 0.020 (0.021) 0.015 (0.018) 0.004 (0.024) 0.009 (0.016) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.018 (0.097) 
-0.003 (0.065) 
0.002 (0.094) 
 
0.029 (0.085) 
0.004 (0.056) 
-0.019 (0.079) 
 
-0.015 (0.098) 
-0.024 (0.065) 
0.002 (0.094) 
 
-0.013 (0.085) 
-0.026 (0.056) 
-0.013 (0.079) 
 
0.035 (0.105) 
0.004 (0.068) 
0.028 (0.096) 
 
0.030 (0.091) 
0.007 (0.059) 
-0.006 (0.081) 
 
-0.025 (0.111) 
-0.030 (0.072) 
0.025 (0.097) 
 
-0.033 (0.090) 
-0.033 (0.058) 
-0.003 (0.080) 
IMR ………. ………. 0.079 (0.121) ………. ………. ………. 0.339** (0.144) ………. 
 
Cut1 
Cut2 
Cut3 
Cut4 
 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
-1.440 (0.236) 
-0.961 (0.236) 
-0.445 (0.236) 
0.488 (0.236) 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
-0.883* (0.454) 
-0.428 (0.446) 
0.063 (0.439) 
0.949** (0.428) 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
-1.115 (0.230) 
-0.633 (0.230) 
-0.114 (0.230) 
0.819 (0.230) 
………. 
………. 
………. 
………. 
0.201 (0.409) 
0.630 (0.397) 
1.092*** (0.387) 
1.924*** (0.6371) 
Constant 
 
3.739*** (0.275) ………. 2.811*** (0.717) ………. 3.362*** (0.270) ………. 0.927 (0.835) ………. 
N 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 
R2 0.1379 ………. 0.1086 ………. 0.1336 ………. 0.0467 ………. 
Pseudo R2 ………. 0.0517 ………. ………. ………. 0.0496 ………. ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.22: Average Marginal Effects (Overall Job Satisfaction Models) – OPROBIT/MLE (Complete Labour Sample): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OPROBIT MLE 
Variables Outcome 
(1) 
Outcome 
(2) 
Outcome 
(3) 
Outcome 
(4) 
Outcome 
(5) 
Outcome 
(1) 
Outcome 
(2) 
Outcome 
(3) 
Outcome 
(4) 
Outcome 
(5) 
LOG (WAGES/HR) -0.032*** 
(0.005) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.044*** 
(0.007) 
-0.148*** 
(0.049) 
-0.052*** 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
0.184*** 
(0.053) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
AGE SQUARED -0.0001***  
(0.00003) 
-0.00005*** 
(0.00001) 
-0.00003*** 
(8.03e-06) 
0.00004*** 
(9.88e-06) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
-0.00003* 
(0.00002) 
-0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00003** 
(0.00001) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
MALE 0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
-0.089*** 
(0.025) 
0.098*** 
(0.029) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
-0.122*** 
(0.036) 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
-0.033*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.026) 
 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
 
-0.028** 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.041) 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
 
URBAN UPPER 
 
URBAN LOWER 
 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN 
 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.038*** 
(0.012) 
-0.030*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.057*** 
(0.020) 
0.044** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
  -0.039*** 
(0.012) 
-0.028** 
(0.014) 
-0.047*** 
(0.014) 
-0.028** 
(0.013) 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.050*** 
(0.015) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
0.061*** 
(0.019) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
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Table 6.22 (Continued): 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
 
ELEMENTARY  
 
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
 
GENERAL HIGH  
 
VOCATIONAL 
 
POST-SEC 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.091*** 
(0.023) 
0.058*** 
(0.008) 
0.051** 
(0.020) 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
0.073 
(0.057) 
 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.034 
(0.021) 
 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.022 
(0.010) 
 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
-0.123*** 
(0.024) 
-0.087*** 
(0.013) 
-0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.103*** 
(0.018) 
-0.105* 
(0.062) 
 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
0.119*** 
(0.030) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.063*** 
(0.023) 
0.091*** 
(0.017) 
0.084 
(0.061) 
 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.038*** 
(0.013) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.027*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024 
(0.023) 
 
-0.044** 
(0.022) 
-0.047*** 
(0.016) 
-0.029 
(0.020) 
-0.137*** 
(0.023) 
-0.084*** 
(0.014) 
-0.085*** 
(0.027) 
-0.114*** 
(0.019) 
-0.107* 
(0.060) 
TRAINING 0.040** 
(0.019) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.048** 
(0.021) 
0.057** 
(0.022) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
-0.061*** 
(0.020) 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WEEK) -0.035*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.049*** 
(0.010) 
-0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
 
SEASONAL 
 
CASUAL 
 
 
 
0.067*** 
(0.010) 
0.056 
(0.034) 
0.104*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.038*** 
(0.005) 
0.033** 
(0.016) 
0.052*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.036*** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.039*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.113*** 
(0.014) 
-0.099** 
(0.046) 
-0.152*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.050*** 
(0.012) 
0.096** 
(0.043) 
0.135*** 
(0.015) 
 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.040*** 
(0.012) 
0.050*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.030*** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.043*** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.083*** 
(0.020) 
-0.137** 
(0.043) 
-0.172*** 
(0.013) 
UNION  -0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.049** 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
 
 1
5
6
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.22 (Continued): 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
SUPERVISOR -0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
0.0001 
(0.016) 
0.00003 
(0.006) 
0.00002 
(0.003) 
-0.00003 
(0.005) 
-0.0001 
(0.020) 
NIGHT  0.011* 
(0.007) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.0005 
(0.003) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.0004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
FORMAL -0.072*** 
(0.008) 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.126*** 
(0.016) 
-0.065*** 
(0.010) 
-0.027*** 
(0.008) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.094*** 
(0.020) 
SKILL -0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
LOG (TRAVEL) -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
 
LARGE 
 
UNKNOWN 
 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
  0.004 
(0.016) 
 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.0004 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.0002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.0003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
 
0.008 
(0.024) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
 
0.003 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.007 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
 
N 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.23: Average Marginal Effects (Overall Job Satisfaction Models) – OPROBIT/MLE (Male Labour Sample): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OPROBIT MLE 
Variables Outcome 
(1) 
Outcome 
(2) 
Outcome 
(3) 
Outcome 
(4) 
Outcome 
(5) 
Outcome 
(1) 
Outcome 
(2) 
Outcome 
(3) 
Outcome 
(4) 
Outcome 
(5) 
LOG (WAGES/HR) -0.032*** 
(0.006) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.044*** 
(0.007) 
-0.213*** 
(0.045) 
-0.057*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.059*** 
(0.005) 
0.241*** 
(0.044) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
AGE SQUARED -0.0001*** 
(0.00003) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00001) 
-0.00003*** 
(8.08e-06) 
0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.00004 
(0.0001) 
  -0.00001 
(0.00002) 
-5.08e-06 
(8.91e-06) 
0.00001 
(0.00002) 
0.00004 
(0.0001) 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
 
-0.034*** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
 
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
 
URBAN UPPER 
 
URBAN LOWER 
 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
 
GREATER CAIRO 
 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.039*** 
(0.013) 
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.016) 
0.057*** 
(0.020) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.047** 
(0.013) 
-0.032** 
(0.014) 
-0.053*** 
(0.015) 
-0.029** 
(0.015) 
 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.061*** 
(0.019) 
0.032* 
(0.017) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
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Table 6.23 (Continued): 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
 
ELEMENTARY  
 
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
 
GENERAL HIGH  
 
VOCATIONAL 
 
POST-SEC  
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
POST-GRAD 
 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.103*** 
(0.025) 
0.059*** 
(0.009) 
0.046** 
(0.021) 
0.070*** 
(0.014) 
0.117 
(0.073) 
 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.043*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.012) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.048 
(0.038) 
 
-0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
-0.131*** 
(0.024) 
-0.087*** 
(0.014) 
-0.071** 
(0.028) 
-0.098*** 
(0.019) 
-0.142** 
(0.060) 
 
0.031* 
(0.017) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
(0.016) 
0.161*** 
(0.034) 
0.070*** 
(0.010) 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
0.100*** 
(0.017) 
0.119 
(0.075) 
 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.030** 
(0.014) 
 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.049*** 
(0.014) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.027*** 
(0.006) 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
 
-0.042* 
(0.022) 
-0.048*** 
(0.016) 
-0.036* 
(0.021) 
-0.160*** 
(0.023) 
-0.086*** 
(0.013) 
-0.088*** 
(0.026) 
-0.114*** 
(0.017) 
-0.130** 
(0.061) 
TRAINING 0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020** 
(0.010) 
-0.054** 
(0.021) 
0.081*** 
(0.026) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.076*** 
(0.020) 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WEEK) -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.007) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
 
SEASONAL 
 
CASUAL 
 
0.067*** 
(0.011) 
0.061* 
(0.036) 
0.104*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
0.052*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.042*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.110*** 
(0.015) 
-0.102** 
(0.046) 
-0.149*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.115** 
(0.045) 
0.149*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.028* 
(0.016) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.069*** 
(0.019) 
-0.144*** 
(0.041) 
-0.172*** 
(0.012) 
UNION  -0.028** 
(0.012) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.042** 
(0.020) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.0003 
(0.020) 
SUPERVISOR -0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.024 
(0.020) 
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Table 6.23 (Continued): 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
NIGHT  0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.0001 
(0.009) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.00001 
(0.001) 
0.00002 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.010) 
FORMAL -0.073*** 
(0.008) 
-0.041*** 
(0.005) 
-0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.125*** 
(0.017) 
-0.063*** 
(0.012) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.081*** 
(0.019) 
SKILL -0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
LOG (TRAVEL) -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
 
LARGE 
 
UNKNOWN 
 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.0004 
(0.003) 
0.0003 
(0.005) 
 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.0005 
(0.006) 
 
0.008 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
 
0.008 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.005) 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.0001 
(0.005) 
 
-0.009 
(0.025) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.022) 
 
N 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 5,062 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
6
0
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.24: Components of Job Satisfaction Equation Results82 (Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: COMPONENTS OF JOB SATISFACTION (Derived Variable) 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
 OLS 2SLS MLE OLS 2SLS MLE 
LOG (WAGES/HR) 0.313*** (0.048) 0.791* (0.475) 2.309*** (0.627) 0.316*** (0.050) 1.419*** (0.455) 2.434*** (0.511) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE -0.075*** (0.019) -0.067** (0.033) -0.076** (0.038) -0.076*** (0.020) -0.020 (0.045) -0.051 (0.042) 
AGE SQUARED 0.001*** (0.0002) 0.001* (0.0005) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001*** (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.001) 0.0005 (0.001) 
MALE -0.617*** (0.156) -0.728*** (0.259) -1.240*** (0.325) ………. ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.369*** (0.078) 
0.616*** (0.229) 
 
0.369*** (0.112) 
0.450* (0.264) 
 
0.263** (0.128) 
0.023 (0.339) 
 
0.371*** (0.080) 
………. 
 
0.355*** (0.100) 
………. 
 
0.245** (0.110) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.001 (0.081) 
0.278*** (0.099) 
0.280** (0.109) 
0.440*** (0.122) 
0.458*** (0.110) 
 
0.082 (0.113) 
0.321*** (0.111) 
0.346*** (0.125) 
0.475*** (0.127) 
0.448*** (0.116) 
 
0.301** (0.131) 
0.455*** (0.128) 
0.535*** (0.149) 
0.591*** (0.150) 
0.396*** (0.133) 
 
0.006 (0.083) 
0.274*** (0.100) 
0.270** (0.113) 
0.453*** (0.128) 
0.470*** (0.115) 
 
0.168 (0.111) 
0.379*** (0.119) 
0.415*** (0.129) 
0.535*** (0.136) 
0.489*** (0.124) 
 
0.296** (0.120) 
0.472*** (0.128) 
0.520*** (0.146) 
0.616*** (0.157) 
0.467*** (0.137) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
-0.032 (0.077) 
0.080 (0.095) 
 
-0.048 (0.082) 
0.041 (0.100) 
 
-0.109 (0.094) 
-0.065 (0.121) 
 
-0.020 (0.081) 
0.115 (0.101) 
 
-0.068 (0.087) 
-0.003 (0.114) 
 
-0.104 (0.098) 
-0.057 (0.127) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
-0.241* (0.146) 
-0.222** (0.104) 
-0.247** (0.124) 
-0.622*** (0.179) 
-0.617*** (0.086) 
-0.682*** (0.184) 
-0.693*** (0.121) 
-0.174 (0.434) 
 
-0.223 (0.141) 
-0.225** (0.102) 
-0.262** (0.130) 
-0.702*** (0.196) 
-0.606*** (0.091) 
-0.701*** (0.199) 
-0.742*** (0.155) 
-0.169 (0.293) 
 
-0.216 (0.173) 
-0.229* (0.122) 
-0.260* (0.153) 
-0.929*** (0.237) 
-0.636*** (0.107) 
-0.856*** (0.228) 
-0.994*** (0.183) 
-0.381 (0.519) 
 
-0.263* (0.150) 
-0.224** (0.107) 
-0.234* (0.127) 
-0.686*** (0.186) 
-0.640*** (0.089) 
-0.625*** (0.194) 
-0.703*** (0.127) 
-0.386 (0.484) 
 
-0.249 (0.153) 
-0.271** (0.111) 
-0.357** (0.146) 
-1.026*** (0.233) 
-0.677*** (0.095) 
-0.756*** (0.225) 
-0.873*** (0.158) 
-0.330 (0.343) 
 
-0.259 (0.180) 
-0.253* (0.129) 
-0.311* (0.163) 
-1.107*** (0.255) 
-0.716*** (0.108) 
-0.919*** (0.242) 
-1.030*** (0.170) 
-0.399 (0.578) 
TRAINING -0.215 (0.146) -0.258* (0.145) -0.466** (0.190) -0.195 (0.159) -0.335** (0.166) -0.532** (0.207) 
 
 
                                                        
82 2SLS models: bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 6.24 (Continued): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WEEK) 0.191*** (0.065) 0.365* (0.189) 0.197*** (0.064) 0.213*** (0.066) 0.612*** (0.185) 0.219*** (0.066) 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.598*** (0.089) 
-0.675** (0.314) 
-0.988*** (0.076) 
 
-0.522*** (0.120) 
-0.813** (0.347) 
-1.048*** (0.102) 
 
-0.281* (0.145) 
-1.634*** (0.475) 
-1.455*** (0.172) 
 
-0.589*** (0.095) 
-0.670** (0.324) 
-0.963*** (0.078) 
 
-0.446*** (0.121) 
-0.950*** (0.356) 
-1.097*** (0.102) 
 
-0.305** (0.133) 
-1.617*** (0.447) 
-1.449*** (0.149) 
UNION  0.213* (0.111) 0.134 (0.136) -0.153 (0.176) 0.188 (0.119) -0.001 (0.147) -0.217 (0.173) 
SUPERVISOR 0.041 (0.107) -0.060 (0.142) -0.381** (0.185) -0.004 (0.114) -0.284* (0.159) -0.543*** (0.189) 
NIGHT  -0.201*** (0.060) -0.186*** (0.065) -0.038 (0.087) -0.214*** (0.062) -0.181*** (0.067) -0.051 (0.083) 
FORMAL 0.745*** (0.088) 0.681*** (0.106) 0.463*** (0.137) 0.750*** (0.093) 0.625*** (0.106) 0.495*** (0.127) 
SKILL 0.144** (0.060) 0.100 (0.074) 0.047 (0.063) 0.179*** (0.062) 0.078 (0.078) 0.069 (0.065) 
LOG (TRAVEL) -0.081** (0.033) -0.093** (0.037) -0.088*** (0.033) -0.073** (0.034) -0.095** (0.039) -0.084** (0.034) 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
-0.074 (0.153) 
0.027 (0.102) 
0.101 (0.153) 
 
-0.118 (0.158) 
-0.003 (0.106) 
0.090 (0.136) 
 
-0.252 (0.189) 
-0.100 (0.125) 
0.103 (0.181) 
 
0.035 (0.167) 
0.056 (0.108) 
0.139 (0.159) 
 
-0.071 (0.179) 
-0.001 (0.111) 
0.111 (0.147) 
 
-0.161 (0.204) 
-0.054 (0.131) 
0.134 (0.189) 
IMR ………. 0.132 (0.188) ………. ………. 0.490** (0.223) ………. 
 
Constant 
 
1.226*** (0.448) -0.039 (1.238) -0.534 (0.990) 0.481 (0.441) -3.333** (1.382) -2.455** (0.947) 
N 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,443 4,443 4,443 
R2 0.1720 0.1544 ………. 0.1618 0.0707 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.25: Wage Equation Results83 - Overall Job Satisfaction Models 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Wage Identifiers  
WAGE REF 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 
TENURE 0.007** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.0001* (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
-0.053 (0.085) 
-0.152* (0.089) 
-0.212** (0.100) 
-0.148* (0.085) 
-0.102 (0.088) 
-0.010 (0.085) 
-0.116 (0.085) 
-0.235*** (0.089) 
 
0.020 (0.084) 
-0.128 (0.088) 
-0.182* (0.099) 
-0.189** (0.085) 
-0.158* (0.090) 
-0.046 (0.088) 
-0.161* (0.086) 
-0.292** (0.090) 
 
0.006 (0.087) 
-0.175* (0.092) 
-0.286*** (0.104) 
-0.199** (0.085) 
-0.172* (0.089) 
-0.065 (0.086) 
-0.163* (0.086) 
-0.286*** (0.090) 
 
0.083 (0.082) 
-0.146* (0.087) 
-0.255** (0.098) 
-0.244*** (0.081) 
-0.237*** (0.085) 
-0.125 (0.083) 
-0.210** (0.082) 
-0.353*** (0.085) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.006 (0.010) 0.007 (0.008) -0.008 (0.012) 0.005 (0.009) 
AGE SQUARED 8.38e-06 (0.0001) -4.60e-06 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.00003 (0.0001) 
MALE 0.305*** (0.061) 0.329*** (0.057) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.074** (0.029) 
0.215*** (0.075) 
 
0.087*** (0.027) 
0.221*** (0.073) 
 
0.070*** (0.025) 
………. 
 
0.086*** (0.024) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.124*** (0.023) 
-0.080*** (0.029) 
-0.117*** (0.031) 
-0.042 (0.035) 
0.050 (0.032) 
 
-0.109*** (0.024) 
-0.082*** (0.029) 
-0.111*** (0.032) 
-0.050 (0.036) 
0.056* (0.032) 
 
-0.117*** (0.023) 
-0.089*** (0.028) 
-0.121*** (0.031) 
  -0.044 (0.036) 
0.012 (0.033) 
 
-0.106*** (0.023) 
-0.089*** (0.029) 
-0.108*** (0.032) 
-0.051 (0.037) 
0.023 (0.033) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.036 (0.022) 
0.075*** (0.028) 
 
0.035 (0.023) 
0.069** (0.029) 
 
0.034 (0.023) 
0.078*** (0.030) 
 
0.028 (0.024) 
0.063** (0.030) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
-0.022 (0.042) 
0.002 (0.029) 
0.0002 (0.037) 
0.130** (0.057) 
0.025 (0.026) 
0.087 (0.054) 
0.135*** (0.041) 
-0.027 (0.132) 
 
-0.009 (0.043) 
0.008 (0.030) 
-0.004 (0.038) 
0.144** (0.057) 
0.039 (0.026) 
0.106* (0.055) 
0.119*** (0.041) 
-0.0005 (0.136) 
 
-0.015 (0.042) 
0.008 (0.030) 
0.029 (0.040) 
0.174*** (0.064) 
0.038 (0.025) 
0.109** (0.055) 
0.096** (0.040) 
-0.172 (0.147) 
 
-0.006 (0.043) 
0.004 (0.031) 
0.002 (0.039) 
0.137** (0.060) 
0.043* (0.026) 
0.120** (0.057) 
0.059 (0.041) 
-0.174 (0.151) 
TRAINING 0.079* (0.044) 0.108** (0.045) 0.117** (0.046) 0.141*** (0.048) 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WEEK) -0.356*** (0.018) ………. -0.350*** (0.018) ………. 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.134*** (0.026) 
0.113 (0.087) 
0.083 (0.022) 
 
-0.133*** (0.027) 
0.314*** (0.089) 
0.194*** (0.023) 
 
-0.106*** (0.027) 
0.085 (0.088) 
0.088*** (0.022) 
 
-0.109*** (0.028) 
0.284*** (0.090) 
0.200*** (0.023) 
UNION  0.141*** (0.034) 0.146*** (0.035) 0.130*** (0.036) 0.134*** (0.037) 
SUPERVISOR 0.190*** (0.032) 0.181*** (0.033) 0.221*** (0.033) 0.214*** (0.034) 
NIGHT  -0.024 (0.018) -0.067*** (0.018) -0.021 (0.018) -0.064*** (0.018) 
FORMAL 0.132*** (0.026) 0.133*** (0.027) 0.109*** (0.027) 0.104*** (0.028) 
SKILL 0.029 (0.019) ………. 0.023 (0.019) ………. 
LOG (TRAVEL) 0.026*** (0.009) ………. 0.019** (0.010) ………. 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.106** (0.045) 
0.078** (0.030) 
0.008 (0.043) 
 
0.094** (0.046) 
0.079*** (0.031) 
-0.004 (0.045) 
 
0.103** (0.048) 
0.069** (0.032) 
0.006 (0.044) 
 
0.089* (0.049) 
0.069** (0.032) 
-0.006 (0.045) 
IMR -0.082 (0.054) ………. -0.167*** (0.062) ………. 
 
Constant 2.029*** (0.244) 0.700*** (0.201) 2.641*** (0.242) 1.161*** (0.179) 
N 5,396 5,396 5,062 5,062 
R2 0.2366 ………. 0.2175 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                        
83 2SLS models: results without bootstrapping standard errors. 
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Table 6.26: Wage Equation Results84 – Components of Job Satisfaction Models 
(Complete/Male Labour Samples): 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WAGES 
 COMPLETE LABOUR SAMPLE MALE LABOUR SAMPLE 
Variables 2SLS MLE 2SLS MLE 
Wage Identifiers  
WAGE REF 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) 
TENURE 0.010*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.003) 
TENURE SQUARED -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002*** (0.0001) 
Occupation: 
PROFESSIONAL 
TECHNICIAN 
CLERICAL 
SERVICE/SALES 
AGR/FOR/FISH 
CRAFT/TRADE 
MACHINE OP 
ELEMENTARY OC 
 
-0.055 (0.086) 
-0.129 (0.091) 
-0.215** (0.101) 
-0.117 (0.087) 
-0.070 (0.090) 
0.005 (0.087) 
-0.089 (0.087) 
-0.219** (0.091) 
 
0.009 (0.075) 
-0.136* (0.079) 
-0.181** (0.090) 
-0.224*** (0.076) 
-0.220*** (0.081) 
-0.130 (0.080) 
-0.221*** (0.077) 
-0.358*** (0.079) 
 
0.010 (0.088) 
-0.144 (0.093) 
-0.295*** (0.105) 
-0.168* (0.088) 
-0.139 (0.092) 
-0.049 (0.088) 
-0.138 (0.088) 
-0.266*** (0.092) 
 
0.063 (0.076) 
-0.148* (0.080) 
-0.252*** (0.093) 
-0.263*** (0.075) 
-0.264*** (0.079) 
-0.170** (0.077) 
-0.247*** (0.076) 
-0.389*** (0.079) 
Individual Characteristics 
AGE 0.005 (0.010) 0.006 (0.009) -0.010 (0.013) 0.002 (0.010) 
AGE SQUARED 0.00002 (0.0001) 0.00001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
MALE 0.313*** (0.063) 0.360*** (0.060) ………. ………. 
Marital Status*Gender: 
MARRIED*MALE 
MARRIED*FEMALE 
 
0.071** (0.031) 
0.224*** (0.079) 
 
0.085*** (0.030) 
0.235*** (0.078) 
 
0.062** (0.026) 
………. 
 
0.080*** (0.026) 
………. 
Region: 
RURAL LOWER 
URBAN UPPER 
URBAN LOWER 
ALEX/SUEZ CAN  
GREATER CAIRO 
 
-0.145*** (0.025) 
-0.078** (0.030) 
-0.117*** (0.034) 
-0.053 (0.038) 
0.044 (0.034) 
 
-0.132*** (0.026) 
-0.085*** (0.031) 
-0.120*** (0.035) 
-0.066* (0.038) 
0.038 (0.034) 
 
-0.139*** (0.025) 
-0.090*** (0.030) 
-0.123*** (0.034) 
-0.058 (0.038) 
0.003 (0.035) 
 
-0.129*** (0.025) 
-0.092*** (0.031) 
-0.117*** (0.035) 
-0.069* (0.039) 
0.005 (0.035) 
Parents’ Education: 
FATHER EDUC 
MOTHER EDUC 
 
0.036 (0.024) 
0.072** (0.029) 
 
0.033 (0.024) 
0.062** (0.030) 
 
0.032 (0.024) 
0.075** (0.031) 
 
0.027 (0.025) 
0.060* (0.032) 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Education: 
LIT/NO DIP 
ELEMENTARY  
MIDDLE SCHOOL 
GENERAL HIGH  
VOCATIONAL 
POST-SEC  
UNIVERSITY 
POST-GRAD 
 
 
-0.033 (0.045) 
-0.002 (0.032) 
-0.014 (0.040) 
0.104* (0.059) 
0.012 (0.029) 
0.085 (0.058) 
0.149*** (0.044) 
0.020 (0.136) 
 
-0.014 (0.046) 
-0.001 (0.033) 
-0.016 (0.040) 
0.114* (0.059) 
0.021 (0.029) 
0.087 (0.059) 
0.098** (0.044) 
-0.013 (0.140) 
 
-0.026 (0.045) 
0.007 (0.033) 
0.017 (0.043) 
0.147** (0.067) 
0.027 (0.027) 
0.113* (0.059) 
0.106** (0.043) 
-0.165 (0.148) 
 
-0.011 (0.046) 
-0.003 (0.034) 
-0.006 (0.042) 
0.115* (0.063) 
0.030 (0.028) 
0.117* (0.061) 
0.052 (0.043) 
-0.193 (0.152) 
TRAINING 0.076* (0.045) 0.106** (0.046) 0.115** (0.047) 0.142*** (0.049) 
Job Characteristics 
LOG (HRS/WEEK) -0.360*** (0.019) ………. -0.354*** (0.019) ………. 
Stability: 
TEMPORARY 
SEASONAL 
CASUAL 
 
 
-0.132*** (0.027) 
0.281*** (0.095) 
0.094*** (0.024) 
 
-0.138*** (0.028) 
0.479*** (0.098) 
0.218*** (0.025) 
 
-0.107*** (0.029) 
0.254*** (0.097) 
0.095*** (0.024) 
 
-0.114*** (0.030) 
0.447*** (0.099) 
0.216*** (0.025) 
UNION  0.140*** (0.035) 0.145*** (0.036) 0.128*** (0.037) 0.138*** (0.038) 
SUPERVISOR 0.198*** (0.034) 0.181*** (0.034) 0.235*** (0.035) 0.221*** (0.036) 
NIGHT  -0.020 (0.019) -0.064*** (0.019) -0.016 (0.019) -0.058*** (0.019) 
FORMAL 0.141*** (0.028) 0.140*** (0.028) 0.118*** (0.029) 0.115*** (0.029) 
SKILL 0.036* (0.020) ………. 0.030 (0.021) ………. 
LOG (TRAVEL) 0.025** (0.010) ………. 0.017* (0.010) ………. 
Firm Size: 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
UNKNOWN 
 
 
0.119** (0.047) 
0.088*** (0.031) 
0.032 (0.047) 
 
0.099** (0.048) 
0.079** (0.032) 
0.006 (0.048) 
 
0.119** (0.050) 
0.077** (0.033) 
0.029 (0.048) 
 
0.099* (0.051) 
0.064* (0.033) 
0.003 (0.050) 
IMR -0.074 (0.057) ………. -0.163** (0.066) ………. 
 
Constant 2.009*** (0.261) 0.787*** (0.219) 2.655*** (0.265) 1.269*** (0.194) 
N 4,747 4,747 4,443 4,443 
R2 0.2474 ………. 0.2277 ………. 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                        
84 2SLS models: results without bootstrapping standard errors. 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis has addressed two major outcomes of labour market activities in Egypt, wages 
and job satisfaction. According to Classical Microeconomic theory, labour productivity is 
likely to impact wages earned, while higher wages are also likely to enhance workers’ 
motivation and job satisfaction levels, leading to an increase in labour productivity levels, 
which in turn may feed back into wages earned. We used data from the 2012 round of the 
ELMPS, which provides a wide range of labour market information at the individual level 
in Egypt. While there are three rounds of the ELMPS, we were confined to the 2012 round 
because data relating to two of our main variables of interest, health and job satisfaction, 
were only available in that round.  
 
We began with a discussion of the Egyptian labour market in chapter II. This was followed 
by a review of statistical data in chapter III, covering the labour sample we utilise in our 
analyses in the chapters that followed. We found that men largely dominate the labour 
force, and it is therefore not surprising that our sample is also largely male. We focused 
our research explicitly on the private sector workers, because the wage determination 
processes are different in the private and public sectors, as we discussed in chapter II.  
 
Our main research questions focused on three major factors in relation to wage levels in 
the Egyptian labour market, which include the sector of employment, productivity, and job 
satisfaction. In chapter IV, we inspected the effect of labour characteristics on selection 
into the formal sector of employment. In addition, we analysed the factors influencing 
wages in the formal vs. the informal sectors, and we corrected for the sample selection bias 
arising from individuals whose wages were not observed in a specific sector due to their 
employment in the alternative sector. Our findings highlighted the factors that increase the 
probability of formal employment in Egypt, which include a history of formal employment 
in the family (fathers who were employed in the governmental or public sectors in the 
past), educated fathers, as well as higher educational degrees and receiving training. We 
also found that selection into formal sector employment is significant for wage 
determination in this sector, and that the factors influencing wages in the formal sector are 
different from the informal sector, such as age, region, educational levels, training, tenure, 
union member, and size of firm.  
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In chapter V, we turned to an analysis of the impact of productivity on wages. Since we 
cannot observe individual labour productivity levels, we used a measure of health to proxy 
for productivity, assuming that healthier individuals would perform better and exert more 
effort on the job. Since there is a possibility of reverse causality, with productivity 
influencing wages and vice versa, we corrected for the potential endogeneity bias by 
utilising methods that instrument health with a variety of variables that impact the health of 
individuals, but not their wages. Furthermore, we corrected for the sample selection bias 
that is likely to prevail due to the unaccounted proportion of the sample that may have 
chosen to opt out of the labour force completely due to severe bad health states. Correcting 
for both biases entailed the identification of a health equation and a selection equation to 
incorporate in our models. In this context, we found that productivity (as proxied by 
health) significantly increases private sector wages, indicating potential improvements of 
labour market outcomes through the improvement of the population’s health.  
 
Finally, in chapter VI, we inspected the effect of various labour characteristics on overall 
job satisfaction and satisfaction with certain job aspects, which include job security, type 
of work, working hours, working schedule, working conditions, commuting to work, and 
matching between qualifications and job. We focused our analysis on the impact of wages 
on job satisfaction. Again and similar to chapter V’s analysis, we expected an endogeneity 
bias and a sample selection bias. Thus, we used methods to correct for both biases and 
found that wages play a major role in enhancing job satisfaction levels in Egypt.  
 
There are a number of notes worth making here. First, our findings equally apply to the 
complete sample of the Egyptian labour market and the male labour sample separately, 
with some minor differences, which is sensible given that men comprise the majority of 
our complete labour sample. Second, while our research does not explicitly address the 
superiority of the formal sector in Egypt, we found an informal sector wage penalty as well 
as lower job satisfaction in the informal sector. Third, we identified the significant role of 
education in improving labour market outcomes, whether in terms of formal employment, 
labour force participation, or wages. Accordingly, policy-makers are urged to target 
channels that enhance human capital, such as educational and training institutions. Fourth, 
union membership proved to be highly significant for improving wages. Finally, we found 
significant differentials with respect to labour market outcomes in favour of urban regions, 
indicating a requirement for policy-makers to improve labour market outcomes in the rural 
areas.  
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7.2 Policy Implications 
According to our findings, formality improves labour market outcomes, whether wages or 
job satisfaction. Accordingly, policies that address and deal with the informal labour 
market should be of top priority. While it is unrealistic to claim that policies should target 
the complete formalisation of the informal labour market, since this sector is still beneficial 
for accommodating a significant proportion of the labour force and absorbing some of the 
effects of unemployment shocks, it is important for policymakers to consider how they can 
minimise the negative outcomes of informal sector employment. This might relate to 
minimum wage legislation or harnessing the power of unions in working for improved 
wages and working conditions in this sector. It might also be useful to reformulate the 
social security system (see chapter IV) to enhance its outcomes and make it more attractive 
for the labour and the employers. Two particular aspects of the social security system 
could aid in achieving this objective. First, policies that address unemployment benefits 
could be of great benefit for lowering the individuals’ cost of unemployment and should be 
put in place to ensure that the reservation wage is sufficiently high that unemployed 
workers do not take on whatever jobs are available. Second, pension reforms could also be 
targeted and policymakers should ensure that future returns and pensions are enough to 
lead a decent standard of living and improve the labour’s preference for jobs that are 
covered and provide them with pensions.  
 
In addition to the above, there could be incentives for employers as well as stricter 
punishment to complement the above policies and motivate employers to cut back their 
share in informal job offerings. For instance, the government could offer tax cuts for 
employers who increase their share of formal employment. Also, the government could 
increase its social security contributions whilst also improving its monitoring systems to 
ensure employers are abiding by the laws.  
 
Our results also highlight the importance of health in influencing labour market outcomes. 
Thus, it is clear that human capital (both in terms of education and health) is crucial 
determinants of labour market outcomes. Attempts to consider policies that might improve 
the health of labour, either through health insurance or subsidised healthcare, are clearly 
important in this context.  
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7.3 Areas for Future Research 
Our analyses in this thesis has analysed a number of labour market outcomes, however, 
much more could be done in this area. To begin with, our research was limited by the 
scope of data available to us. Explicit labour productivity data measures were unavailable, 
leading us to use a proxy (health) for productivity. One way of overcoming this difficulty 
is to collect primary data, however, it may not be optimal, as primary data collection is 
usually limited in coverage and hardly covers a sample that can be deemed representative 
of the national labour market. Accordingly, data accumulation institutions should consider 
the requirement of such data and develop methods of their collection in order to allow for 
more direct and explicit empirical research. Examples of such labour productivity data may 
include output/labour ratio at individuals’ firms, industry- or firm-level labour turnover, 
supervisors’ appraisal of individuals’ performance, or frequency of breaks and workday 
interruptions. In addition, we were unable to conduct analyses utilising explicitly the 
female sample. This is another factor that can be addressed more thoroughly if data 
accumulation efforts were expanded to account for a larger sample of the female labour.  
 
Similarly, while the ELMPS is a panel dataset, we were unable to make use of this aspect 
since two of our variables, health and job satisfaction, appeared only in the 2012 round. As 
more rounds of data for these variables become available, it will be possible to consider 
changes over time and across individuals. This would allow us to control for individual 
variation, which is extremely important in controlling for individual characteristics like 
ability. Thus, as the dataset expands and more rounds containing the required data are 
added, it would be worthwhile to expand on the analyses of the topics of this thesis.  
 
Additionally, we have highlighted certain aspects in the labour market, which may be 
deserving of further thorough analysis, such as regional differences in terms of labour 
market outcomes, which we control for but do not explicitly address. Further research 
could explicitly address the differences with respect to regional effects on wages and job 
satisfaction in order to better understand how the labour market is different across regions 
and perhaps even improve on policies that may differ according to regions. Finally, our 
study is limited to waged employed workers, leaving out a significant proportion of the 
labour, which could be considered in future analyses.  
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